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Within a distributed system, autonomous agents may find it necessary to cooperate in
order to achieve their objectives. Interaction protocols provide standard frameworks
within which to conduct common classes of interaction, but they are only useful when
the agents using them have a common interpretation of the constrai ts imposed by
those protocols. Inopensystems, where there are no system-wide objectives and com-
ponents are contributed from a variety of sources, this is difficult to ensure.
An agent within a sufficiently complex environment will find it necessary to draw
inferences from information sources of varying integrity and completeness. Given
flawed or incomplete information, it may be necessary for an agent to resort to non-
monotonic reasoning in order to be able to make concrete decisions within limited
windows of opportunity. This can be expected to create inconsistencies in the joint
beliefs of agents which can only be repaired by dialogue betwe n peers. To verify
and repair all possible sources of inconsistency is impractic l for any sizable body of
inference however — any belief revision must therefore be subject to prioritisation.
In this thesis, we introduce a mechanism by which agents can perform opportunis-
tic argumentation during dialogue in order to perform distributed belief revision. An
interaction portrayaluses the protocol for a given interaction to identify the logical
constraints which must be resolved during the interaction as it unfolds. It then com-
pares and reconciles the expectations of agents prior to theresolution of those con-
straints by generating and maintaining a system of arguments. The composition and
scope of arguments is restricted in order to minimise the information exchange whilst
still trying to ensure that all available admissible viewpoints are adequately represented
immediately prior to any decision. This serves both to make int raction more robust
(by allowing agents to make decisions based on the distributed wisdom of its peer
group without being explicitly directed by a protocol) and to reconcile beliefs in a
prioritised fashion (by focusing only on those beliefs which directly influence the out-
come of an interaction as determined by its protocol).
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Distributed artificial intelligence concerns itself with te deployment and coordination
of multi-agent systems. In particular, it is concerned withthe achievement of com-
plex collaborative behaviours with a minimum of scripting and oversight. Ideally, it
should be possible to assign some task to a system without dictating how that task
should be performed, such that the system will then spontaneously assemble itself into
a configuration capable of efficiently executing that task.
Such assembly requires that the agents constituting a system be able to collectively
and autonomously choreograph themselves in order to perform any number of arbitrary
tasks. This in turn requires shared frameworks for communication and coordination. It
also requires that agents be able to reason about their own private states and their exter-
nal surroundings so that they can play their roles effectively within such frameworks.
Given a sufficiently complex environment however, agents may need to reason with
incomplete knowledge and make assumptions based on unproven hypotheses where
no evidence exists to the contrary. This thesis concerns itself with the conduct of inter-
actions between autonomous yet truthful agents in knowledge-rich environments, and
with how the chosen beliefs of agents influence such interactions. It asks under what
circumstances it is possible to control and direct such influe ce in order to achieve
outcomes which best reflect the combined wisdom of all involved agents.
A basic assumption on the part of this thesis is that it is desirable for models of
interaction to avoid pedantry and over-reliance on ‘ritualbehaviours’ — behaviours
which are indecipherable to outsiders, particularly potential participants. In other
words, any given interaction protocol should be broadly applicable to a given class
of problem and any action demanded by such a protocol should clearly lead towards
one of a finite number of clear outcomes. Given our desire thatmodels should be both
1
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lightweight and generic, it then becomes evident that agents cannot be totally sub-
servient to any model, because so many unstated factors are left to the discretion of the
individual acting in its given role. Discretion does not entail isolation however. There
is often no reason why agents cannot freely solicit the opinins and expectations of
their peers during an interaction in order to better discharge their responsibilities. This
can be done in harmony with, rather than in spite of, the interaction protocols to which
they must adhere.
Another assumption made in this thesis is that agents in a multi-agent system do
not exist in a state of hermetic seclusion. Instead, they arecontinuously engaged with
their environment. However whilst an agent may have at its disposal a great volume
of information, that information is not always of the greatest integrity. It may in fact
contain several inconsistencies between and even within specific information sources,
usually introduced by mistaken assumptions. Agents therefore must have the ability to
evaluate any article of information according to their needs, and ultimately disseminate
and test their conclusions — this can easily be done during dialogue with their peers,
when such conclusions may shape the course of an interaction. Fr m this perspective,
interaction between agents can be seen as serving as an engine for distributed belief
maintenance.
With these ideas in mind, this thesis introduces a mechanismby which arbitrary
interactions based on shared interaction protocols can be augmented to allow the dis-
semination of useful information whilst providing an opportunity to resolve the in-
evitable conflicts which arise from otherwise honest agentshaving contradictory be-
liefs. By engaging in an opportunistic process of distributed argumentation, a vessel
into which agents can articulate certain expectations and beliefs provenant to the in-
teraction, called here aportrayal, can be created which frees the accompanying inter-
action protocol to concern itself solely with the choreography of the interaction itself,
rather than with the minutiae of how constraints on such choreography are best re-
solved. We use this mechanism to demonstrate the synchronisation of agent beliefs
within a restricted argument space — a state in which the distributed wisdom of agents
as it portends to the interaction at hand can be leveraged with minimal exchange of
information. It will be shown that such synchronisation allows both for more robust
interactions and for the unsolicited propagation of commontheories within an agent
population, which provides a stronger basis for further interactions between a given
group of agents.
Let us begin by describing the motivating problem.
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1.1 Motivation
This thesis was originally motivated by a desire to make interactions (specifically, co-
ordinated exchanges of data and services between autonomous pr cesses) more reli-
able; a study was made of interactions conducted using distributed dialogue protocols
written in theLightweight Coordination Calculus(or LCC) [Robertson, 2004]. Moti-
vated itself by a desire for a decentralised approach to theelectronic institutionsmodel
of agent interaction (E-Institutions) [Esteva et al., 2001], LCC protocols identify the
abstract roles played by agents in a given class of interaction, and define an indepen-
dent process model for each. Agents assume roles as necessary, voluntarily limiting
their behaviour to fit with the constraints of the given process model, and their actions
are then coordinated with those of their peers by means of messag exchange. Given
common knowledge of the protocol itself, any message receivd from a peer can then
be taken as a commitment to the effect that any prerequisite decisions which must be
made prior to sending such a message have been made, and any consequent actions de-
manded by its role model will be taken. Consequently, there is (for many interactions
at least) no need for any central oversight over interaction.
Nonetheless, it became clear that collaboration between agts is heavily influ-
enced by the assumptions each agent brings into an interaction. In LCC, progress
towards any particular outcome is determined by the evaluation of certain logical con-
straints, which individual peers1 are free to decide based on their own personal theo-
ries. Since how an agent interprets its environment influences the decisions it makes,
it follows that ontological, epistemological and historical oncerns will all affect the
outcome of any task it engages in. Simply put, an agent could behave in a manner
entirely unexpected by its peers by simple virtue of evaluating a given constraint in an
unexpected way. Of particular concern were cases in which anage t wouldappearto
behave consistently with expectations, but where there existed some hidden discrep-
ancy between its reasoning and that of its peers which would lea to violation of some
social contract at a later time (perhaps not even during the same interaction).
Example 1.1 A typical interaction would be one in which an agent engages with its
peers in order to bring about an action it could not perform byitself. Assume that
there exists an LCC protocol which allows an agent to acquireaccess to a privileged
resource by first acquiring the support of a trusted peer.2 Such a protocol would define
1Throughout this thesis, we use the term ‘peer’ to mean an autonom us agent, rather than a simple
distributed process.
2Indeed there does exist such a protocol, in Chapter 6.










Figure 1.1: A simple interaction in which an agent engages with its peers in
order to gain access to some resource.
three roles:
Applicant — An agent acting in roleapplicant requests the advocacy of an existing
patron of an inaccessible resource. If the advocate acceptsthe applicant’s re-
quest and the resource’s controller accepts the advocate’srecommendation, then
success is confirmed upon being able to access the resource. This role specifies
two constraints (one of which,accessible, is checked both at the start and end of
interaction):
accessible(Applicant, Resource) — The applicant must not initially be able to ac-
cess the desired resource, but should have access after receiving permission
from the controller.
patron(Advocate, Resource) — The applicant must be able to identify a suitable
patron of that resource to be its advocate.
Advocate — The agent designated theadvocate will present an applicant’s case to the
resource’s controller should it consider the applicant trustworthy. Thusadvocate
will only proceed if the following constraints are satisfied:
controller(Controller, Resource) — The advocate must be able to identify an agent
capable of deciding peers’ access to the resource.
trustworthy(Applicant, Resource) — The advocate must decide whether or not the
applicant should be trusted with access to the resource.
Controller — Thecontroller permits access to a resource only if an applicant is both
eligible and has been advocated by a peer it already trusts. Thus the following
constraints are imposed:
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trusts(Controller, Advocate) — The controller must already trust the advocate, and
thus its judgement.
eligible(Applicant, Resource) — The controller must consider whether or not the
applicant is even eligible for access.
Each agent may possess its own conception of what the ‘correct’ interpretation of a
given proposition might be. In this case, most propositionscan be interpreted rather
subjectively. For example, the evaluation of trust can be based on reputation, obser-
vations of past behaviour, the possession of credentials, or the perceived intent of the
subject; it may also be universal, or circumstantial. This protocol also relies on agents
being able to distinguish betweentrustinga peer and considering a peer to betrust-
worthy3. Eligibility may be based on qualities of the agent, the logistics of resource
provision, or both. It also cannot be ascertained from the protocol itself exactly what
constitutes a ‘patron’ of a resource.
In the above example, an interaction could go awry if the advocate declares the ap-
plicant trustworthy, but the applicant later abuses that trust. The problem of concern
was not merely one of trust however. A similar issue would arise if the controller de-
cided that the applicant was eligible based on false assumptions about the applicant.
This reveals a related problem — that the satisfaction of certain constraints in an LCC
protocol is often reliant on information presumably gathered prior to interaction. If
the given protocol does not provide an explicit mechanism bywhich an agent can so-
licit information from its peers, then many propositions will only be resolvable if the
agent already knows enough to make a decision based on whatever interpretation of
that proposition it applies, or possesses the initiative (and privilege) to retrieve the in-
formation in the midst of an active interaction. The only other option is to make an
unverified assumption, which could lead to an unjustified interaction outcome.
It is worth immediately noting that, to a certain extent, anyconstraint interpre-
tation problem can be resolved by the prior construction of mre rigorous protocols.
Ambiguous constraints can be decomposed into a set of simpler, more objective propo-
sitions. Likewise, for any decision that may require additional testimony from peers,
the protocol can explicitly provide a process by which an agent can query those peers,
and then collate the results. In doing this however, an interac ion protocol (whether
written in LCC or otherwise) is likely to become less generically applicable to differ-
ent variations upon the same basic task. Such protocols tendto become useful only
3Something which seems to regularly confuse otherwise intelligent people all the time.
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in the circumstances specifically envisaged by the protocoldesigner — they demand
that a given constraint is resolved in a certain way or they demand that information is
gathered by a particular routine. It was quickly decided that if LCC was to be useful
in arbitary systems (such as those which allow free contribution of peers and services,
the very kind of system for which LCC was designed), then its protocols needed to be
kept flexible and concise, and individual agents needed to beafforded the discretion to
make decisions in whatever manner they deemed most appropriate.
Thus it became of great interest to investigate the possibility of a mechanism which
would allow agents to generically explore constraints imposed on an interaction; a
mechanism which could operate alongside any interaction prtocol, preferably without
any need to modify existing protocols. Such a thing would be us f l in a number of
scenarios, all of which can naturally arise during archetypal interactions. For example:
Soliciting advice from peers — An agent may have to decide between a number of
actions based on its evaluation of a certain unknown quantity. The agent may be
able to make a more informed decision however, if it is first allowed to solicit
advice from any of its peers.
Example 1.2 Benjamin has to decide whether or not Alanna is trustworthy in a
given role. Not knowing much about Alanna, Benjamin would preferably want
more information about her and her past interactions with oter peers. Thus




3) Alanna and Dante have collaborated
without incident...
2) Alanna has worked with Dante...
1) Alanna is a researcher in field X...
Peer D
Alanna volunteers her credentials (in this case, that she isa researcher in a
field relevant to the given role, with the implication that this makes her suitable
for the role), whilst Charlotte, with Dante’s assistance, provides reference to an
analogous case in which Alanna justified the trust given to her.
This is an example of adisseminationdialogue, where missing data is solicited
or volunteered in order to apply some decision procedure.
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Verifying decisions — A particular agent may be tasked with making decisions for
its peer group. There may however be cases where the agent would make a
decision not admissible to its peers. It would be useful if peers were able to
query the agent’s decisions on their own initiative, but without committing to
then systematically verifyingeverydecision taken.
Example 1.3 Charlotte has determined that Alanna is eligible for accessto a





2) How so, given...?
1) Alanna is eligible...
3) Elaborate...
Peer D
Dante however, perhaps having assumed that Alanna was not eligibl , queries
how Charlotte came to her decision. Similarly, Benjamin maybe curious as to
how Charlotte makes such decisions, having an incomplete und rstanding of the
underlying problem.
This is an example of aninvestigationdialogue, where requests are made for
statements to be elaborated upon in order to allow other agents to verify the
reasoning of peers.
Negotiating services— Two (or more) agents may need to negotiate the provision of
some service. Where the inherent properties of a service arenot enshrined within
an interaction protocol, the best way to handle negotiationmay be to focus on the
satisfaction of abstract constraints, which the peers can dispute until a mutually
admissible contract is produced.
Example 1.4 Alanna seeks a service which Benjamin provides. A successful
interaction in this case is contingent on the seller being able to provide a specific
product which matches the buyer’s needs, and the buyer beingwilling to spend
whatever resource is necessary to obtain the product offered:
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Peer B
Peer A
1) I would like...
2) I can provide this...
Peer B (2)





6) But have you considered...
In this case, dialogue is used to describe the vital attributes of the product, ex-
plaining why they do or do not fulfill either constraint, inviting counter-points.
This is an example of anegotiationdialogue, where agents argue the merits of
some transaction until consensus is reached as to its particul s or it is deter-
mined that the requirements of all parties cannot be reconciled.
Identifying alternative approaches — If an agent finds that their plans have gone
awry (or are about to), it may be that its peers are able to provide information
identifying alternative approaches, allowing the agent tosalvage a failing inter-
action or re-attempt it under different circumstances.
Example 1.5 Alanna would like Benjamin to assist it in some task, but Benjamin




1) I request assistance...
2) I cannot help, but Peer C can...
3) I request assistance...
It should be possible for Benjamin to direct Alanna to another peer (in this case
Charlotte) who is more suitable, allowing Alanna to repeat her request for as-
sistance.
This is an example of anexplorationdialogue, where agents collaborate to find
new resolutions for constraints on interaction.
Identifying changes of state— If an agent observes a change in the environment in
the midst of an interaction, one which has bearing on an active interaction, it
would be helpful if that agent was able to convey that observation to its peers
prior to the interaction proceeding further.
1.1. Motivation 9
Example 1.6 Alanna has been charged by her peers with determining whether




3) Service should not be provided
 to client Z because...
2) Should suspend
new contracts...




Benjamin determines that new contracts should be suspendedhowever based
on information disseminated by Charlotte; Charlotte then informs Alanna that
a lack of resources will prevent future services from being fulfilled, stopping
Alanna from offering the service until the situation is resolved.
This is an example of atransitiondialogue, where the accepted situation given
any earlier dialogue is changed to better reflect new information.
To be able to generate the kind of dialogues just described however requires there to
be a standard process by which dialogue can be constructed wihout recourse to any
data not found in the interaction state. There was already work d ne on using dialogue
games to explicate elements of LCC protocols in [McGinnis etal., 2005], but in this
case the focus would be on providing a generic problem to solve by agents during
interaction which would result in the generation of the desired dialogues.
Such a decision problem would need to be sufficiently lightweight such that it
would not unduly encumber any interaction it was attached to. In particular, in cases
where additional dialogue wouldnot be necessary to ensure an optimal interaction,
the problem should be resolved all but immediately; where demed by peers to be
beneficial however, agents should be able to engage in more in-d pth discussion.
Example 1.7 Alanna has to choose one of a number of methods for interpreting some
corpus of data, each with its own intrinsic qualities. Alanncan solicit advice from her
peers, in this case Benjamin and Charlotte. If both peers arein agreement about which
procedure to use, then whilst there is the possibility that tey favour the same procedure
for entirely contrary reasons, in general it is likely that selecting that procedure is a
good plan that requires no further deliberation.
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Peer B
Peer C
Data Corpus Method ? Conclusions
Peer A
2) Method X is best suited...
1) Method X is best suited for this task.
On the other hand, if another peer Dante favours an alternative procedure, it is prob-
ably worth finding out why, as it is possible that Dante is in possession of important
information not available to his peers.
Peer B
Peer C
Data Corpus Method ? Conclusions
Peer A
1) The data is highly self-referential...
...so method X is unsuitable.
Peer D
2) If the data is of a given volume,
then method X is best suited.
Dante’s input may lead to a more thorough discussion of the qualities of various pro-
cedures. Note that even if Dante is found to be misinformed, an opportunity has been
given for any false assumptions on his part to be identified and purged.
It was found that the underlying decision problem could be understood as one ofdis-
putation. All the example scenarios identified could be understood asa consequence
of aggressively positing some claim and inviting dissenting opinions. Where no dis-
sent exists, there would be no further dialogue — otherwise,a group of agents could
collectively generate a succession of assertions and arguments which would explore
disputes and reveal essential information about the domainof discussion.
For example, looking at the different (overlapping) types of dialogue identified
previously:
Dissemination — A dissemination dialogue can be invoked by positing hypotheses
and inviting peers to respond. Agents can provide support for a given claim, or
can provide information which undermines it.
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I posit that Alanna is either trustworthy, or not. You posit that Alanna
is trustworthy given some proposition. Another peer may posit that
proposition as truth, or provide evidence to the contrary.
Most dialogues will involve some degree of information dissemination, some-
times unsolicited.
You dispute another peer’s claim, providing evidence to support your
case. I observe your arguments, and learn something useful which I
did not expect to learn in this context.
Investigation — Given a claim by a peer, an agent can request that the peer expand
upon its underlying reasoning, or can articulate its own explanation in order to
provoke agreement or an alternative explanation from the peer.
I take issue with one of your claims, suggesting that you had me
certain assumptions, which I reveal to be flawed. You admit myar-
gument, but point out that you had inferred your conclusion fr m a
different line of reasoning entirely, which you lay out for me.
Negotiation — A sceptical agent can assume that a given artefact isnotadequate, and
force its peers to disprove each of its objections in turn until the final artefact
meets its requirements.
I wish for you to perform for me a service. You make an offer, but I am
sceptical as to whether it adequately fulfill my needs and so posit that
it does not. You then provide arguments explaining to me why this is
not the case, or if you cannot, you make me a different offer.
Exploration — If every peer is allowed to posit possible resolutions to a given con-
straint, and is free to attack resolutions it finds unacceptable, then one can expect
that any claims still admissible after dialogue has played out are still (to the best
of the peer group’s knowledge) viable possibilities.
We argue that certain peers should or should not be entrustedwith
some important task. Even should we fixate on a particular pee, our
prior conclusions still stand, and we can return to them should our
preferred choice be unwilling (or unable) to perform our task.
Transition — Provided that the results of dialogue are persistent (at least over the
course of an interaction), the admissibility of claims can change given new in-
formation.
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We decide that Alanna is eligible for some privilege, based on the
testimony given and the arguments made. At some later point,cir-
cumstances change, undermining a pivotal argument in her favour.
By revisiting that argument, we can note the change, and re-evaluate
Alanna’s eligibility based on the arguments remaining.
In such a manner can a hypothetical system of arguments be generat d which ex-
plores the distributed knowledge of peers engaged in an interaction, but only where it
is expected to influence the interaction. Such behaviour canbe implemented by using
assumption-based argumentation [Bondarenko et al., 1993], which can act as a generic
proxy for many different forms of defeasible reasoning [Kakas and Toni, 1999].
Thus, we have our motivation — a desire to specify a distributed decision problem
and a mechanism for solving that problem which will induce ad-hoc dialogue between
agents, dialogue which will serve to inform the beliefs of agents such that more robust
interactions can be conducted without resort to over-engineered protocols.
With this motivation in mind, consider now our contribution.
1.2 Contribution
In this thesis we specify a wholly distributed mechanism foropportunistic argumen-
tation which allowssincereagents engaged in some interaction to share insights and
reconcile conflicts of belief prior to making decisions which influence that interac-
tion’s outcome. We demonstrate that it is possible to interleave this mechanism with
an ongoing cooperative agent interaction in order to make itmore robust, to prevent
ill-informed decisions from being made by individual agents and to ensure an outcome
which better reflects the true state of the environment, as well as provide an improved
basis for further interactions between those agents involved. We verify this mechanism
by proof and validate it by example.
A portrayal is an annotated system of arguments articulated by agents during an in-
teraction in support of, or in opposition to, particular resolutions of constraints imposed
on interaction by an interaction protocol. It affords the agent tasked with deciding a
given constraint the ability to forewarn its peers of the decision it would make in the
current circumstances prior to actual resolution, inviting its peers to make arguments
challenging that decision. It also allows agents acting in other roles to posit the deci-
sions they would make if acting in the constrained role, permitting the deciding agent














Figure 1.2: An interaction between three agents can be augmented by con-
structing an interaction portrayal in tandem with the execution of a protocol.
mains with that agent. The arguments and counter-argumentsintroduce new concepts
to a group of peers and provide an opportunity to test existing assumptions. By pro-
voking a mutual re-evaluation of beliefs, common theories ar constructed supporting
more robust interaction without infringing on the autonomyof individual agents.
Example 1.8 Consider an interaction executed according to the protocolsummarised
in Example 1.1 wherein an agent Alanna takes on the role ofapplicant to a resource
library and an agent Benjamin takes on the role ofadvocate. Over the course of dia-
logue, Alanna and Benjamin will express arguments supporting or refuting different
resolutions of the constraints on interaction. For example:4
Alanna: I can be trusted with the library because I am a researche in the field and
have no reason to abuse your trust.
Benjamin: You are not trustworthy because you have violatedtrust in the past.
Benjamin can further dispute Alanna’s claim:
Benjamin: You cannot be a researcher, because you do not appear to have a research
topic.
Alanna: Actually, I am a researcher (presents credentials).
Whilst likewise, Alanna can dispute Benjamin’s:
Alanna: There is no evidence that I have violated trust in themanner you suggest.
Benjamin: You are not trustworthyspecificallybecause you abused access tolabora-
tory (an analoguous resource).
Alanna: My prior point stands.
4This example is drawn from the material in Chapter 6.
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Benjamin, being assigned the task of evaluatingrustworthy(alanna, library) in his role
as advocate, will then use the arguments made to decide whether or not Alanna is
trustworthy subject to his own scepticism and bias.
Our concern is not however with some intractable notion of perfect argumentation be-
tween agents which always provides optimal results but which is too cumbersome to
deploy in practice, but with providing a ‘good enough’ service whichmightbenefit the
agents in an interaction and will not act to their detriment —efficiency is vital, insofar
as portrayals must be something which can be deployed alongside any number of in-
teractions without significant impact on the efficacy of a multi-agent system. This has
required us to explore the notion ofargument spaces, which serve to define the scope
of argumentation in a heterogeneous reasoning environmentby defining both relevance
and necessary level of detail for arguments. By providing the means for agents to de-
termine and, if necessary, refine the argument space of an interaction incrementally
based on prior dialogue, we can ensure that portrayals are kept initially minimal, to
be expanded only when agents decide that certain arguments mus be explored further.
Necessarily however, this forces us to consider the notion of a goodargument space,
one in which agents are still able to adequately explore the various facets of the prob-
lem at hand — defined as one in which all conclusions admissible given the distributed
knowledge of agents can be seen to be admissible given a complete exploration of the
argument space. Such a space can be seen as the ‘goal state’ ofhe decision problem
which a portrayal is generated to solve. We identify the coreproperties of a ‘good’ por-
trayal argument space for an interaction, and we ensure thatour mechanism produces
portrayals which occupy that space, ‘solving’ the decisionproblem.
Example 1.9 In the previous example, arguments are presented at a level of detail
necessary to describe the essential dispute. However within the confines of its own
knowledge base, an agent will reason at an arbitrary level ofcomplexity commensurate
with its knowledge of the domain. For example, Alanna might reason the following
way:
Alanna: I can be trusted with the library because:
– I am a lecturer at the University of Edinburgh.
– Edinburgh is a recognised higher education institution.
– Any lecturer employed by a higher eduction institution is a researcher.
– I need access to certain data.
– That data is only found inlibrary.
– There is no benefit in abusing access to the only source of needed data.
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– A researcher with no incentive to abuse a resource can be trusted with
that resource.
This is much more detailed than is probably necessary to persuade Benjamin. In par-
ticular, each additional detail confers the possibility offurther dispute. However, if the
end conclusions are the same then such dispute will have no effect on the practical out-
come of the interaction which argumentation is ostensibly being performed to assist.
Moreover, an actual autonomous reasoning agent in a complexdomain will likely use
far more extensive reasoning than the toy example given above, and there may be gen-
uine computational issues associated with articulating and permitting argumentation
over complete chains of deduction.
These problems are resolved in this thesis by providing a means to limit the initial
complexity of arguments and then incrementally expand uponthem as deemed neces-
sary by agents. For example, in this case, Alanna may initially simply state her claim:
Alanna: I can be trusted with the library.
Benjamin can then explore Alanna’s claim by requesting thatAl nna elaborate upon it
more, or by anticipating her reasoning, elaborating upon ithimself and attacking that
elaboration (at which point Alanna can counter-attack or describe how her reasoning
is different from that presumed by Benjamin):
Alanna: I can be trusted with the library because I am a researche in the field and
have no reason to abuse your trust.
Benjamin: You cannot be a researcher, because you do not appear to have a research
topic.
By expanding the space of argumentation only incrementallyfrom a minimal starting
space, unnecessary detail is dispensed with, and uncontroversial claims can be dealt
with with minimal consideration.
Moreover, in keeping with our focus on fully distributed interactions, it follows that our
mechanism must be fully distributed and tolerant of the vagaries of an asynchronous
system, its product easy to disseminate from peer to peer. This requires that adequate
regard is given to the challenges of communicating arguments in an asynchronous
setting with many different agents involved. Such regard isduly given.
The ultimate purpose of our portrayal mechanism then is two-fold. Firstly, we seek
to make interactions between autonomous agents more robustby requiring agents to
ensure that their decisions are admissible to their peers (if not necessarily preferred by
them). By accumulating evidence and challenging assumptions, t is hypothesized that
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agents become more likely to validly achieve their objectives; the more a particular
group of agents engages in such discourse, the greater the degr e of synchronisation
between their beliefs, and the greater the basis for furthercollaborations — in question
is merely how efficiently this can be done. From the perspectiv of interaction design,
the use of portrayals make it unnecessary to write protocolswhich explicitly specify
certain processes of debate and negotiation, allowing for mre generic, lightweight
protocols.
Secondly, we wish to correct inconsistencies between the beli fs of an agent and
its peers. We blame such inconsistencies primarily on the requi ment in complex,
dynamic environments for agents to independently make assumptions in order to make
concrete decisions, and it is evident that interaction betwe n agents provides a good
opportunity to discover and correct any mistakes made. However simply throwing
the beliefs of agents together into one giant belief revision problem is not feasible in a
system which is in continual flux and which will therefore likely have changed before a
solution can be produced. Fortunately, we can use the interactions engaged in by agents
as a kind of opportunistic prioritisation mechanism for truth maintenance, on the basis
that the constraints on interaction identify where consistency between agents is most
vital. The use of argumentation to disseminate and process propositions as part of our
portrayal mechanism can be shown to implement this opportunistic prioritisation.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 1 of this thesis has provided a backdrop for the rest of the thesis, introducing
the contribution itself, as well as the problems it exists toaddress. The next part of this
thesis provides the theoretical framework underpinning our c ntribution:
Chapter 2 examines the notion of multi-agent interaction, and in particular the kind
of distributed, protocol-driven dialogues which we seek toaugment with our
contribution, providing a brief review of pertinent literature.
Chapter 3 explores the use of argumentation as a generic framework formodelling
an agent’s internal reasoning processes.
Chapter 4 builds upon Chapter 3 by bridging internal argumentation with social ar-
gumentation between peers. This chapter also defines formally the distributed
decision problem which our portrayal mechanism exists to solve.
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The second part of this thesis concerns itself with the specification and implementation
of our distributed interaction portrayals:
Chapter 5 specifies the portrayal mechanism, defining the notion of a portrayal in-
stance and the operations which agents can invoke to manipulte one. In this
chapter, we specify how agents construct arguments within the confines of a por-
trayal, as well as how agents determine whether a portrayal has been adequately
reconciled with their own beliefs.
Chapter 6 provides an in-depth example of the portrayal mechanism in action; this
serves to temper the theoretical properties specified in earlier chapters with a
demonstration of the practical benefits of augmenting an interac ion with a por-
trayal.
Finally,Chapter 7concludes the thesis, discussing the practicalities of thecontribution
as well as providing an overview of possible future work.
1.4 Prior Publication
Some of the work in this thesis was presented at the Autonomous Agents and Multia-
gent Systems (AAMAS) conference in May 2010 [Martin et al., 2010]:
Martin, Robertson, Rovatsos. (2010). Opportunistic belief reconciliation during dis-
tributed interacions. InProceedings of the 9th Interactional Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), pages 433–440.

Chapter 2
Autonomous and Distributed Agent
Interactions
The purpose of interaction between agents within a distributed system is to propagate
knowledge and to assemble new behaviours by coordinating the actions of individ-
ual peers. If performed correctly, agents will naturally assume roles which befit their
particular expertise, whether a given role demands that an age t acts as oracle, coor-
dinator, instrument of change or anything else. Whilst interactions may ultimately be
orchestrated for the benefit of outside forces, an autonomous agent will be motivated
by its own goals regardless of their provenance, and so can beexp cted to act upon
its own initiative, collaborating with its peers to construct new interactions as they are
deemed necessary.
Consider however interaction within anopendistributed system. We define an open
system here as one which allows the contribution of components from different sources
which do not necessarily adhere to any particular model or design. Whilst the com-
position of the system as a whole may be a product of design along with the medium
for communication, the nature of individual agents within the system is such that their
behaviours cannot be predicted by their peers except after rigorous observation. Con-
flicting ideals and standards can produce agents with notably different internal pro-
cesses. Combining the idiosyncrasies of heterogeneous agency with both a complex,
often inaccessible environment and a dynamic agent population makes the coordina-
tion of arbitrary groupings of agents towards arbitrary ends a challenging problem to
address.
Given then a population of autonomous agents within an open distributed system,
it becomes necessary to provide a common framework in which interaction can be
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controlled and directed on the volition of those agents participating, without unduly
constraining agent autonomy beyond that which is necessaryto ensure one of a number
of recognisable outcomes. One approach is to formalise the social institutions which
underlie certain classes of interaction, defining the protoc ls to which those agents
should adhere if they want to act within such institutions. Having specified these social
models for interaction, it then becomes necessary to disseminate them in a form which
can be executed by amenable peers.
This chapter concerns itself with interaction choreography within a distributed sys-
tem of autonomous, knowledge-based agents. In §2.1 we consider the very nature
of interaction and dialogue. In §2.2 we consider how interactions can be modelled
by agents, and how these models can be used to specify interactions in a distributed
system as well as merely predict them. This allows us in §2.3 to provide a specifica-
tion for distributed interaction based on an interaction protocol. Finally, in §2.4, we
consider how the distribution of interaction affects the ability of interacting agents to
make coherent decisions. All this serves to provide a formaldescription of the kind
of interactions which we are interested in, and to define the problem which we seek to
solve.
2.1 Interaction and Dialogue
An interaction is‘reciprocal action; action or influence of persons or thingson each
other’.1 This is superficially uncontroversial, but is also rather vague, which unfortu-
nately seems to describe the definitions of interaction habitu lly used in multi-agent
systems research. For example [Weiss, 2000] defines an interaction as any activity oc-
curring between agents or between agents and their environment — an extremely broad
definition which whilst not necessarily incorrect, fails toimpart any significant insight
into the nature of reciprocal activity. Given that we are concer ed here with interactive
symbolic reasoning, it seems somehow inadequate that the noion of interaction itself
lacks the precision necessary to be defined symbolically.
A run of a distributed system records the observation over time ofevents occurring
during a given execution of the system by the processes within it [Fagin et al., 1995,
Halpern and Moses, 1990]. Such a run can be used to construct alogic l time-line of
all internal and external events which have affected a givensystem of agents over the
course of its existence. An interaction can merely be seen thas any particular set of
1Courtesy of theOxford English Dictionary[Simpson, 2006].
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events drawn from such a time-line which exhibit certain properties. We shall define
these properties as so:
Causality — Every event is an action by an agent which influences or is influe ced by
at least one other event in the interaction precipitated by another agent (events
involve more than one agent and are all causally linked).An event influences
another if the former necessarily occurs prior to the latter.
Connectivity — The set of events defining an interaction cannot be divided into two
disjoint subsets in such a way that one subset does not influence the other (the
selected events describe a single interaction).A set of events influences another
if there exists an event in the latter set which is influenced by an event in the
former set.
Whilst perhaps not strictly essential insofar as there exist communicative processes
which one might wish to model which do not fulfil this criterion, there is also another
property which could be said to be required of ‘reciprocal action’:
Participation — Every agent involved in the interaction both wields influenc and is
itself influenced over the course of events (an agent which merely dictates events
or just passively observes them is not considered a participant of the interaction).
An agent influences another if the latter performs an action which is influenced
by an action of the former.
Here an event is essentially anything that ‘happens’ between ag nts over some period
of time. Events are holistic; an event can describe the combination of many smaller
events, in which case an interaction itself is an event (and thus interactions must them-
selves be holistic). We mainly concern ourselves however with events which are ob-
servable actions perpetrated by agents towards other agents. Thus we can formally
define our own notion of interaction specifically for this thesis:
Definition 2.1 An interaction I is a set of events{ε1, . . . ,εn} (where n> 1) which
have been partially-ordered by a relation≺ such that:
• Each eventε is an action by a set of agents A observed by a set of agents O. Both
sets must be minimal under set inclusion (i.e. there is no agent in A which was
not involved in perpetratingε, and likewise there is no agent in O which did not
observeε).
• If εi ≺ ε j then eventεi necessarily occurred prior toε j .
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• For every actionεi ∈ I by a set of agents Ai observed by a set of agents Oi , there
exists another actionε j ∈ I such that either:
– ε j is an action by agents Aj where Oi ∩A j 6= /0 andεi ≺ ε j (causality 1).
– ε j is an action observed by agents Oj where Oj∩Ai 6= /0 andε j ≺ εi (causal-
ity 2).
• InteractionI cannot be divided into two disjoint sets Ei and Ej in such a way
that there exist no two eventsεi ∈ Ei and ε j ∈ E j for which eitherεi ≺ ε j or
ε j ≺ εi (connectivity).
• If an agent a is involved in enacting an eventεi ∈ I such that a∈ A, the set
of actors, then there exists another actionε j ∈ I for which a∈ O, the set of
observers. Likewise, if an agent o observes an eventεk ∈ I such that o∈ O, the
set of observers, then there exists another actionεl ∈ I for which o∈ A, the set
of actors(participation).
The criteria ofcausality, connectivityandparticipationall rely on an abstract notion
of ‘influence’. Evidently a key consideration then in modelling interaction is one of
pedantry — if an intelligent agent can be considered a product of its history, then it
could be claimed thateveryevent which occurs to that agent exerts influence on any
and all future actions, suggesting that interactions can befoundeverywhere. Now this
might be a perfectly reasonable philosophical assertion, but practicality dictates that
we model interactions from a slightly less all-encompassing viewpoint, only consid-
ering events which effect a change of state which is discernible at whatever level of
abstraction we choose to model. To that end, when speaking ofan interaction between
agents, there is often a focus on a particular class of activity.
A dialogue is a particular form of interaction wherein every event is a speech
act [Austin, 1962, Searle, 1969] uttered by an agent which then exerts some illocu-
tionary force upon at least one listener. As such, a dialoguecan be considered to
be a collection of messages exchanged between peers (in multi-agent systems often
drawn from a performative language like KQML [Finin et al., 1994] or FIPA-ACL
[O’Brien and Nicol, 1998]), where the illocutionary force of messages can be deter-
mined from the influence they wield on interaction. We can easily dapt Definition 2.1
for dialogue:
Definition 2.2 A dialogueD is a set of speech acts{m1, . . . ,mn} (where n> 1) which
have been partially-ordered by a relation≺ such that:
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• Each speech act m is a message from an agent s to a set of recipients R.
• If mi ≺ mj , then message mi necessarily is received by at least one agent in R
prior to mj (asynchronicity).2
• For every message mi ∈ D from an agent si to agents R, there exists another
message mj ∈ D such that either:
– mj is sent by an agent s2 ∈ R, and mi ≺mj (causality 1).
– mj is received by agent si , and mj ≺mi (causality 2).
• DialogueD cannot be divided into two disjoint sets Ei and Ej in such a way that
there exist no two separate events mi ∈ E1 and mj ∈ E2 for which either mi ≺mj
or mj ≺mi (connectivity).
• If an agent s sends a message m1∈ D , then there exists another message mj ∈ D
for which s∈ R, the set of recipients. Likewise, if an agent r∈ R receives a
message mk ∈ D , then there exists another message ml ∈ D which has been sent
by r (participation).
As a form of interaction, dialogue is of particular interestbecause it is purely and di-
rectly communicative; as such it is the focus of most research into interaction (from
[Searle, 1969] to [Walton and Krabbe, 1995] to [Robertson etal., 2008] for example).
By focusing on dialogue, we no longer need concern ourselvesabout indirectly influ-
encing agents by the careful stacking of pebbles or the laying of pheromone trails, and
instead consider only the near-immediate transfer of information between two peers.
Additionally, dialogue has a non-recursive base unit — the speech act — which means
we do not have to worry about the holistic nature of abstract events, and can simply
measure the evolution of an agent system’s state message by mssage.
Example 2.1 Consider a scenario in which an agent Alanna desires data which can be
found only in a specific library, one which is only accessibleto a privileged few. Alanna
knows of another agent Benjamin, who is a patron of that library. Alanna decides
therefore to enlist Benjamin’s support to acquire the access privileges she needs. This
leads to the following (very simple) dialogue:
1. Alanna requests Benjamin’s assistance; “Benjamin, could you help me get ac-
cess to the library?”
2This definition accounts for asynchronous communication byallowing response by one recipient of
a message prior to the reception of the message by all intended recipients.







Figure 2.1: A dialogue between agents Alanna, Benjamin and Charlotte, as
described in example 2.1.
2. Benjamin recommends Alanna to Charlotte, the controllerf the library; “Char-
lotte, I recommend that Alanna be given access to the library.”
3. Charlotte then grants Alanna permission; “Alanna, you may access the library.”
Consequent to Alanna’s initial request, each illocution ispredicated upon the previous
one (demonstrating causality and connectivity). Moreover, it is clear that each agent
both acts and is acted towards (demonstrating participation).
Whilst many of the statements made over the course of this chapter can be seen to ap-
ply equally to any form of interaction, ultimately we are conerned in this thesis with
interaction dialogues — acts of agent coordination driven by the exchange of mes-
sages. Thus, any statement made about interaction in the following sections should, by
default, be considered to apply to dialogue-type interactions first and foremost.
It is not enough just to able to identify the presence of interaction however — we
want to be able to model it as well. If an agent can model different types of potential
interaction in order to identify the factors which differentiate one interaction from an-
other, then that agent can plan for an interaction based on those factors which apply to
its current circumstances.
2.2 Interaction Models and Protocols
An agent models possible interactions based on the expectedresponses of its peers to
particular events occurring under different environmental conditions. Given an inter-
action model, an agent can use that model to predict the course of an interaction and
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so choose to act in such a manner as to ensure a particular desired outcome. In a dis-
tributed system however, it is often impossible to predict with certainty the responses
of peers, partially because of uncertainty about the true state of the environment and
partially because the nature of the peers themselves is not always fully understood and
thus their actions become intrinsically unquantifiable. Taken to a logical extreme, it
might seem necessary for agents to produce arbitrarily complex contingency plans in
order to cover all possibilities. This approach is clearly intractable.
Interaction can be made more predictable however by the use of interaction proto-
cols.3 In this context, an interaction protocol is basically an interaction model which
has been in some way published in some standard format, such that it can then be used
to specifyinteraction rather than merely predict it. If agreement canbe obtained to the
effect that all agents will only act in adherence to a given shared protocol for some
particular interaction, then any agent involved in that interaction can more accurately
predict the responses of its peers and the outcome which is likely to unfold because of
them. All that would remain then is the problem of accuratelydetermining the system
state so as to adequately inform the decisions made by agentsduring interaction.
2.2.1 Modelling Interaction
If the initial state of a multi-agent system (which we will take here to include agent
programming) is known, then it is possible given a run of the system to determine the
state of that system at all points in that run, based on the cumulative state changes
brought about by observation of events. Evidently, it must al o be possible to de-
termine how a specific interaction influences the system state as well. It is a mistake
however to casually assume that any given interaction occurs in isolation — we can see
this by considering the ease with which we can identify multiple overlapping interac-
tions in any sufficiently involved system of agents. Even considering solely interaction
dialogues, there will be any number of events external to theinteraction which will
influence agents and the course of dialogue without being formally part of it.
As such, whilst the system state can change because of the events which compose
an interaction, it can also change in spite of them. There will also be events not part of
an interaction which technically change the system state, but which have no actual in-
fluence on the outcome of an interaction whatsoever. We can mitigate the obfuscating
3In this chapter we use the term ‘protocol’ quite broadly. In [Maudet and Chaib-draa, 2002,
Flores and Kremer, 2002] for example, a distinction is made betweendialogue protocolsandconver-
sation policies, a distinction we do not make here.
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effect of irrelevant events however by differentiating theint raction state from the sys-
tem state. We can also abstract aside irrelevant elements ofthe concrete system state
in favour of just the portion of the state which is pertinent to the interaction at hand.
By doing these things, we can more clearly see the course of interaction and identify
those events which actually affect it.
An interaction modelis, in essence, simply a specification of some set of valid
transitions between abstract states. Given a sufficient description of a system state, it
is possible to determine the interaction that would then occur. An interaction model
can be used to predict the outcome of ongoing interactions, but can equally be used to
analyse them after they occur or to guide an agent through a future interaction:
Definition 2.3 An interaction modelM defines a set of transition relations(Si ,E,S f )
where:
• Si abstractly describes some initial system state.
• S f abstractly describes some final system state.
• E is a set of partially-ordered events which would allow the transition of a system
from stateSi to stateS f .
An interactionI is modelledby an interaction modelM if there exists a series of tran-
sitions(S0,E1,S1),(S1,E2,S2), . . . ,(Sn−1,En,Sn) (where n> 0) such thatI ⊆
⋃n
j=1E j
(where Ej ≺ E j+1) and for every transition relation(S j−1,E j ,S j), there exists a corre-
sponding transition relation(Si ,E j ,S f )∈M whereinSi ∼ S j−1 andS f ∼ S j as defined
in Definition 2.4 below.
Transition relations specify possible outcomes of certainsequences of events occurring
given a particular system state. We do not ascribe any particular format to a system
state description — for now, it is sufficient to think of such descriptions as restrictions
on the possible worlds in which a given state transition can occur. We will also limit
our consideration toglobalstates, leaving aside the notion of local state until later:
Definition 2.4 Two system state descriptionsS1 andS2 are compatible if the inter-
section of possible worlds described byS1 andS2 is not empty (i.e. it is possible for
both state descriptions to describe the same world). This fact is denotedS1∼ S2.
Note that there may be many ways to construct the same interaction from a set of tran-
sition relations. In practice, any interaction model wouldlikely be specified using some
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process calculus from which transition relations can be derived from an enumeration of
the different cases or outcomes accounted for (e.g. [Robertson, 2004, Walton, 2004a]).
Example 2.2 Consider how Alanna might model the dialogue of Example 2.1.Infor-
mally:
I need access to the library. I can request the assistance of an existing pa-
tron of the library. If my chosen patron trusts me, then he will recommend
me to the library controller, otherwise he will decline to assist me, ending
our dialogue. Upon receiving a recommendation, the controlle will grant
me permission if she considers me to be eligible, at which point I have
achieved my goal. Otherwise, the controller will refuse me,again ending
dialogue.
This informal model can be decomposed into a number of state transi ions of the form
(Si ,E,S f ). For example:
Si = The library is inaccessible, but Benjamin is a patron of that library.
E = {Alanna: “Benjamin, could you help me get access to the library?”}
S f = The library is inaccessible, Benjamin is a patron of that library, and
Alanna has requested that Benjamin recommend that she be given
access to it.
Another example:
Si = Benjamin has recommended Alanna to the controller of the library,
and Alanna is eligible for access to that library.
E = {Controller: “Alanna, you may access the library.”}
S f = The controller has permitted Alanna to access the library,nd so the
library is accessible.
Using these state transitions, Alanna can model the dialogue of Example 2.1 using any
series of transitions wherein each final state is compatiblewith the initial state of the
next transition, and where the events generated by such a series of transitions subsume
the dialogue.
As already stated the outcome of an interaction is dependenton the system state. The
purpose of aninteraction stateis to describe an ongoing interaction and to relate that
interaction to some underlying interaction model such thatit can be used to determine
possible system states:
Definition 2.5 An interaction stateS for an interaction modelled by some interaction
modelM can be described by a tuple(H,∆,M ) where:
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• H is the interaction as transpired so far; H is a set of events,partially-ordered
by a relation≺ as per Definition 2.1.
• ∆ describes the obligations outstanding on interaction in order to obtain certain
tangible outcomes;∆ can be viewed as a set of possible event sets, each partially-
ordered like H, but each describing an exclusive outcome.
• For every event set F∈ ∆, it is the case that(H ∪F) is an interaction as per
Definition 2.1 with the caveat that there is no eventε f ∈ F and eventεh ∈ H
such thatε f ≺ εh (i.e. F may be caused by H, but H is never caused by F).
• For every set F∈ ∆, the interaction(H ∪F) is modelled byM as per Definition
2.3.
An interaction state serves then to describe what has already occurred and what may
yet occur given that the completed interaction is expected to be one defined by the
selected interaction model. Uncertainty as to the final interaction exists because the
system state may not be known in its entirety, and external events may change the
system such that interaction cannot proceed according to the given model — instead,
the outcome of the interaction will be determined by the transitions available in the
interaction model given the system state at the point of execution.
In order to determine whether a modelled interaction is ongoing within a given sys-
tem, we need to be able to determine whether the interaction state models the system
state, in analogous fashion to how an interaction model might model a specific inter-
action. To be able to do this for non-trivial cases, it must bepossible to access part of
the run of the system prior to the specified system state in order to identify any portion
of the interaction which has already occurred during that run:
Definition 2.6 A transition history h(S) of some system stateS is a (partial) descrip-
tion of the transitions made by a system into stateS, where:
• h(S) can be considered to be a transition relation(S0,H,S), where H is a
partially-ordered set of the events which have happened since some initial state
S0 allowing the transition to stateS.
• A transition(Si ,E,S f ) ∈ h(S) if and only if there is a sub-transition(S′i ,E
′,S′f )
of (S0,H,S) (as per Definition 2.3) such thatSi ∼ S′i , S f ∼ S
′
f and E⊆ E
′.
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Once we are able to confirm that the past events in an active interaction have occurred
in a system, it then remains to show that the system is in a state which allows the
interaction to be completed.
Definition 2.7 An interaction stateS = (H,∆,M ) modelssome system stateS if and
only if for every F∈ ∆ it is the case that(H ∪ F) is modelled byM using a sub-
transition(Si ,H,S) ∈ h(S) such thatS describes an ongoing interaction inS.
Let us return then to our running example:
Example 2.3 Assume that Alanna initiates the dialogue described by Example 2.1.
Assume that the initial system stateS0 can be described as follows:
The library is inaccessible to Alanna, but Benjamin is a patron of that
library, and Benjamin trusts Alanna.
The initial interaction stateS0 = ( /0,∆0,M ), whereM is the interaction model de-
scribed in Example 2.2 and∆0 describes two possible dialogues:
1. Alanna requests help from Benjamin, Benjamin recommendsAlanna
to the library controller, and the controller grants Alannapermission.
2. Alanna requests help from Benjamin, Benjamin recommendsAlanna
to the library controller, but the controller refuses to grant Alanna
permission.
S0 modelsS0 because for all interactions described by∆0, it is possible for them to
occur given stateS0; Alanna does not expect the scenario in which Benjamin declin s
to assist Alanna, because she knows that Benjamin trusts her, and (according to her
model) will therefore recommend her to whoever the library controller is.
According toM (and Example 2.2), Alanna is able to request help from Benjami ,
transitioning into a new stateS1. This moves the event ‘Alanna requests help from Ben-
jamin’ to the history H1 of interaction stateS1, and leaves∆1 describing the possible
remaining events:
1. Benjamin recommends Alanna to the library controller, and the con-
troller grants Alanna permission.
2. Benjamin recommends Alanna to the library controller, but the con-
troller refuses to grant Alanna permission.
S1 modelsS1 because(S0,H,S1) ∈ h(S1) and all interactions(H1∪F) for F ∈ ∆1 are
possible. Suppose that Benjamin then recommends Alanna to Charlotte. The system
state would then be one in which Benjamin had just made his recommendation, and
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Charlotte would then grant or reject Alanna’s request. It cannot be predicted which
would happen however, because Alanna does not even know if she is eligible, and so
either outcome would result in an interaction state modelled by the updated system
state.
Unmodelled events can lead to an interaction state no longermodelling the system
state, such that interaction cannot proceed without violating in some way the interac-
tion model (i.e. there are no valid transitions from the current state).
Example 2.4 The interaction model given in Example 2.2 only accounts fora very
limited set of eventualities. Consider a few of the unmodelle events which might
occur after Alanna requests help from Benjamin:
• Benjamin might decline to assist Alanna,despitetrusting her, because such an
act might interfere with some prior obligation.
• Instead of contacting Charlotte as expected, Benjamin might render assistance
by some other means, such as offering to acquire the desired information for her.
• Library controller Charlotte might request additional information from Alanna
prior to determining eligibility — the interaction as modelled will not proceed
until Alanna responds to Charlotte’s query.
• Benjamin or Charlotte responds to Alanna’s request in a manner which Alanna
simply does not understand.
Any of these events will require Alanna to reconsider her interaction model if she is to
respond intelligibly.
There are four basic responses an agent can take upon discover ng that the state of
an interaction does not model the system state; the interaction an be aborted, the
agent can wait until the system returns to a state compatiblewith the interaction, the
interaction can be ‘repaired’ or the interaction model can be revised.
Aborting an interaction is best kept as a last resort. Not only does the agent not
acquire any of its goals, but this response may violate the agent’s obligations (at least
as they are viewed by its peers). The consequences of this canvary from being mostly
harmless to being severely damaging to an agent reputation,resulting in loss of privi-
leges or greater difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of other peers in future.
In a dynamic system, the state of the world changes, and sometimes it changes
back. A group of agents could be involved in an interaction which can only proceed in a
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given state, temporarily stopping activity whenever that st te does not hold. Obviously
however, there are scenarios where the system willnot return to a state compatible
with an interaction, at least not without the intervention of the agents involved.
‘Repairing’ an interaction entails actively shifting the system state into one which
the given interaction model can provide a valid transition relation for. The idea is that
agents in an interaction can engage in some temporary digress on in order to restore
the system state to one in which interaction can continue. For example, an agent can
perform an action which changes its environment to a more desirable state, or it could
stop to gather or supply additional information for its peers which might allow the
interaction to continue (for example, in the case where Charlotte makes an unexpected
request of Alanna, Alanna might be able to repair the interacion simply by fulfilling
the request). Note that any auxillary interactions may themselves need to be modelled,
albeit perhaps independently of the main interaction.
Sometimes however, the unexpected event is not simply some distraction which
can be cleanly dealt with prior to continuing interaction. Sometimes the unexpected
event indicates the unfolding of an entirely unplanned outcme (for example, Charlotte
might offer Alanna an alternative means to acquire the information which motivates
her actions). Revising an interaction model is basically a matter of adding new transi-
tion relations to the model such that the unfolding interaction is adequately specified.
The fundamental difficulty is that an agent may not be in a position to comprehend
the consequences of a hitherto unexpected event on the system state, in which case it
will not be able to extrapolate the remainder of the interaction, nor determine the out-
come. Essentially, the agent would need an understanding ofthe interaction that goes
beyond the model given — by, for instance, being able to classify peech acts by illo-
cutionary force (see the discussion of agent communicationlanguages such as KQML
[Finin et al., 1994] below). We generally assume otherwise,since for our purposes this
simply implies that there exists another, greater interaction model available to an agent
which happens to subsume the one used.
Of the four possible responses just described, one is essentially surrender, another
involves doing nothing and yet another requires either considerable creative intelli-
gence on the part of the interacting agent, or considerable over-engineering of inter-
action models commensurate with the complexity of the system in which interaction
occurs. Only interaction repair seems generically practicl. Ideally though, we would
simply prefer that our interaction models accurately described system behaviour in the
first place, such that interaction states model system states more often than not. In the
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next section then, we compound on our woes by pointing out howdifficult this really
is in practice.
2.2.2 Institutionalising Distributed Interaction
In a distributed multi-agent system, agents are autonomousprocesses, with their own
state and programming. Any given agent in the system is unlikely to be able to access
the local states of their peers, nor are they necessarily able to perceive all parts of
the environment in which the distributed system is situated. On the other hand, the
nature of interaction is such that agents are only expected to respond to events which
they can directly observe. Dialogue in particular can be seen as a series of messages
exchanged from one peer to another — with any response dependnt on only on the
message and an agent’s beliefs at the time of reception. Thusit should be possible to
create models of interaction wherein all transitions of system state can be localised to
particular agents; these local transitions can then be usedto reconstruct a description
of a complete interaction.
We consider adistributedinteraction model as being composed then of local agent
transition relations, where each transition relation describes the events which must be
observed in order for a particular (abstract) agent to transitio from one local state to
another, generating further events as a consequence:
Definition 2.8 A distributed interaction model M defines a set of local transition
relations(σ,Li ,Eo,Eg,L f ) where:
• σ ∈ Σ, whereΣ is the set of identifiers for agents acting in particular roles inM .
• Li abstractly describes the system state local toσ prior to generating Eg.
• L f abstractly describes the system state local toσ after observing Eo.
• Eo is the set of events observed byσ which allow the transition of the local state
of σ fromLi toL f .
• Eg is the set of events generated byσ over the course of the transition of the local
state ofσ fromLi toL f .
• εo ≺ εg for all eventsεo ∈ Eo and εg ∈ Eg, where≺ is a temporal ordering as
per Definition 2.1.
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M also defines a number of environment transition relations(E ,Li ,Eo,Eg,L f ), which
are defined as above except thatE represents the system beyondΣ as a single entity.
For system state transitions, events are fully internalised within the system, but because
local transition relations focus on individual agents, there is a need to distinguish be-
tween events observed and events generated by those agents.It is also necessary to
note those events observed or generated outwith those agents — the ‘environment’ in
this case includes anything not immediately connected to the interaction being mod-
elled, including agents which do not have roles in that interaction. This is important
because local transitions are focused on the private statesof individual agents, and
events directed towards the environment are required for inte actions to exact change
to the system state beyond those private states:
Definition 2.9 A system state transition(Si ,E,S f ) is described by a distributed in-
teraction modelM if and only if either:
• There exists a setΓ of local transitions(σ,Li ,Eo,Eg,L f ) and environment tran-
sitions(E ,Li ,E′o,E
′
g,S f ) such that:
– E is the union of all observed events Eo in Γ minus all generated events E′g
in Γ.
– E is also the union of all generated events Eg in Γ minus all observed events
E′o in Γ.
– System stateSi is the combination of all local statesLi in Γ.
– System stateS f is the combination of all local statesL f in Γ.
• (Si ,E,S f ) can be constructed from a series of sub-transitions(Si ,E1,S1), . . . ,
(Sn−1,En,S f ) (where n> 1) and every such sub-transition is described byM as
per this definition.
An interactionI is modelled byM if there exists a transition(S0,E,Sn) described by
M such thatI ⊆ E.
Thus, provided that we can distribute (and then reintegrate) the interaction state, we
can use the definitions of the previous section to describe distributed interaction.
It is not simply the system state which is difficult to access in a distributed sys-
tem. It is also more difficult to quantify the set of possible ev nts which might pro-
voke a transition, because individual agents are not necessarily cognisant of the full
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capabilities of their peers, or even the full underlying dynamics of the broader en-
vironment in which a distributed system might exist. For interaction dialogues, this
problem can be resolved by the use of agent communication languages such as the
Knowledge Query Management Language (KQML) [Finin et al., 1994] and the Foun-
dations of Intelligent Physical Agents Agent Communication Language (FIPA ACL)
[O’Brien and Nicol, 1998].
Agent communication languages formalise dialogue by classifying the permissible
types of illocution an agent can make and defining semantics for each type, essentially
quantifying the events which can be generated as a part of an interaction dialogue.
KQML defines a strict set ofperformatives(such astell, ask-if andreply) which agents
can use to communicate with one another. Every message generat d in KQML must
be of a given performative type and provide a certain set of parameters, including
references to the logical language and ontology used.
Example 2.5 If the dialogue described in earlier examples in this chapter was con-
ducted using an agent communication language like KQML, messages would arrive







. . . )
Where in this case, Alanna is asking Benjamin if he could recommend that Alanna
be granted access to the library. This expressed using a Prolog proposition and a
hypothetical ontology.4
FIPA ACL is the result of a consortium effort to create a standard agent communica-
tion language, based on examination of KQML and an interfacel nguage known as
Arcol [Breiter and Sadek, 1996] developed for France Telecom. It retains many of the
principles of KQML, but culls many ‘unnecessary’ performatives and grants greater
capacity for combining performatives. There exist many variants of KQML and FIPA
ACL [Labrou et al., 1999], and the two languages can be seen asrepresentative of that
approach to agent communication as a whole.
4There does exist a Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF) [Genes reth and Fikes, 1992], which is
specifically designed for information distribution, and which is often used with KQML, both being
developed as part of the Knowledge Sharing Effort (KSE) [Patil et al., 1992].
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One criticism of the performative language approach however is that it relies on
mentalisticrather thansocial reasoning [Singh, 1998, Wooldridge, 2000] — that is,
agents still need to reason about the internal beliefs of other agents with no guide as
to whether they comprehend events in the same way as their peers, rather than relying
on social norms as a means to bind peers to a shared social contract. In terms of our
formalism, agents might be able to quantify the ‘events’ of dialogue, but they will
still have to model transitions for every possible responseto a given performative an
arbitrary peermightmake over the course of interaction depending on their localstate
(which they cannot ever be certain of).
There is another approach available however. Consider this. Agents can model
interactions in terms of transitions between interaction state . By analysis of these
transitions, an agent can determine the circumstances under which a given outcome
will transpire. An agent can then apply an interaction modelin order to ensure desired
outcomes in future interactions, where those interactionsadhere to the model. In a
distributed system however, an agent does not have direct access to the programming
of its peers, and thus may not be able to accurately predict the actions which its peers
might take during an interaction, making it unlikely that itwill be able to produce
interaction models for arbitrary interactions on demand.
For most practical interactions there are not usually many qualitively different func-
tional outcomes however. Out of those outcomes which do exist, many are simply
graceful failures, where one party in an interaction declins to proceed further due to
adverse circumstances or personal disinterest. The difficulty in modelling arbitrary
interactions is not really a result of too many possible outcmes, but from the diffi-
culty inherent in recognising that a particular arbitrary event indicates a move towards
a particular functional outcome.
It would be advantageous if the interaction models used by agents topredict inter-
action could be published in some common format and then usedto specifyinteraction
instead — this is the idea behind agent protocol languages. An interaction protocol
formalises a particular set of interactions by specifying the ‘correct’ responses to par-
ticular events, limiting the options available to agents toonly those which allow an
interaction to converge upon one of a finite set of monitorable outcomes; each out-
come comes with conditions and obligations imposed upon it wh ch are made known
to all agents bound by the protocol. Thus, if an agreement canbe extracted from all
agents participating in a given interaction to the effect that t ey will all adhere to a
given protocol, then that interaction becomes easier to model insofar as the interaction
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becomes explicitly the product, rather than the source, of the model. This approach
to interaction is less dependent on the internal states of agents, being more concerned
with social commitment [Jennings, 1993].
There has been a great deal of research into particular typesof agent interaction
protocol, such as contract nets [Davis and Smith, 1983], black oard systems and gen-
eral negotiation dialogues [Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994, Rahwan et al., 2003] — a
survey of general types can be found in [Huhns and Stephens, 2000]. All these systems
share the same inherent (dis)advantage — they strictly limit the events and state transi-
tions being modelled, and compel agents to only generate those events and transitions.
Thus, whilst providing a practical means to conduct distributed interaction, they do not
permit circumstances not foreseen by the protocol designer. Nonetheless, the use of
protocols is deemed the best basis for agent interaction without a massive increase in
the creative intelligence of agents.
Of interest to the multi-agent community then is the development of languages and
tools to specify and publish different kinds of interactionprotocol. One such devel-
opment is electronic institutions [Esteva et al., 2001]. Institutions define collections
of scenes, which each define a protocol by which agents shouldc n uct themselves
within the given scene, as well as the norms under which such aprotocol should be
conducted [Garcı́a-Camino et al., 2005]. A number of tools have been developed to
aid in the specification of such institutions [Esteva et al.,2002, Esteva et al., 2004].
Example 2.6 Our running example can be seen as a scene within an electroniinsti-
tution describing the use of a library as a social utility. The scene could be described
using finite state automata, showing the states between which agents, acting in their









The scene begins in the ‘prohibited’ state, but can move intothe ‘application’ state
if Alanna can send a request message to a possible patron. That patron can either
decline the request, returning the scene to the applicationstate, or he can make a
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recommendation to the library controller, moving the sceneinto the ‘recommendation’
state. The scene can be left either from the prohibition state (if Alanna is unable to
achieve her objective) or from the ‘permission’ state (if Alanna gets the access she
needs).
A flaw inherent in [Esteva et al., 2001], as specified, is a lackof proper distribution of
the protocols defined. Institutions are policed by overseers, which determine whether
or not a given agent is acting in accordance with its designated role. One would prefer
that protocols could be enacted without such oversight, in afully decentralised fashion.
The key to distributing an interaction protocol, and thus distributing an interaction
model amongst a group of peers, is the ability to disseminateto each agent which
wishes to adhere to the protocol the information necessary to allow them to perform
their role in the interaction without requiring access to the entire system. At the same
time, by disseminating each agent’s role specification toall agents in an interaction,
even if other peers cannot execute that role, all agents becom aware of the social
consequences of certain events observed during interaction [Osman, 2007], and can tell
if their peers are acting in accordance with their commitments. We justify the removal
of the requirement that agents be policed by observing that afair interaction protocol
ensures that it is in the interests of agents to follow the protoc l. Moreover, common
knowledge of a protocol ensures that agents which violate their commitments will be
recognised, and this can be factored into future match-making of agents to particular
roles in interaction [Lambert and Robertson, 2005].
The Lightweight Coordination Calculus [Robertson, 2004] and its sister calculus
Multi-Agent Protocols [Walton, 2004a] use this approach. Te strength of LCC (and
MAP) lies in its ability to choreograph a group of agents at a high level of abstraction,
with arbitrarily complex requirements hidden behind simple declarative constraints.
We have already mentioned LCC in Chapter 1, and shown an example of an LCC pro-
tocol in Example 1.1. LCC makes no commitment as to how protocols are distributed,
or how agents can be found to fulfil certain roles however — however there have been
numerous extensions made to LCC which demonstrate how it canbe used in a number
of practical domains [Robertson et al., 2008]. In particular, the recentOpenKnowledge
project [Siebes et al., 2007] has provided an entire framework for multi-agent service
composition and execution which uses LCC to coordinate interac ions.
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2.3 A Formal Specification of Distributed Interaction
Having reviewed a few of the available approaches to interacion, we now concentrate
on distributed dialogues specified by a common interaction pr tocol, as was initially
described in Chapter 1. We provide here an abstract logical specification of how such
dialogue can be conducted in a distributed system — we do thisso that later in Chapter
5, we can demonstrate how our portrayal mechanism might operate alongside an inter-
action by showing how it interfaces with the specification defined here. We shall also
show how our specification can be applied to the Lightweight Coordination Calculus
[Robertson, 2004] — being as it is exemplary of the approach to interaction we advo-
cate in this thesis, and pivotal to optimal understanding ofthe examples of interaction
found in Chapter 6.5
As in §2.2.1, we consider interaction, at its most abstract,as a set of events moti-
vating the transition of an agent system to a new state:
Definition 2.10 An interactionI brings about a system stateS f if the execution ofI
causes a complete transition of an interaction stateS i modelling some prior system
stateSi into a new interaction stateS f which modelsS f :








models(Si ,S i) ∧
transition(S i, I ,S f ) ∧










• models(S,S ) is true if interaction stateS models system stateS as per Definition
2.7.
• transition(S i,E,S f ) is true if the set of events E causes a transition from inter-
action stateS i into interaction stateS f .
• closed(S ) is true if S describes a complete interaction such thatS = (I , /0,M )
as per Definition 2.5, where interaction modelM is specified by some protocol.
Given an initial system stateSi , we state that an agent can bring about interactionI if
it can select a protocol compatible withSi (such that initial interaction stateS i models
5The formal model specified in this section is adapted from that of [Robertson et al., 2008], but
differs in that it specifies a parallelised rather than linear model for multi-agent coordination, which we
believe to be more generically useful.
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Si) and perform a complete enactment of that protocol (generati g I as we transition
from S i to a closed interaction stateS f ) bringing about a new system stateS f (being a
state modelled byS f ).
This is a declarative depiction of an interaction; it can be us d to identify that
an interaction described by a given interaction model has occurred within a system by
identifying a series of system state transitions which match one described by the model,
or it can be taken as an abstraction of the process by which an interaction model can
guide the transition of a system to a new state, with an interac ion as its by-product —
our concern here is primarily with the latter interpretation.
Let us now examine more closely the different parts of our specification.
2.3.1 Initiating Interaction
The first requirement of protocol-based interaction is thatere exists an applicable
protocol available to a motivated agent prior to interaction (in practical terms, this
requirement is best fulfilled by having either a publishing service for protocols, or a
means to synthesise protocols). Agents can then determine which of the available pro-
tocols is actually applicable to its current circumstances, and which of those protocols
best serves its goals.
Definition 2.11 An interaction stateS models a system stateS if S is the initial state
of an interaction based on a protocolP selected by an agentσ which it considers to be
applicable toS:
models(S,S ) ← selection(σ,S,P) ∧ initial state(P,S )
Where:
• selection(σ,S,P) is true if an agentσ would select the protocolP for a new
interaction given the system stateS.
• initial state(P,S ) is true if S = ( /0,∆,M ) according to Definition 2.5 such that
M is the interaction model specified byP and∆ describes all possible outcomes
of executing an interaction according toP.
The selection of a protocol is based on what an agent knows of the system state, biased
by its goals. We do not concern ourselves with exactly how this is done, accepting that
it is part of the internal programming of the agent. We do needto concern ourselves
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however with how an agent can select an interaction state which will model the system
state, despite being (presumably) unable to access that entire state.
Fundamentally, a protocol should not make too many assumptions about the system
from the start, so that it can gracefully bring interaction ta close if circumstances are
different from those assumed by the initiating agent (this can be as simple as providing
a way to close interaction immediately should an initial constraint fail). A protocol
should also be fair to all peers involved; opportunity must be given to agents when-
ever applicable to decline committing to some course of action which they believe to
be incompatible with their current beliefs or commitments.The motivation for the
agent initiating an interaction to select a fair protocol issimply one of enlightened
self-interest — it is unlikely that peers will agree to adhere to a protocol which does
not protect their interests, and a break from protocol will effectively destroy any social
contract being formed between peers.
In abstract terms, a protocolP should specify an interaction modelM which max-
imises the number of possible worlds described by a system stateSi in any transition
relation(Si ,E,S f ) ∈ M such that it is almost always possible to find an interactionI
modelled byM which can be performed from a given initial system state description
(in question is whether that particularI is desirable to a given agent).
Given that we are concerned here with theinitial interaction state, wherein no part
of the interaction has yet transpired, it should be possibleto select an interaction state
S = (H,∆,M ) which models the system stateS without knowledge of the history ofS.
Given that(S, /0,S) ∈ h(S), it should be possible to find a system stateSi ∼ S referred
to inM such that givenH = /0, for everyF ∈ ∆, it is the case that( /0∪F) is modelled
byM in accordance with Definition 2.7.
Example 2.7 Let us return to the premise of Example 2.1, wherein Alanna desires
access to the much-vaunted library. Now recall the protocolfirst displayed in Example
1.1. This protocolacquire access specifies a process by which an agent can obtain
access to a given resource, provided that the advocacy of an existing patron of that






acquire access provides a desirable outcome (in which Alanna becomes able to access
her desired information) and is compatible with system stateS0 as defined in Example
2.2 provided that Alanna adopts the role ofapplicant(library) such thatApplicant =
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alanna, Resource = library andAdvocate = benjamin. The initial interaction stateS0 is
as in Example 2.2 also (albeit with the possible events mapped to messages prescribed
by acquire access).
One part of the contribution of the Open Knowledge project was a service for pub-
lishing and indexing LCC protocols. A mechanism for LCC protocol synthesis was
also examined in [McGinnis et al., 2005]. As yet however, it has generally been as-
sumed that humans will be primarily be responsible for actual selection of protocols,
though work on automatic verification of properties of MAP / LCC protocols has been
conducted [Walton, 2004b, Osman, 2007] which could prove tobe the basis for au-
tonomous protocol selection by agents.
2.3.2 Transitions of Interaction State
Whilst the system state is only partially accessible to and only partially under the con-
trol of the agents within it, the interaction state is something the agents have full control
over (within the confines of an accepted interaction protocol). Instead of actually spec-
ifying the transition of system states then, we instead simply transition the interaction
state, and in doing so enact the actions prescribed by the protocol for such transitions.
Those actions can be relied upon to influence the system stateaccordingly, and main-
tain the link between interaction state and system state modulo any external events.
An interaction state transition is the combination of (parallel) transitions of the
local interaction states accorded to individual agents involved in an interaction:
Definition 2.12 An interaction dialogueI is the set of messages exchanged between
a group of agentsΣ driving a transition from an initial interaction stateS i to a final
interaction stateS f , which can be partitioned into a set of local interaction states for
each agentσ ∈ Σ:

















local state(S i,σ,S [σ]i) ∧
transition(S [σ]i,M(i,σ),M(o,σ),S [σ] f ) ∧






• actors(S ,Σ) is true if Σ is the set of agents involved in the interaction described
by interaction stateS .
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• local state(S ,σ,S [σ]) is true if S [σ] is the the portion of interaction stateS
pertaining directly to the agentσ.
• transition(S [σ]i,Mi ,Mo,S [σ] f ) is true if the local interaction stateS [σ]i of agent
σ can transition into stateS [σ] f given the reception of the messages in set Mi ,
responding with the messages in set Mo.
In general, one would expect that there will be one agent which is evidently involved
in the interaction from the beginning (being the initiatinga ent), and that other agents
will be introduced as interaction progresses. In the specificat on above, it might appear
that we expect all agents that will be involved in an interaction o be known from the
start. This is in fact not the case — we expect that the full setΣ of peers will remain
not fully instantiated for a significant part of the durationf an interaction, and that it
will not be possible to evaluate all agent transitions immediately. In particular, the set
of messages received by an agent must first be dispatched by its peers before they can
be responded to, meaning that most agent transitions will only be able to be evaluated
incrementally, with the ability to progress the interaction being intermittent between
agents. Naturally if interaction is to continue towards completion, it must always be
possible to advance at least one peer’s portion of the interaction state at any particular
point in the interactive process.
Example 2.8 Alanna wants to use the protocolacquire access to transition from a
system state in which she cannot access the library to one in which she can. At this
point, we know that Alanna is going to be one of the actors in the final dialogue, but
as yet we are uncertain as to which other agents will be involved. The part of the
interaction local to Alanna is described by the predicatetransition:
transition(S [alanna]i,M(alanna,i),M(alanna,o),S [alanna] f )
WhereinS [alanna] is the interaction stateS known to Alanna, and M(alanna,i) and
M(alanna,o) are the sets of messages received and dispatched during interaction re-
spectively. Naturally, we do not know the content of these two sets from the outset of
dialogue either.
As interaction progresses however, we are able to incrementally instantiate our
model. Say that Alanna requests Benjamin’s aid as expected.We know then that
request ∈M(alanna,o). We also now know that Benjamin is a participant in the interac-
tion, in the role ofadvocate(library):
transition(S [benjamin]i,M(benjamin,i),M(benjamin,o),S [benjamin] f )
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In addition, we know thatrequest∈M(benjamin,i) (this is verified, in a circuitous way, by
the requirement that the set of all dispatched messages matches he set of all received
messages, as well as the requirement in Definition 2.14 laterthat all messages are used
to progress interaction).
Finally, if the resulting dialogue does indeed unfold as described in Example 2.1,
we shall be able to introduce Charlotte to the interaction, ad fully instantiate our
model such that:
transition(S [alanna]i ,{permit},{request},S [alanna] f )
transition(S [benjamin]i ,{request},{advocate(alanna)},S [benjamin] f )
transition(S [charlotte]i ,{advocate(alanna)},{permit},S [charlotte] f )
At which point we can infer that interactionI = {request≺ advocate(alanna) ≺
permit}.
Other than the initiating agent, agents are generally inducted into an interaction be-
cause they have been identified as satisfying some logical requirement described by
the interaction protocol and are then sent a message to that effec ; in some systems
however, peers are selected in advance of interaction. Either way, selection of peers
may involve invocation of a matchmaking service in order to identify suitable peers,
such as that specified by [Lambert and Robertson, 2005].
2.3.2.1 Decomposing the Interaction State
The interaction state for a distributed interaction supported by an interaction protocol
can be seen to consist of three parts; the protocol itself, thactive state and the norma-
tive model. The protocol is a distributed interaction modelas described by Definition
2.8 — in practical terms, it consists of a set of process models which can be assigned
to agents acting in particular roles in a compatible interaction. The set of active clauses
is the set of process modelsin situ — that is, it consists of copies of process models
extracted from the protocol which have been adopted by agents, a d which are in some
state of execution (which is represented by transformations of the models, as will be
described below). The normative model describes any socialnorms applicable to the
interaction. We do not concern ourselves much with norms — basically the normative
model in a interaction state is a black box for the elements ofsocial behaviour which
we do not address in this thesis. For example, the normative model might provide rules
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restricting the actions an agent can take whilst engaged in an teraction (e.g. to en-
sure that the agent does not sabotage the integrity of the interaction by simultaneously
engaging in another interaction which changes the underlying basis for the first inter-
action), or provide rules restricting how long an agent can st ll in providing a response
to a message (e.g. in order to acquire information to help it resolve a constraint without
resorting to abduction). LCC provides a simple example of a normative element; a pro-
tocol designer can add ‘common knowledge’ predicates to a protocol which provide a
standard means to resolve a particular logical constraint.6
In a distributed system, the interaction state for an interaction must be distributed
amongst all interacting peers. In question then is how much information each agent
requires to conduct its role(s) in interaction. At the very least, each agent needs access
to the process models for every role it adopts. Since these models are extracted from
a common interaction protocol, and agents may adopt additional roles as interaction
progresses, it would seem expedient for every agent to possess a full copy of the pro-
tocol. This confers an additional benefit — individual peerswill always be aware of
the provenance of certain events (because they can determine the pre-conditions for
the dispatch of a given message by any of their peers in the interaction from the pro-
cess models for their roles) and thus will be able to verify from events observed the
the decisions peers must have taken in their given roles and what commitments they
essentially make if they are to continue to adhere to the commn protocol.
Definition 2.13 The local interaction stateS [σ] for an agentσ is a partition of the
interaction stateS containing the protocolP, the normative modelN and the subset
M [σ] of active clauses adopted byσ:









norms(S ,N ) ∧
role models(S ,σ,M [σ]) ∧









• protocol(S ,P) is true ifP is the protocol to which interaction stateS adheres.
• norms(S ,N ) is true ifN describes the social norms to which interaction state
S adheres.
6This does not invalidate our own contribution however, since these predicates tend only to decom-
pose a constraint into smaller, more elementary constraints, which are still subject to interpretation by
agents.
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• role models(S ,σ,M [σ]) is true ifM [σ] is the set of process models adopted by
agentσ so far according to interaction stateS . For each role R adopted byσ,
there exists a process modelM [R,σ] ∈M [σ].
• peer state(M [σ],P,N ) returns the local interaction stateS [σ] collectively de-
scribed by process modelsM [σ], protocolP and social normsN .
Selection of roles in interaction, and thus the process models to use from the interaction
protocol, depends on the state of interaction. At the start of interaction, the agent
responsible for initiating the interaction and selecting its protocol must select an initial
role. Clearly this must be a role from which it can immediately transition its state
and generate events which will induct further peers into theint raction (as defined
immediately below). Aside from this requirement however, an agent is free to select
any role which suits its needs, and we do not concern ourselvewith this further. Other
agents are essentially drawn into roles by the events they observe; they can only select
a role which allows them to respond to such events, otherwisethe interaction will not
proceed. As interaction progresses, the process models described within an agent’s
local interaction state will ‘unfold’,7 essentially closing off outcomes which no longer
apply to the current interaction state, and opening paths which are admissible given the
events observed.
2.3.2.2 Local State Transition
The actual conduct of interaction is in the local state transitions made by agents in
response to observations, and the effect such transitions have on an agent, its peers and
its environment.
Definition 2.14 The local interaction stateS [σ] of an agentσ cannot advance without
an event to trigger that advancement. This forms a base case for local state transition:
transition(S [σ], /0, /0,S [σ]) ← true
Otherwise, an agentσ will dispatch a set of messages(Mo∪Mn) in response to re-
ceiving messages Mi as it transitions from a local interaction stateS [σ]i to a state
S [σ] f :
transition(S [σ]i,Mi,(Mo∪Mn),S [σ] f ) ←
7Imagine a sheet of paper, folded several times. Large parts of its surface are hidden, and the observer
can only guess what is on it. As the sheet gets unfolded however, more of its hidden surface is revealed.
Eventually, all of its surface will become clearly apparent. This would appear to be the reasoning behind
the notion of ‘unfolding’ a logical clause.








role model(S [σ]i,M [R,σ]i) ∧
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−−−−−−−−−→M [R,σ] j ∧
updated state(S [σ]i,M [R,σ] j ,S [σ] j) ∧









• role model(S [σ],M [R,σ]) is true ifM [R,σ] is a role model describing the re-
quirements placed on agentσ when acting in role R given the local interaction
stateS [σ].
• M [R,σ]i
Mi ,S [σ],M j ,Mn
−−−−−−−−→ M [R,σ] j is an unfolding by agentσ of process model
M [R,σ]i into M [R,σ] j in response to receiving messages(Mi/M j) in accor-
dance with the protocol stored within local interaction state S [σ]; this act of
unfolding generates the set of messages Mn.
• updated state(S [σ]i,M [R,σ],S [σ] j) is true if S [σ] j describes the local interac-
tion state after re-integration of process modelM [R,σ] into prior local interac-
tion stateS [σ]i.
• transition(S [σ]i,Mi ,Mo,S [σ] f ) is true if agentσ can transition from local inter-
action stateS [σ]i to stateS [σ] f given the reception of messages Mi , dispatching
the set of messages Mo in response.
Given a distributed dialogue protocol, an agent can transition state by successfully un-
folding the process model for any one of its adopted roles in interaction. By executing
the actions prescribed within, an agent will generate events which will change the sys-
tem state and drive interaction further. A process model canonly be unfolded given
the satisfaction of any conditions imposed by the model however. Logical constraints
require an evaluation of agent beliefs, which are derived from observation of events
and personal introspection. Meanwhile, agents can only take certain actions if certain
defined messages have been received from peers during interaction; these messages
compose the actual interaction dialogue proper. The connectio between interaction
state and system state is maintained by the evaluation of constrai ts and execution of
responses; the imposition of constraints ensures that the syst m state has bearing on
the interaction state, and the execution of actions (including the generation of new
dialogue) ensures that the system state changes alongside the interaction state.
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At this point, we can demonstrate how a role model drawn from an LCC protocol
can be unfolded; this is done incrementally, where in each step an agent either dis-
patches a message, formally receives a message, satisfies a con traint or performs an
action. Unfolding is performed by finding a compatible rewrite ule and, subject to any
conditions, applying it to the role model. Whilst we concentrate on LCC specifically,
one can imagine an analogous process for any equivalent agent protocol language.
Definition 2.15 A role modelM [R,σ] = a(R,σ) :: P drawn from an LCC protocolP
can be incrementally unfolded by applying appropriaterewrite rules to a(R,σ) :: P
and its sub-clauses:8
a(Rn,σ) :: P
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ a(Rn, I) :: E if P
Rn,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−−→ E
P1 else P2
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ E if P1
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ E ∨
P2
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ E
P1 par P2



















R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ P1 then E if closed(P1) ∧
P2
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ E
P1 then P2
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ E then P2 if P1
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ E
M⇒ a(Rr ,σr)
R,Mi ,Mi ,S [σ],{m(a(R,σ),a(Rr,σr),M)}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c(M⇒ a(Rr ,σr))
P←M⇐ a(Rs,σs)
R,Mi ,Mi/m(a(Rs.σs),a(R,σ),M),S [σ], /0
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c(M⇐ a(Rs,σs)) then P
if m(a(Rs,σs),a(R,σ),M)∈Mi
P←C
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ E if satisfied(σ,C) ∧
P
R,Mi,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ E
a(Rn,σ)
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ a(Rn,σ) :: P if role model(S [σ],a(Rn,σ) :: P)
A
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ c(A) if execute(σ,A)
A role modela(R,σ) :: P isclosed(i.e. role R has been performed byσ in its entirety),
if all of its sub-clauses are closed. This can be determined using the following rules:
8For brevity, we have omitted a few rewrite rules which are merely pedantic variations on those
present.
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closed(a(R,σ) :: P) ← closed(P)
closed(P1 then P2) ← closed(P1) ∧ closed(P2)
closed(c(P)) ← true
Individual rewrite rules may be conditional on the satisfaction of certain logical propo-
sitions:
• interleave(P1,P2,E) produces an interleaving E of parallel procedures P1 and P2
such that any closed sub-clauses of either procedure are sequentially ordered,
according to the following (strictly ordered) rules:
interleave(P1,P2,P1 then P2) ← closed(P1)
interleave(P1,P2,P2 then P1) ← closed(P2)
interleave(P1 then P2,P3,P1 then E) ← closed(P1) ∧ interleave(P2,P3,E)
interleave(P1,P2 then P3,P2 then E) ← closed(P2) ∧ interleave(P1,P3,E)
interleave(P1,P2,P1 par P2) ← true
This ensures that a role model with parallelised sub-procedur s will describe the
order in which events are handled when unfolded.
• satisfied(σ,C) is true if logical constraint C can be satisfied using the beliefs of
agentσ.
• role model(S [σ],a(R,σ) :: P) is true if there exists a role modela(R,σ) :: P de-
fined withinP, the protocol used to modelS (P is shared by all agents involved in
S and thus is accessible withinS [σ]). This is identical in principle torole model
as defined in Definition 2.14.
• execute(σ,A) calls upon agentσ to execute action A immediately. This may
affect a change in agent state, or a change in the environment. There a few
special actions worth noting:
– null does nothing. It is often convenient to perform a null action— for
example, within the base cases of recursively-defined role mdels.
– succeed indicates that an agent has achieved its goal within the interaction;
the idea is that an agent can enact any plans contingent upon achieving
a desired outcome upon encountering this action (e.g. accessing the data
within a library).
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– fail indicates that an agent has not achieved its goal within the int raction;
the idea is that if an agent has any alternative plans in case of failure, it can
enact them upon encountering this action. Note thatfail doesnot indicate
a breakdown of the interaction itself — instead, it merely indicates that an
agent’s ideal outcome has not emerged (e.g. an agent’s request is refused).
The above rewrite rules are not quite the same as those found in [Robertson, 2004,
Robertson et al., 2008] — this is to better accommodate our contribution. In this case,
the grammar for LCC has been made slightly more permissive, and a stronger distinc-
tion is made betweendeclarativeconstraints (which is what we usually mean by the
term ‘logical constraint’) andproceduralconstraints (which we prefer to refer to as
actions). Traditionally LCC does not make a strong distinction, and allows both ac-
tive and reactive constraints which may or may not exhibit a procedural effect when
evaluated.9 Because our contribution is only concerned with investigating he truth
of logical propositions, and not with the side-effects of evaluating propositions which
are merely wrappers for procedures, we want to make it as easyas possible for our
portrayal mechanism to be able to distinguish between the two.
Example 2.9 By applying the rewrite rules of Definition 2.15, Alanna can transform
her process model, driving her interaction with Benjamin and Charlotte forward. For
instance . . .
Alanna should request help from Benjamin if the library is not accessible and
Benjamin is a patron of the library . . .
a(applicant(library), alanna) ::
request⇒ a(advocate(library), benjamin)
← ¬ accessible(alanna, library) ∧ patron(benjamin, library) then . . .
. . . becomes . . .
Alanna has requested help from Benjamin . . .
a(applicant(library), alanna) ::
c(request⇒ a(advocate(library), benjamin)) then . . .
. . . because Alanna is satisfied that the library is inaccessible (accessible(alanna, li-
brary) is false) and that Benjamin is a patron of the library (patron(benjamin, library)
is true). As a side effect, this produces messagerequest directed towards Benjamin in
9In this respect, LCC treats propositions as if predicate calls in Prolog, revealing its roots as a proto-
type written in that language.
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the role ofadvocate(library), which allows us to enter Benjamin into the interaction as
described in Example 2.8.
Assume that Benjamin responds to Alanna’s request, and recommends her to Char-
lotte. Charlotte, deeming Alanna eligible, then dispatches a messagepermit to Alanna.
This allows her to unfold her model further:
a(applicant(library), alanna) ::
c(request⇒ a(advocate(library), benjamin)) then
c(permit⇐ a(controller(library), charlotte)) then
succeed← accessible(alanna, library).
At this point, all that remains is to complete the interaction by confirming that the
library is indeed now accessible (which Alanna will either accept as a consequence of
receiving Charlotte’s permission, or will confirm independtly).
2.3.3 Completing Interaction
Interaction is complete (‘closed’) once all agents have completed their roles in the
interaction, and thus no further events are expected to be obs rved pertaining to that
interaction:
Definition 2.16 An interaction stateS models a system stateS if S is the final state of
an interactionI which is part of the recent history ofS:
models(S,S ) ← ∃!I . ( interaction(S , I ) ∧ stimulus(S, I ) )
Where:
• interaction(S , I ) is true if interaction stateS = (H,∆,M ) as per Definition 2.5
such that interactionI = (H∪F) for some F∈ ∆ (i.e. interactionI is one of the
interactions whichS might describe).
• stimulus(S, I ) is true if(Si , I ,S)∈ h(S) for some system stateSi as per Definition
2.6 (i.e. interactionI is a stimulus for the transition of the system into stateS).
Given that a final interaction stateS = (I , /0,M ) such that it describes a unique inter-
actionI which has finished, with no further events due, it is clear that S models any
system stateS which immediately transpires at the end ofI . Note that in our specifica-
tion, the interaction state will always model the system state immediately after the end
of interaction because that system state will be a product ofthe actions performed in
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transitioning the interaction state to its final form (alongwith any coincident external
events which failed to stop interaction).
If the interaction state is inferred to model the system state by means of Definition
2.16, then the interaction has clearly ended (otherwise it would not already be in the
history of the system state). However, there are other meansto i fer that the interaction
state models the system state without requiring interaction to be complete. Therefore
in Definition 2.10, we perform an additional check (closed(S )) in order to ensure that
interaction has actually finished.
2.4 Distributed Decision Making
Within a distributed system, each agent has its own view of the system — an agent
extrapolates the system state from its own personal state and its observations of its
environment. If an agent cannot access the personal states of its peers and it cannot
directly perceive in its entirety the environment in which the agent system is situated,
then we must accept that the agent will not be able to construct a complete description
of the system state. This does not preclude it from partakingin interaction of course —
aside from the coordination of behaviour, interaction is often used to gather informa-
tion from peers. Agents can infer more details about a systemfro the behaviour of
their peers, particularly if peers can be expected to adhereto some known interaction
model.
In Definition 2.3, we specified that an interaction could be understood by the state
transitions caused by the events comprising that interaction. A given interaction model
is unlikely to actually define transitions from every possible concrete system state to
every other concrete system state. Instead, it would define abstract states which could
describe any number of actual system states based on what aspects of the system ac-
tually have bearing on the modelled interaction. To be able to ffectively apply an
interaction model to a new interaction, it is only necessarythat agents know enough
about the system to be able to respond to events.
As an interaction unfolds, agents can refine their understanding of the system by
observing their peers’ actions, and comparing them with theinteraction model. As-
suming adherence to the model, the observation of a given event indicates a particular
system transition; agents can thus infer that the real system ate lies in the intersec-
tion of possible worlds described by the transition relation in the interaction model,
and their own system state description. Of course, this assume that agents always
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perceive the world accurately.
The basic justification for non-deductive reasoning is the ne d to make decisions
with incomplete information. Consider an interaction wherein an agent must select one
of two actions, each of which leads to a different system state, both of which are justi-
fiable given the agent’s knowledge of the system. Based on a balance of admissibility,
probability and risk, the agent assumes a given system stateand selects an action —
and indeed, continues to act based on that assumption. Any peers observing the actions
of that agent will then be given cause to infer that assumption themselves, regardless
of whether or not it accurately reflects reality.
Eventually, two agents with mutually inconsistent views ofthe world are likely
to interact, and this is going to affect how the agents behave. An event will occur
which cannot be reconciled with the state an agent believes the ystem to be in, and the
interaction state will no longer model that system state, compelling the agent to resort
to one of the options described at the end of §2.2.1. However because the perception
that the interaction state does not model the system state isnot universal, it may be that
such efforts actually lead to dissonance between interaction and system state from the
perspective of the other agent. In fact, it may not be possible for the interaction state
to model all views of the system simultaneously at all. Note that his can occur even if
all agents are acting in adherence to a common protocol.
Example 2.10 In our running example, Alanna believes that she can be trusted with
access to the library. It is possible however, that Benjaminin fact believes that Alanna
is not trustworthy. Assume that dialogue is conducted in adherence to protocolac-
quire access as per Example 2.7; it is commonly known that an advocate willrec-
ommend an applicant iftrustworthy(Applicant, Resource). Thus we have a scenario
wherein Alanna expects Benjamin to recommend her to Charlotte, but Benjamin will
not, due to contradictory beliefs. This means that in spite of having a common proto-
col, there will still come a point in which the interaction state will appear not to model
the system state.
Let us look at another less admittedly subjective constraint. A controller will only
permit access if the advocate is already a trusted peer andeligible(Applicant, Re-
source). It may be that Charlotte lacks information about Alanna, oreven has false
beliefs about her which would lead her to infer that Alanna isineligible. Again, if
Alanna believes that sheis eligible, this will create a circumstance where interaction
state does not model apparent system state.
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This creates a dilemma. The interaction has already gone awry (from the perspective of
at least one agent), but all peers are committed to completing the interaction according
to the protocol. This may force agents to act in ways counter to their best judgement
in order to fulfil a social contract (not so evident in the above example, but imagine
if Benjamin trusts Alanna, butCharlottedoes not — by the protocol, Charlotte must
grant access if Alanna is eligible anyway, because the evaluation of trustworthiness is
conferred to Benjamin alone). Another possibly more damaging scenario may arise;
an agent may think that events support their perception of the system state, but in fact
are indicative of another state which is actually less beneficial to them, such that the
agent actually acts against its own best interests (e.g. Alanna isnot trustworthy, but
Benjamin and Charlotte assume that she is, indirectly givinher access to a sensitive
resource). We would like to prevent either scenario from occurring where possible.
It might be worth noting that technically there is a very easyway to ensure con-
sistency between different views of the system on the part ofindividual agents. That
is simply by applying epistemic modal logic [Fagin et al., 1995] — if beliefs are ex-
plicitly accorded to individual agents, then there is no inco sistency (because whilst
‘Alanna is eligible’ and ‘Alanna is not eligible’ are inconsistent statements, ‘Alanna
believesthat Alanna is eligible’ and ‘Charlottebelievesthat Alanna is not eligible’ are
not). However, this does not in practice actually solve the problems just described,
because essentially all it does is divest agents of responsibility for peers’ beliefs, when
what we actually want is for agents to be in agreement. We are more interested in
the possibility that if agents were able to combine their pertin nt beliefs, they would
actually be able to draw better conclusions.
Our preferred approach then is to have a mechanism to repair system state de-
scriptions, or more specifically, the beliefs of agents usedto make decisions during
interaction.
Example 2.11 Assume that Alanna believes that she is trustworthy, but Charlotte be-
lieves otherwise. It is Benjamin who will ultimately have todecide one way or the
other. We want to be able to identify the conflict before Benjamin makes his decision
and, if possible, resolve it. We do not however want to sift through everything that
Alanna and Charlotte believe about the system, because mostof it is not relevant to
the decision to be made.
What we would like is for Benjamin, prior to evaluating the pro ositiontrustwor-
thy(alanna, library), to invite Alanna and Charlotte to posit their expectations:
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Alanna: true→ trustworthy(alanna, library).
Charlotte: trustworthy(alanna, library)→ false.
Noting a dispute, Benjamin would then permit agents to elabor te upon their claims,
or to attack one another’s assumptions. Assume that Charlotte’s distrust of Alanna is
based on an erroneous belief about past behaviour:
Charlotte: true→ stole data(alanna, . . . ) . . .
This might be immediately quashed by Benjamin, who knows that Alanna did not do
such a thing. Assuming that Charlotte cannot produce an alternative argument, it
would then appear that it is admissible to trust Alanna, and upon resuming the main
interaction, there would be no apparent dissonance betweenth interaction state and
the apparent system state.
In essence, we want to allow agents to share information, such that fewer unfounded
assumptions are made (because the system state descriptions agent use are more ‘com-
plete’) and the outcome of interaction meets the expectations of peers (because in-
consistencies between system state descriptions have beenidentified and removed). It
could be said that what we are looking for is a distributed truth maintenance system
[Huhns and Bridgeland, 1991] — albeit one which is specifically targeted at making
specific multi-agent coordination tasks more robust, rather t an ensuring global con-
sistency of beliefs (which we argue in the next chapter to be prohibitively expensive
and impractical computationally).
We want to do this however in a fashion which does not negate the advantage of us-
ing interaction protocols (compact descriptions of interaction with well-defined events
and state transitions). Therefore, we want to frame this as adi tinct interactive process
which works alongside the main interaction, and merely intercedes where necessary to
ensure that the most rational outcome arises. This has the benefit of allowing us to use
unaugmented protocols. In Chapter 5, we shall specify such aprocess. Prior to this
however, we shall demonstrate how argumentation can be usedto r pair inconsisten-
cies between agent beliefs, giving us a formal basis upon which to build our ultimate
contribution.
In summary — in this chapter we formalised our preferred notion of interaction
and described how interaction between intelligent agents can be identified and guided
by various means, but in particular using dialogue protocols written in the Lightweight
Coordination Calculus [Robertson, 2004]. We provided a model for the process of exe-
cuting an interaction in accordance with an LCC protocol, soas to provide a framework
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upon which we can later attach our contribution (to be specified n Chapter 5). We also
considered the problems inherent in interaction between independent peers even when
guided by a protocol, with particular emphasis this last secion on contrasting agent
beliefs — this sets up the motivation for the next chapter. What we shall do in Chapter
3 then is build up a case for using argumentation to reconcilethe beliefs of agents prior




An Argumentative Approach to
Defeasible Reasoning
It may be that an agent is unable to rely entirely on deductivereasoning in order to
function in a sufficiently complex environment. It may find itnecessary instead to
make decisions based on assumptions drawn from untested hypotheses. By making
such assumptions, an agent can act in uncertain and volatilecircumstances, rather than
succumb to decision paralysis. It must always be recognisedhowever that any as-
sumptions made, even when consistent with all evidence available at the time, may
later prove to be false. Thus, an agent must be willing to revise its beliefs and discard
prior conclusions upon the discovery of new information.
In a multi-agent system made up of heterogeneous agents, it can be expected that
the assumptions made will vary from agent to agent, based on each agent’s particular
experiences and biases. This may lead to a divergence of belie s, which in turn can lead
to even ostensibly cooperative agents responding differently to the same set of circum-
stances. In particular, an agent might expect that a peer will account for certain factors
before making a decision, factors which the peer might actually be ignorant of — such
a presumption could adversely affect the outcome of any interac ion which happens
to be contingent upon such a decision. Consequently, it is important to consider how
social mechanisms such as dialogue can be used by agents to periodically compare
observations and challenge expectations, ideally to arrive at a unified viewpoint — but
if not that, then at least to arrive at a consensus to the effect that conflicting beliefs can
still be held to be based on rational interpretations of all the evidence available. Such
a consensus hinges upon having a robust model for describinghow those conflicting
beliefs can be inferred from observed data, and how those beli fs then interact within
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a given social context.
We should not make the mistake of assuming however that dialogue is the imme-
diate process from which agents derive their beliefs. Dialogue is merely a means to
introduce new hypotheses into the internal reasoning machinery of the listener. Before
we can properly consider social reasoning, we must first consider how agents deter-
mine beliefs in isolation so that we can then understand the influence of dialogue upon
that process.
Argumentationresearch has provided generic frameworks within which to com-
prehend the process of defeasible reasoning (for example [Bondarenko et al., 1993,
Dung, 1995, Kowalski and Toni, 1996, Kakas et al., 1998]), and such frameworks of-
ten play proxy to any of a number of alternative logics ([Kakas and Toni, 1999] men-
tions default logic [Reiter, 1980], modal logics [McDermott, 1982] and auto-epistemic
logic [Moore, 1985] as examples). Interestingly, despite being based on a naturally
multi-agent metaphor, argumentation is often distilled inthe literature such that it be-
comes an introspective process which can easily be confined to a single actor1 — it is
this line of research which we most closely follow in this chapter, despite our intention
to then distribute that process as an essential part of this thesis’ contribution.
In summary, this chapter concerns itself with the use of argumentation to derive
theories which agents can then use to make decisions. In §3.1, we consider the funda-
mental mechanics of theory production, in order to ensure that we have a foundation
on which to then build our argumentation system. In §3.2, we specify an assumption-
based argumentation system which can produce admissible theories given a set of can-
didate hypotheses. This will allow us to explore in the next chapter how argumentation
can be distributed amongst a group of peers.
3.1 Requirements of Practical Reasoning
Before moving onto the particulars of our model for defeasible reasoning, it is worth
identifying some of the fundamental elements of logical, agent-oriented reasoning;
such elements serve to provide a useful foundation upon which to build further models.
This also provides an opportunity to summarise many of the practical difficulties faced
by any agent which needs to reason about and act within a complex environment.
An agent may have available to it any number of information sources. These in-
formation sources may be internal to an agent (e.g. its memori s, goals or the internal
1Not always however — see for example [Rahwan et al., 2003, Prakken, 2005].
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Figure 3.1: An agent applies a logical framework to interpret some informa-
tion source.
state of its components). They may also be external, part of an agent’s environment
(various artefacts, records, communications from other agnts, etc.). In order to in-
terpret such information sources, some kind oflogical frameworkis required. Such a
framework can be used to deconstruct compatible streams of information into mean-
ingful logical sentences from which can be derived further conclusions by application
of some inference procedure:
Definition 3.1 A logical framework can be described by a pair(L , ⊢) where:
• L defines all interpretable sentences under this logic framework — L can be
treated as the set containing every such sentence to the effect that if an informa-
tion sourceΘ is interpretable by(L , ⊢), thenΘ⊆ L (i.e. we can considerΘ to
be a set of sentences drawn fromL ).
• ⊢ is an inference procedure used to derive conclusions from sets of premises by
application of inference rules encoded within⊢. If a conclusionϕ ∈ L can be
inferred from an information sourceΘ ⊆ L using ⊢, then it can be stated that
Θ ⊢ ϕ.
The purpose of a logical framework is to provide syntax for a corpus of information and
pragmatics for its interpretation.2. Any single information source may be interpreted
radically differently depending on the logical framework used, although most artificial
information sources are created with a particular syntax (and semantics) in mind. An
agent’s knowledge base also constitutes an information source, albeit a derivative one.
An agent need not apply the same framework to all informationsources available to it.
In this work, we concern ourselves primarily with logical frameworks which re-
strict themselves to only monotonic inference, and is closed under negation.
2Strictly speaking a logical framework doesnot provide semantics — the meaning attributed to a
body of information cannot be adequately determined without additional context.
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Figure 3.2: An agent applies a deductive framework to draw conclusions
from its knowledge base.
Definition 3.2 A deductive framework is a logical framework(L , ⊢) in which all
inference using⊢ is monotonic.3
• Given a sentenceϕ∈ L , there exists a direct negation¬ϕ∈ L such thatϕ∧¬ϕ ⊢
false.
Ideally, an agent would be able to restrict itself to purely deductive inference, such that
provided the information available is accurate, the agent ca have perfect confidence
in any conclusions inferred. Unfortunately, within a sufficiently complex environment
which can be described asinaccessible, dynamicandnon-deterministic(amongst other
qualities) [Russell and Norvig, 1995], such an idealistic policy may not be sufficient
for that agent to achieve its goals. Consider:
Inaccessibility — An inaccessible environment is one in which an agent cannotde-
duce the environment’s complete state. Certain facts aboutthe environment can-
not be soundly inferred, and as a result an agent might have tomake assumptions
based on what it perceives to be the most likely scenario given pr vious obser-
vations.
Dynamism — A dynamic environment’s state can change without input from an
agent. If an agent is too slow to respond to events, then the world may change,
removing the justification for its action. Even if an agentcanacquire the infor-
mation it requires to soundly determine the optimal response to an event, it may
be impossible to do so within the window of opportunity.
Non-determinism — Often a side-effect of inaccessibility, a non-determinist c envi-
ronment is one in which there can be more than one possible result of an action,
3This is basically the same as the deductive framework(L ,R ) used in [Dung et al., 2007] and other
papers with the rules inRsubsumed within⊢, except that(L , ⊢) is always closed under negation, which
is not presumed by(L ,R ).
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Figure 3.3: An agent applies a hypothesis generator to provide an explana-
tion for its observations.
with no apparent factor to indicate one result over another.The deductive agent
must consider all disjunctions of possible consequences — something which in
most logics is computationally prohibitive (and indeed is often disallowed in
many logics to improve computability [Levesque and Brachman, 1987]), with-
out any expectation of a firm final conclusion.4
All these factors serve to make deductive reasoning difficult — taken together they
make it all but impossible for an agent of limited resources to perform any kind of
complex reasoning which does not involve some degree of abductive or inductive in-
ference.
Definition 3.3 A hypothesis generatoris any logical framework(L , ⊢) in which ⊢
is used to perform non-monotonic reasoning.
• Given an information sourceΘ ⊆ L , a hypothesis generator can produce a set
of hypotheses H such thatΘ ⊢ h for every h∈ H.
An agent can use a hypothesis generator to produce possible explanations for its ob-
servations; it can then choose to assume some of these hypotheses if no contradictory
evidence is available and the advantages of acting based on such a sumptions is con-
sidered to outweigh the inherent risk of being wrong. This can be done by using a
deductive frameworkwithin a hypothesis generator to perform deductions with can-
didate assumptions — if a contradiction can be generated within a given subset of
assumptions, then the hypothesis generator should not generat those assumptions to-
gether in the same context, but should instead find a different set of assumptions which
provide a consistent theory.
An agent’s beliefs can be said then to be based on a balance of empirical obser-
vation and hypothetical speculation as befits the environment in which the agent finds
4This tends to motivate the use of probabilistic methods to chose the most likely result. Tacit
assumptions are still being made however, and so such methods are intrinsically non-monotonic.
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itself. These beliefs can then be used to made decisions and solve problems encoun-
tered in an agent’s pursuit of its goals. However, decision-making based on a set of
beliefs is only rational if those beliefs areconsistentwith one another.
Definition 3.4 A set of sentencesΠ is internally consistentunder a deductive frame-
work (L , ⊢) if it is the case thatΠ ⊆ L and there exist no two inferencesΠ ⊢ ϕ and
Π ⊢ ϕ̄ whereϕ andϕ̄ are mutually exclusive (i.e.Π ⊢ ¬(ϕ∧ ϕ̄)).
Once an agent starts relying on inferences built on assumptions however, it increases
the risk that the beliefs which logically follow willnot be internally consistent. It
may not even be practical to prevent this ever happening — theinherent intractability
of consistency checking for arbitrary theories described using many expressive logics
means that it will not always be feasible to identify all conflicting beliefs within a
knowledge base of a particular size within a given time frame, nor may it even be
a simple matter to resolve them once found [Hansson, 2003]. Nonetheless, within
certain limited contexts, it may still be feasible to construc a consistent theory.5
Definition 3.5 A context theoryΠ is a set of beliefs drawn from a hypothesis space∆
which is internally consistent under a deductive framework(L , ⊢).
The context in which a theory is formed and used is deliberately kept ill-defined here,
being something determined by the reasoner and its circumstances. Fundamentally, a
context theory is produced by some formal mechanism drawingfrom a limited hypoth-
esis space, where the hypothesis space describes the hypotheses generated by some
hypothesis generator and the conclusions which we are interested in trying to draw
within the context; we then use that mechanism to select hypot eses to use as assump-
tions in some (hopefully) consistent theory. For example in§3.2.4, we define contexts
for theories generated within an assumption-based argumentatio framework.
In general, we suspect that agents in true information-richenvironments will re-
quire some means to partition their beliefs so as to limit theamount of computation
involved when conducting particular reasoning tasks — whatever the result of such a
partitioning, the basis for that partitioning will providethe context for a given reason-
ing problem. In this thesis, we are interested in theories drawn within the context of
practical interactions between peers:
5In belief revision literature, ‘theory’ is generally used to refer to the closure of a set of beliefs. Here
it is used generically to describe any coherent set of related beliefs, which may or may not be closed
under deduction.
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Example 3.1 An agent Eliza intends to enlist one of her peers to gather astronomical
data for analysis in order to test her thesis. In order to determine the best course of ac-
tion, she needs to produce a theory which can provide an answer to c rtain questions:
Is the local observatory suitable for gathering the required data?
Is there a peer who can gather the data for her?
Eliza has already observed the following, interpreted according to some logicL :6
∀X,Y,Z. suitable(X,Y)∧ requires(Y,Z)→ available(X,Z)
“If a facility is suitable for a task, then any instrument required for the task
must be provided by the facility.”
∀X,Y,Z. assignable(X,Y)∧ suitable(Y,Z)→ performable(X,Z)
“An agent can perform a task if it can be assigned the task at a facility
suitable for that task.”
∀X,Y. performable(X,Y)→ capable(X,Y)
“Being allowed to perform a task implies that an agent is capable of per-
forming that task.”
Using these observations as an information source, Eliza might then generate the fol-
lowing hypotheses within a hypothesis generator(L , ⊢H) (such that each hypothesis
is inferred from the above observations):
suitable(observatory,experiment)
“The local observatory is suitable for Eliza’s experiment.”
requires(experiment,telescope(optical))
“Eliza’s experiment requires an optical telescope.”
¬available(observatory,telescope(optical))
“The telescope at the observatory is broken.”
assignable(dante,observatory)
“Dante can be assigned tasks at the observatory.”
¬capable(dante,experiment)




“Dante has experience performing experiments like Eliza’s.”
Assuming that Eliza is not able to access another information source which can con-
firm or refute any of these hypotheses by observation, it thenbefalls Eliza to produce
a theory consistent with what evidence she does have which can be used to resolve the
6All logical expressions in this chapter use the conventionsf Prolog for variables and constants,
where variable names begin with an upper-case letter, and costant terms do not.
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questions presented to her; this can be done by selecting a subset of the above hypothe-
ses which is internally consistent according to adeductiveframework(L , ⊢D) (along
with any other hypotheses Eliza might generate from furtherobservations). Our con-
cern over the rest of the chapter then is withhow Eliza can use(L , ⊢D) to efficiently
select which hypotheses to assume as part of a theory by whichs e then might use to
make decisions when interacting with her peers.
Our primary concern in this chapter is not so much with thegenerationof hypotheses,
for which many approaches can be conceived, but with the ration l selectionof hy-
potheses consistent with available evidence and other selected hypotheses within some
logical context. Given a justifiable set of assumptions, we can then form theories which
can be used to describe an agent’s chosen beliefs within thatcontext, and so be used
by that agent to make decisions. We are also interested in howthose theories should be
revised in the face of new evidence and new, possibly more compelling, propositions.
We are still concerned with one type of hypothesis generation actually. Hypotheses
generated by communication, where agents engage in dialogue and introduce new con-
cepts to one another is every bit as valid a means of hypothesis g neration as private
speculation, particularly because such concepts have generally already been evaluated
by another peer based on its own information sources. We shall see ater that the por-
trayal mechanism introduced in Chapter 1 can be seen as a social hypothesis generator
for the agents involved in an interaction just as easily as itcan be seen as a hypothesis
selector for communal reasoning. It is simply a matter of pers ctive.
For the remainder of this chapter and the next, we shall focusn argumentation, a
particular form of defeasible reasoning, which can be applied to the problem of theory
generation within the context of multi-agent interaction.In particular, we demonstrate
how a body of evidence can be interpreted differently based on the bias and scepti-
cism of the observing agent, why systems of arguments can be particularly suitable for
describing the relationship between hypotheses in a dynamic environment, and why
argumentation is particularly applicable for managing claims made by heterogeneous
agents of varying degrees of expertise in arbitrary domainsprovided that we can con-
trol the space in which argumentation occurs.
3.2 Using Argumentation to Rationalise Beliefs
The study of argumentation concerns itself with logical disputation — the generation
of arguments in support of particular claims, and furthermore the evaluation of the
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acceptability of such arguments in tandem. An argument can be considered to be
a non-monotonic ‘proof’ for some claim insofar as it provides a basis for inferring
that claim, but equally it does not preclude the possibilitythat that proof might be
later cast into doubt. Stated differently, an argument is anappeal to the validity of
a claim in the absence of further evidence to the contrary — such contrary evidence
taking the form of further arguments, which may support contradictory claims or may
undermine the basis upon which a previous claim is made. Suchcounter-arguments
can themselves be attacked however, often resulting in websof conflict which must
be appraised as a whole in order to ascertain the acceptability of the assertions woven
within. Acceptance however is dependent not just on the lay of arguments, but on the
scepticism of the evaluator and the manner by which mutually-opposing claims are
prioritised. Argumentation in informatics seeks to provide computable formalisms for
every aspect of logical disputation, and so provide useful models for agent-oriented
automated reasoning.
Argumentation is based on a metaphor of human discourse, andas such is of-
ten applied in the form of literal dialectic protocols for artificial multi-agent com-
munication, particularly for negotiation [Rahwan et al., 2003] or knowledge sharing
[Black and Hunter, 2007] tasks. Equally, argumentation is applied in a more purely
epistemological sense as a generic paradigm for defeasiblereasoning [Dung, 1995,
Kowalski and Toni, 1996], wherein a reasoner essentially plays its own devil’s ad-
vocate in order to ensure that the inferences drawn from its hypot eses are collec-
tively coherent [Kakas et al., 1998, Kakas and Toni, 1999]. It can be seen however that
these two approaches remain conceptually close, and from a certain abstract viewpoint
merely represent a differing emphasis between the procedural and declarative levels of
disputation [Prakken, 1995].
The purpose of an argumentation framework is to manage speculative (and thus
defeasible) reasoning by providing a logical context in which hypothetical propositions
can be tested against known facts and observations as well asagainst each other. It does
this by producing a system of arguments specifying the relationship between individual
arguments, which can then be evaluated in a number of ways. In§3.2.1 we specify
argumentation in abstract, defining those properties generic to any system of arguments
regardless of the underlying mechanism for generating it. In §3.2.2 we use assumption-
based argumentation to define a framework which can be used toexpl re a particular
hypothesis space, generating a system of arguments; we thenin §3.2.3 specify how the
argument system can be interpreted in order to derive a defeasibl theory. Finally, in
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§3.2.4, we summarise how all of this applies tointernalargumentation.
3.2.1 Abstract Argumentation
Before considering different modes of argumentation, it isnecessary to consider their
commonalities.Abstract argumentation[Dung, 1995] concerns the analysis of argu-
ments based purely on the relationships which exist betweenthem, ignoring both the
internal structure of arguments and their provenance:7
Definition 3.6 A system of argumentsis a pair (A ,⇁) where:
• A is a finite set of (possibly abstract) arguments.
• ⇁ is an attack relation between pairs of argumentsa,b ∈ A such that ifa⇁ b,
then “a attacksb”.
An argument is a statement about the world. The nature of an att cka⇁ b is to assert
that if one accepts argumenta, then consequently one must reject argumentb.
Example 3.2 Consider a set of arguments exploring an extended hypothesis space
based on the hypotheses generated in Example 3.1:
a = Dante can be assigned tasks in the observatory and the observatory can be
used for this experiment, so Dante can perform the experiment (attacksb).
b = Dante does not know how to handle this type of task, so Dante cannot per-
form the experiment (attacksa).
c = The experiment requires the use of the observatory’s main telescope, but
the telescope is currently broken, so the observatory cannot be used for this
experiment (attacksa).
d = All instruments on the observatory are non-functional, sono agent can as-
sign tasks to the observatory (attacksa andg).
e= Dante has handled analogous tasks in the past, so Dante knows ho to
perform this type of task (attacksb).
f = The experiment can be performed using a radio telescope, sothe experiment
does not require the use of an optical telescope (attacksc).
g = Other agents are assigning tasks involving the main telescope to the obser-
vatory, so the telescope is not broken (attacksandd).
h = The experiment requires observations made in the visible spectrum, so the
experiment cannot be performed using a radio telescope (attacksf)
This forms the system of arguments illustrated by Figure 3.4, wherein each node repre-
sents an argument and each directed edge an attack by one argument towards another.
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Figure 3.4: A graph depicting the system of arguments detailed in Example
3.2.
A key insight regarding abstract argumentation is that although arguments do not really
have meaning without context, the status of arguments within an argument system can
be evaluated independently of the framework in which they arembedded by consid-
ering them purely in terms of their relationship with one another. For instance:
Definition 3.7 Given a system of arguments(A ,⇁), a set of argumentsS ⊆ A de-
fendsany argumenta∈ A if there is an argumentb ∈ S for every attackc⇁ a (where
c∈ A ) such thatb ⇁ c.
It is possible to identify particular sets of arguments which collectively describe po-
sitions which an agent might adopt in a (possibly hypothetical) debate.Acceptability
semantics[Dung, 1995] concern themselves with the task of attributing such interpre-
tations to abstract arguments.
Definition 3.8 Given a system of arguments(A ,⇁), acceptability semanticsconfer
properties onto any qualifying set of arguments, orextension, S ⊆ A . For instance:
• S is conflict-free if there are no two argumentsa,b ∈ S such thata⇁ b.
• S is admissibleif S is conflict-free andS defends every argumenta∈ S .
• S is completeif S is admissible and ifS defends an argumenta∈ A , thena∈ S .
• S is preferred if S is maximally complete (under set inclusion).
• S is sceptically preferred if S is the intersection of all preferred extensions.
• S is grounded if S is minimally complete (under set inclusion).
7Unless otherwise noted, all Definitions in §3.2.1 are taken from [Dung et al., 2007].
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• S is ideal if S is an admissible subset of the sceptically preferred extension
[Dung et al., 2007].
Given a particular acceptability semantic (admissibility, completeness, etc.), a set of
argumentsS is said to beacceptableif it exhibits the chosen quality.
Different acceptability semantics are primarily distinguished by the degree of scepti-
cism they enforce and how comprehensively an acceptable setof arguments resolves
the conflicts inherent within a given argument system. To illustrate:
• A conflict-freeset of arguments does not attack itself, but provides no consider-
ation for the consequences of outside arguments. It represents an untested point
of view.8
• An admissibleextension is an interpretation of (some of) the evidence which is
defensible, but not necessarily uniquely so. It representsa point of view which
is self-contained and which has not been convincingly debunked, but which may
still be validly rejected in favour of some other (equally admissible) viewpoint.
Consider the system of arguments illustrated below:
In this instance the argument set{a, c, e} is admissible, as is{a}, {c}
and{a, c}, but not{e}, {a, e} or {c, e} which fail to defende from
both attackersb and d. Corresponding admissible sets can also be
constructed fromb, d and f. {a, d} and{b, c} are also admissible,
as is the empty set/0.
An argument is admissible if it is a member of an admissible set; if an argument
is inadmissible, then it is unacceptable under any of the accptability semantics
described here other than perhaps being conflict-free.
• A completeextension is an admissible interpretation of the evidence which in-
cludes everything in a system of arguments which it defends.It represents a
confident point of view which accepts all consequences whichfollow from it
— such a viewpoint is not inherently more correct than any other admissible
interpretation however.
8Strictly speaking, being conflict-free is generally considered to be a prerequisite for an acceptable
set of arguments rather than an actual acceptance criterionin and of itself.
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From the above argument system, admissible set{a, c, e} is complete,
as is its mirror{b, d, f}. Sets{}, {a}, {b}, {c} and{d} are all com-
plete, as are{a, d} and{b, c}, but{a, c} and{b, d} are incomplete
withouteand f respectively.
• A preferredextension is a complete interpretation of as much of the evidence
as can be managed whilst maintaining consistency. It represnts a point of view
which covers as many of the facets of a dispute as possible. Ifan argument
system confuses more than one independent issue, then therewill exist complete
extensions which are not preferred extensions (because a complete extension
need only fully cover the consequences of having an opinion on someof the
issues).
Again from the above system,{a, c, e} and{b, d, f} are preferred, as
are {a, d} and{b, c}. Sets{a}, {b}, {c} and{d} are not preferred,
because more arguments can be added to each set without affecting
internal consistency.
Note that this argument system is essentially evaluated by addressing
the issues ofa versusb andc versusd, then looking at the resulting
consequences. Every complete extension addresses one, both or nei-
ther issues, whilst every preferred extension addresses both issues by
requirement.
• The sceptically preferredextension is the set of claims which all coherent in-
terpretations (at least implicitly) support. It represents the arguments acceptable
from every viewpoint, but which are not necessarily self-defending (e.g. because
two viewpoints have different bases upon which they accept the same argument).
This extension can be controversial insofar as it accepts claims founded on un-
certainty, which may be unacceptable in some circumstances(such as in legal
reasoning).
Consider the system of arguments illustrated below:
In this instance the argument set{d} is sceptically preferred being
the intersection of the preferred sets{a, d} and {b, d}. Although
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botha andb defendd, they also contradict one another, meaningd is
generally accepted but lacks an agreed justification.
• Thegroundextension is the most sceptical appraisal of the evidence, acc pting
only arguments which are well-founded and uncontroversial. It represents a cau-
tious point of view which accepts only those claims which appear unassailable in
lieu of further arguments, and for which the justification for acceptance is univer-
sally agreed under all coherent interpretations (unlike the sceptically preferred
extension).
Consider the system of arguments illustrated below:
In this instance the argument set{a, d} is grounded, being minimally
complete —a requires no defence, so is defended by{}, and so must
be included for completeness, butd is wholly defended bya, and so
then must also be included. The resulting set is complete.
• An idealextension is a set of claims which all interpretations support, but which
is also self-defending. Lying between the sceptical preferd and grounded sets
in terms of scepticism, the primary difference between ground and ideal exten-
sions (where a difference in practice even exists) lies in anideal extension’s
acceptance of mutually-defending and self-defending arguments as opposed to
the ground extension’s insistence that every argument’s defenc be entirely in-
dependent of the argument itself.
Consider the system of arguments illustrated below:
In this instance the argument set{a, d} is ideal insofar as it is scepti-
cally preferred and admissible. However{a, d} is not ground because
a cannot be defended withoutd, butd is only defended by itself ora.
All measures of acceptability (alternatives of which includestable[Dung, 1995],semi-
stable[Caminada, 2006b] andeager[Caminada, 2007] semantics) are inherently de-
feasible — given additional evidence, a previously accepted argument may become
untenable.
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Figure 3.5: Two interpretations of the argument system described in Exam-
ple 3.2: the ground extension {e, h} attacks arguments b and f, but leaves
all remaining arguments undecided; the preferred extension {a, e, g, h} at-
tacks all other arguments.
The number of possible ways a system of abstract arguments cabe interpreted
could be very large, since every arbitrary choice made between two opposing but ad-
missible arguments has the potential to double the number ofacceptable argument
extensions which can be identified within the system. Abstract argumentation also
makes no consideration of the provenance of individual arguments — in particular,
the notions of acceptance described here take no account of the possibility that certain
arguments may be demonstrably false (i.e. acceptance is based purely on argument
relationships), or that not all attacks between arguments have been identified (i.e. ar-
gumentation is assumed to be complete within a given context). It may be that a given
concrete argumentation framework will not be able to make such guarantees, in which
case there may exist additional factors which will complicate the interpretation of ar-
guments. These issues are addressed in §3.2.3.
At this point we can turn our attention back to our previous example:
Example 3.3 There are a number of possible interpretations of Example 3.2, two of
which are illustrated by Figure 3.5.9 In particular, there are three complete extensions:
• The set{a, e, g, h} (illustrated on the right of Figure 3.5) is founded on the
uncontroversial argumentse(which asserts that Dante knows how to perform the
task in question) andh (which asserts that a radio telescope in inadequate in this
case), and resolves the equally weighted dispute betweend andg by favouring
9An emboldened node represents an argument included in an exte sion, a dotted node represents an
argument directly attacked by the extension. A shrunken node is one which has not been included in the
extension, but which has not been formally repudiated either.
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g (accepting that the telescope is not broken). This leads to the conclusion that
Dante can perform the desired experiment.
• The set{c, d, e, h} is again founded one andh, but favoursd (accepting that
no agent can assign tasks to the observatory). By accepting these arguments, it
cannot be said that Dante is able to perform the desired experiment.
• The ground extension (and thus minimal complete extension){e, h} (illustrated
on the left of Figure 3.5) merely accepts that Dante knows howto perform the
task required and that a radio telescope cannot be used for this, but will not
commit to anything else without further evidence (in particular, the question as
to whether the telescope in the observatory is broken or not).
The first two extensions above are preferred, being maximally complete. The ground
extension is both sceptically preferred and ideal (which isnot uncommon in practice).
There are fourteen admissible extensions in total.10
The range of interpretations for a given argument system canbe particularly broad if
the system contains many mutually rebutting arguments, particularly if there are no
outside arguments to decide between them. Conversely, manysystems of argument in
practice may have only one acceptable complete extension, which will simultaneously
be the single ground, preferred, sceptically preferred andideal extension. It is often
dependent on the hypothesis space in which arguments are generat d as to which ten-
dency applies; a hypothesis space describing a domain whichis highly subjective, or a
space which permits one to claim the negation of any hypothesis ju t as easily as the
hypothesis itself, is going to produce many admissible extensions and few ground ar-
guments, whilst a more objective domain with very strongly-defined rules will produce
fewer admissible arguments, and will likely have a substantial ground extension. The
many different concrete argumentation frameworks producein argumentation litera-
ture are typically justified by the perceived qualities of the domain in which they are
conceived to be used.
It may be useful at this point to begin considering how an agent might derive an
interpretation from a system of arguments. Anargument labellingis a mapping of
arguments to some state. Such a labelling constitutes an interpre ation of an argument
system, deciding whether a given argument has been accepted, rej cted or left unde-
10Left as an exercise to the reader . . .
3.2. Using Argumentation to Rationalise Beliefs 73
cided:11
Definition 3.9 Anabstract argument labellingof a system of arguments(A ,⇁) can
be performed by a partial functionlab : A ⇀ {in,out} where:
• lab(a) = in for some argumenta∈ A , if and only if for all argumentsb∈ A such
thatb ⇁ a, it is the case thatlab(b) = out.
• lab(a) = out for some argumenta∈ A , if and only if there exists an argument
b ∈ A such thatb ⇁ a and lab(b) = in.
The set of arguments{a∈ A | lab(A) = in} is an admissible extension of(A ,⇁).
The above definition does not necessarily produce a unique labelling if any cycles
exist in the argument system. As has been proven in [Caminada, 2006a], by choosing
a particular labelling which maximises or minimises the assignment of different states
(i.e. in, out or undecided), different types of extension arise. For example:
Any labelling — Any set of arguments labelledin according to Definition 3.9 is an
admissible extension.
Any complete labelling – If a labelling of arguments is complete (such that there exist
no unlabelled arguments which can be immediately labelled according to the
rules of Definition 3.9 without resorting to making any more abitrary decisions),
then the set of arguments labelledin is a complete extension.
Maximal in or out — By attempting to label as many arguments as possible, the se
of arguments labelledin will be a preferred extension.
Minimal in or out — By not making any arbitrary labelling decisions, the set ofar-
guments labelledin will be the ground extension.
Intersection of maximal labellings — By labellingin every argument which isin for
all preferred labellings, the set of arguments labelledin will be sceptically pre-
ferred; the maximal admissible subset of that set is ideal (and thus the sceptically
preferred and ideal extensions require the most computation to label).
We can show how we might label the arguments of Example 3.2 to produce the the
interpretations described in Example 3.3:
11Definition 3.9 is from [Caminada, 2006a], modified slightly to use a partial function into{in,out}
rather than total function into{in,out,undec}.
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Example 3.4 Look again at Figure 3.5 — we have already provided two labellings of
the system of arguments described by Example 3.2, using the visual convention of em-
boldening nodes representing arguments which arein, dotting out nodes for arguments
which areout, and reducing nodes for arguments which are left undecided.
Ground Extension — We labelin any arguments which are automatically acceptable
(eandh), and then labelout the arguments they attack (b andf). This may leave
other arguments free of acceptable attacks (none in this case), which we can
label in, which may lead to further arguments being labelledout — this can be
continued until there are no more unequivocal arguments. The remainder are
left unlabelled.
Preferred Extension — We essentially label what we can (e→ in sob → out, h→
in so f → out), then one by one we make any arbitrary decisions necessary to
continue labelling (labelg→ in so c, d → out) until no more arguments can
be labelledin without contradicting Definition 3.9, or all arguments haveb en
labelled (labela→ in becauseb, c andd are out).
The choice of which acceptability semantic to apply when interpreting a system of ar-
guments is determined best by the domain from which arguments are drawn and the
investment a given agent has in the acceptance or rejection of particular arguments. For
example, if an agent is considering possible resolutions ofconstraints imposed on an
interaction, and declaring the satisfaction of certain constraints carries a commitment
which weighs heavily on that agent (perhaps due to difficultyin obtaining the outcome
mandated by the interaction protocol, or because there is a large penalty for failing to
attain the mandated outcome), then an agent may choose to intrpret arguments which
satisfy those constraints sceptically. Such scepticism need not be applied universally
across an argument system however; one can choose arbitrarily between equally ad-
missible arguments in one part of the system, and refuse to make a decision in another,
producing a complete extension which is neither preferred (interpreting the whole sys-
tem) or ground (refraining from anything controversial). Even if an agent uses an
extension which is not complete however, any decisions madeshould be compatible
with the complete extension of which that extension is a subset — the only really valid
reason not to explicitly accept a proposition which is defended by an agent’s accepted
extension is in the case where the agent simply has not yet tried to satisfy (and thus
test) that proposition.
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Given an acceptability semantic, there still remains however the question of how
to choose between two equally acceptable extensions (e.g. two different preferred ex-
tensions). If we assume that any purely logical reason to accept one extension over
another would be expressed in the argument system itself, thre must then be a heuris-
tic element to selection which is dependent on the context inwhich argumentation
is conducted. We shall return to this in §3.2.3, when we consider argumentation no
longer in abstract.
Given then an interpretation of an argument system according to some acceptability
semantic, the status of many of the propositions used withinthe arguments making that
system can be determined. This however requires a concrete fram work in which we
can construct arguments from propositions so as to then later be able to deconstruct
them, and so be able to construct a theory from those proposition .
3.2.2 A Framework for Constructing Arguments
The purpose of anargumentation frameworkis to provide a logical context for a system
of arguments so that it can act as a vehicle for defeasible reasoning. Arguments are
given a formal representation and attacks are defined in terms of how the claim made
by one argument interferes with the support for another. [Prakken, 1995] identifies five
elements which must be present if an argumentation framework is to be used to derive
a theory from a system of arguments:
1. An underlying formal logicin which to express logical assertions.
2. A notion of argumentin order to construct arguments from such logical asser-
tions.
3. A notion of conflictin order to identify how one argument can attack another.
4. A notion of defeatin order to determine the outcome of conflicts between argu-
ments.
5. A notion of acceptancein order to determine the belief status of different logical
assertions given the relationships between arguments made.
In [Dung, 1995], an argumentation system is considered to consist of two components
— theargument generationunit, and theargument processingunit. We will observe
the same divide, considering the first three of Prakken’s elem nts in our specification
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of argument generation in this section and the final two elements in our specification
of argument interpretation in §3.2.3.
Central to our particular formalisation of an argumentation framework is the no-
tion of anargument space, which defines the hypothesis space which arguments exist
to explore, and thus limits the detail and scope of argumentspermissible within a given
argumentation framework. Abstactly, an argument space canbe defined as the set of
all valid arguments which can be included in a given system ofarguments. More prac-
tically, an argument space defines the properties which identify a valid argument; these
properties may be dependent on external factors and the state of existing arguments.
Thus, we can generically define an argumentation framework as follows:
Definition 3.10 Anargumentation framework can be described by a tuple(L , ⊢,∆)
where:12
• (L , ⊢) is a deductive framework used to construct arguments.
• ∆ is theargument spacewithin which arguments are generated such that∆ can
be treated as the set of all valid arguments.
• An argument is a pair 〈Φ,α〉 whereΦ ⊆ L forms the minimal, initernally-
consistent support for a claimα ∈ L such thatΦ ⊢ α, there exists no subset
Ψ⊂Φ such thatΨ ⊢ α and〈Φ,α〉 ∈ ∆.
• An argument〈Φ,α〉 attacks another argument〈Ψ,β〉 if and only if Ψ ⊢ γ and
{α} ⊢ ¬γ.
– If β = γ, then〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉 and〈Φ,α〉 rebuts 〈Ψ,β〉.
– If β 6= γ, then〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉 and〈Φ,α〉 undercuts 〈Ψ,β〉.13
This description of an argumentation framework provides thunderlying logic, notion
of argument and notion of conflict necessary to generate a system of arguments which
can then be evaluated in accordance with an agent’s knowledge base. It should be noted
that, despite being part of a greater mechanism for defeasibl (non-monotonic) rea-
soning, within our argumentation framework we use a deductive (monotonic) frame-
work for generating arguments in line with the reasoning articulated in [Prakken, 1995]
12This particular depiction of an argumentation framework isadapted from that of anassumption-
basedframework [Bondarenko et al., 1997, Dung et al., 2007]; here, any assumption setA is subsumed
in the definition of argument space∆, whilst any contrariesC will be subsumed by operator⊢.
13The notion that arguments can be either rebutted or undercut, and that this sufficiently describes all
ways in which an argument can be attacked is articulated in [Pollock, 1995].
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(this is standard in assumption-based argumentation [Bondare ko et al., 1997]). Es-
sentially, the non-deductive part of argumentation is in the generation (and selection)
of hypotheses with which to construct arguments, whilst theactual claims made by
arguments are derived monotonicallyassumingthe chosen supporting hypotheses.
Monotonicity aside, the logical framework(L , ⊢) used for argumentation may sub-
sume certain axiomatic assertions beyond those rules needed to b a functional deduc-
tive system (rules likemodus ponens) in order to simplify the argumentation process.
This may include certain ‘undeniable’ facts and rules — ‘strict’ ules as distinguished
from thedefeasible rules(e.g. as used in [Garcı́a and Simari, 2004]) which might be
explicitly invoked within arguments (and thus can be subject to contradiction and at-
tack):
Example 3.5 Assume that an agent is able to make the following inference using a
deductive framework(L , ⊢):
{observer(eliza)} ⊢ agent(eliza)
Assume that this is because the rule “∀X. observer(X)→ agent(X)” is inherently as-
sumed by⊢ such that/0 ⊢ ∀X. observer(X)→ agent(X) (i.e. no evidence is required to
support this rule).
If this deductive framework is used in an argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆), then
no argument〈Φ,α〉 supported by the statement “∀X. observer(X)→ agent(X)” would
need to explicitly include “∀X. observer(X)→ agent(X)” within its support Φ14 —
however it also would not be possible to contradict the rule.For example, consider the
following argument:
〈Ψ, (observer(falstaff) ∧ ¬agent(falstaff)) 〉
This argument is internally inconsistent becauseΨ ⊢ ¬(∀X. observer(X)→ agent(X))
andΨ⊢ ∀X. observer(X)→ agent(X) simultaneously; this is because we have already
established that/0 ⊢ ∀X. observer(X)→ agent(X) and ⊢ is monotonic.
A logical framework may also provide an expanded notion of mutual exclusion beyond
simple negation:
Example 3.6 Consider an object which may be either red, green, or blue. A naive set
of arguments can be constructed to describe its possible apparance:15
14This notion of a ‘sub-minimal’ argument which leaves aside established facts and rules is referred
to as an ‘enthymeme’ [Black and Hunter, 2008].
15For both clarity and brevity, many example arguments in thissection have been kept partially or
wholly abstract — it is left to the reader to imagine how abstractions might be instantiated.
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Figure 3.6: Two systems of arguments as described in example 3.6: on
the left, a naive system; on the right, the same argument system with the
exclusivity of colours recognised.
a = 〈 { The object is blue,∀X. ¬(blue(X)∧ red(X)) }, ¬red(thing) 〉
b = 〈 { The object is green,∀X. ¬(green(X)∧ red(X)) }, ¬red(thing) 〉
c = 〈 { The object is red,∀X. ¬(blue(X)∧ red(X)) }, ¬blue(thing) 〉
d = 〈 { The object is green,∀X. ¬(blue(X)∧green(X)) }, ¬blue(thing) 〉
e= 〈 { The object is blue,∀X. ¬(blue(X)∧green(X)) }, ¬green(thing) 〉
f = 〈 { The object is red,∀X. ¬(green(X)∧ red(X)) }, ¬green(thing) 〉
The resulting argument system is illustrated by Figure 3.6 on the left. Alternatively,
if we factor the rule that if an object is of one colour, then itis not of another (e.g.
/0⊢ ∀X. ¬(blue(X)∧ red(X))) into our argumentation framework, then we can produce
the system illustrated on the right of Figure 3.6:
g = 〈 { The object is red}, red(thing) 〉 (attacksh and i).
h = 〈 { The object is blue}, blue(thing) 〉 (attacksg and i).
i = 〈 { The object is green}, green(thing) 〉 (attacksg andh).
This is much simpler and therefore easier to interpret, particularly if only part of a
greater system of arguments.
Thus a logical framework which subsumes more information can be used to produce
simpler systems of arguments. On the other hand, anything subsumed by the frame-
work cannot be subject to argument if it is not shown within the argument system
(i.e. subsumed sentences will not be defeasible). As we shall ee later, in a dynamic
system there needs to be a distinction between indelible facts (strict axioms and rules
which can be safely subsumed by the framework) and things which are known, but
are subject to change (defeasible rules and hypothetical assumptions which are better
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left explicit in arguments and accounted for during argument interpretation). Further-
more, for multi-agent argumentation, the restriction on what we can subsume becomes
even tighter — only common knowledge [Halpern and Moses, 1990] can be safely
subsumed, because in practice, agents will provide their own l gical frameworks and
therefore might not be able to follow arguments which do not clearly show the assump-
tions being made.
Of course we do not want to simply generate any and every argument which can
be articulated using a logical framework — we only care aboutarguments which have
some bearing on the subject of discourse. This is ensured by the argument space of
the argumentation framework, which defines the hypothesis space which arguments
exist to explore. For example, in anassumption-basedargumentation framework (as
introduced in [Bondarenko et al., 1997]), an argument spaceis defined by the set of
assumptions which can be used to support claims — any argument which draws wholly
on the given assumption set (in conjunction with any strict rules subsumed by the
logical framework used to infer claims from support) is therefo e within the argument
space, whilst any argument which uses premises not in the setis no within the space.
For our purposes, we shall define a ‘default’ argument space as being based on a set
of assumptions which can be used to support claims and a set of‘base’ claims which
argumentation should be focused on determining the truth of:
Definition 3.11 Theargument space∆ of an assumption-based argumentation frame-
work (L , ⊢,∆) can be described by a pair(H,F) where:
• Thehorizon H ⊆ L defines the set of sentences which can be used as premises
for arguments in∆.
• ThefocusF ⊆ L defines the set of claims which(L , ⊢,∆) has been employed to
determine the status of.
An argument〈Φ,α〉 is within an argument space (i.e.〈Φ,α〉 ∈ ∆) if and only ifΦ⊆H
and eitherα ∈ F or there exists an attack〈Φ,α〉⇁ a such thata∈ ∆ independent of
〈Φ,α〉.
This definition of an argument space defines two things; it defines the set of hypotheses
which can be used to construct arguments, and it defines the subj ct of argumentation.
This is not the only way an argument space can be defined however. Sometimes there
may be no particular focus to argumentation, or there may be oth r criteria by which
arguments are filtered. Regardless, the point of an argumentspace is to ensure that any
80 Chapter 3. An Argumentative Approach to Defeasible Reasoning
argument made in an argumentation framework contributes tothe problem it exists to
solve.
Example 3.7 Consider an argument space which subsumes the hypotheses ofExam-
















Assume that we have a deductive framework(L , ⊢) for first-order predicate logic,
which has been augmented with the following domain rules:
∀X,Y,Z. suitable(X,Y)∧ requires(Y,Z)→ available(X,Z)
∀X,Y. assignable(X,Y)→∃Z. available(Y,Z)
∀X,Y. performable(X,Y)→ capable(X,Y)
∀X,Y,Z. requires(X,Y)∧usable(Z,X)→Y = Z
∀X,Y,Z. ∃A. assigns(A,X,Y)∧ requires(Y,Z)→ available(X,Z)
∀X,Y,Z. requires(X,Y)∧usable(telescope(Z),X)→ viewable(telescope(Z),Y)
We can now produce concrete instances of the abstract arguments d scribed in Exam-
ple 3.2:
a = 〈 { assignable(dante,observatory),
suitable(observatory,experiment),
∀X,Y,Z. assignable(X,Y)∧ suitable(Y,Z)→ performable(X,Z) },
performable(dante,experiment) 〉
16Variables of the formXi are free variables, which can be treated as being existentially qualified.
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b = 〈 { ¬capable(dante,experiment) }, ¬performable(dante,experiment) 〉




Note that argumentsb andc need not show the domain rules being applied, because
those rules are subsumed within the inference mechanism used by(L , ⊢,∆). All three
arguments shown are within∆; all supporting assumptions are in H, the claim of ar-
gumenta is in F, and argumentsb andc attacka. Conversely, the following arguments
cannot be generated within(L , ⊢,∆):
i = 〈 { assignable(dante, laboratory) }, ∃X. available(laboratory,X) 〉
j = 〈 { confidential(experiment),
¬private(observatory),
∀X,Y. suitable(X,Y)∧ confidential(Y)→ private(X) },
¬suitable(observatory,experiment) 〉
Argumenti can be constructed using assumptions in H, but is irrelevantbecause its
claim is not is F nor does it attack any other argument described in Example 3.2.
Argumentj attacks argumenta, but is built from assumptions not in the hypothesis
space∆, and so can be considered ‘outside the problem definition’. Of course, if an
agent was to encounter this argument (perhaps from another ag nt), then it might want
to expand its argument space to encompass it — we consider this possibility in§4.1.2.
In practice, the hypothesis space in which argumentation isconducted need not be fully
defined upon the outset of argumentation — it may be that an argument space is refined
incrementally over the course of argumentation (though onecould view this as an ex-
ample of a well-defined argument space which merely imposes amore complex set of
requirements on when an argument is relevant). The portrayal mechanism contributed
by this thesis for instance defines an argumentation system with a minimal argument
space which is then extended as the motivating interaction develops. Nonetheless, it is
useful to be able to formally describe the argument space in wh ch arguments exist at
any given point in an argumentation process, in order to succinctly demonstrate various
useful properties.
Given a suitable argumentation framework, it should be possible to generate a sys-
tem of arguments with the properties described in §3.2.1. Itshould then be possible to
produce an interpretation of arguments from which a defeasible theory can be derived.
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3.2.3 Interpreting a System of Arguments
Given a concrete system of arguments, we should be able to derive a new theory from
an interpretation of that argument system using the assumptions made in accepted
arguments:
Definition 3.12 Given a system of arguments(A ,⇁) generated using a logical frame-
work (L , ⊢) along with an argument labelling functionlab : A ⇀ {in,out} and a
theory core Θ ⊆ L , the accepted extensionE of (A ,⇁) is the set of arguments




In the above definition, we refer to something called thetheory core. The theory core
is a body of logical sentences which represent what is already known prior to argumen-
tation, perhaps being the product of direct observation of the environment. Naturally,
if relevant to the context in which a defeasible theory is used, it should be included
alongside any selected hypotheses when making decisions. We do not just mention its
existence out of a sense of completeness however. The content f the theory core can
have bearing on the interpretation of arguments.
It may be that an agent is able to use observations of the environment in order to
immediately ascertain the truth or falsehood of certain propositions claimed by or used
in support of arguments in an argument system. As we shall see, this is particularly
relevant if the observed state of the environment changes and we wish to reinterpret an
argument system to reflect those changes. In such an event, wewould want to be able
to immediatelydismissany arguments which contradict observations. The theory core
anchors the argumentation process by defining that which is currently ‘unarguable’,
permitting only interpretations of arguments which appearto be consistent with it:
Definition 3.13 Given a deductive framework(L , ⊢) and a theory coreΘ ⊆ L , an
argument〈Φ,α〉 can bedismissedif Φ ⊢ ϕ andΘ ⊢ ¬ϕ for some sentenceϕ ∈ L .
If an argument is dismissed, then it isnot included in the argument system for the pur-
poses of abstract interpretation — so (for instance) attacks gainst a given argument by
dismissed arguments are ignored. This has an effect on the interpretation of the argu-
ment system and therefore on the labelling of arguments. Thus we update Definition
3.9:








Figure 3.7: The system of arguments from Example 3.2 after the dismissal
of arguments contradicting the theory core of Example 3.7.
Definition 3.14 Given a theory coreΘ⊆ L , anargument labelling of a system of ar-
guments(A ,⇁) generated within an argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) can be per-
formed by a partial functionlab : A ⇀ {in,out} where:
• lab(a) = in for some argumenta∈ A , if and only ifa cannot be dismissed and
for all argumentsb ∈ A such thatb ⇁ a, it is the case thatlab(b) = out.
• lab(a) = out for some argumenta∈ A , if and only ifa can be dismissed or there
exists an argumentb ∈ A such thatb ⇁ a and lab(b) = in.
The set of arguments{a∈ A | lab(A) = in} is a valid extension of(A ,⇁) givenΘ.
At this point, one might ask what the difference is between propositions in the the-
ory core, and propositions subsumed by the logical framework ith which arguments
are constructed. In essence, the theory core can be changed without forcing the re-
generation of an argument system, instead simply affectingan existing system’s cur-
rent interpretation. Thus, the theory core is better suitedtowards recording the en-
vironment state, which is subject to change over time, whilst we can subsume into
the logical framework strict domain rules and other ‘fundamentally true’ propositions.
Ideally, we want to subsume into the framework more knowledge so that we can sim-
plify the system of arguments then generated. In practice however, we may find there
is little that we can accept unconditionally and more which is subject to change, and
so we place these things into the theory core.
Example 3.8 Referring back to Examples 3.2 and 3.7, let us look at possible interpre-
tations of our argument system. We have already identified thifferent naive interpre-
tations of the system in Example 3.3; let us assume now that Eliz can glean additional
information about her current environment:
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available(observatory,seismograph)
“The observatory’s seismograph is operational”.
∃X,Y. assigns(X,observatory,Y)∧ requires(Y,telescope(optical)
“Someone has been assigned a task at the observatory which requires the
optical telescope”.
requires(experiment, images(visible))
“Eliza’s experiment requires images in the visible spectrum.”
This becomes part of the theory core for any theory derived from the argument system.
We can now dismiss argumentd:17
d = 〈 { ¬∃X. available(observatory,X),
∀X,Y. assignable(X,Y)→∃Z. available(Y,Z) },
∀X. ¬assignable(X,observatory) 〉
Argumentd is predicated on the assumption that all instruments in the observatory are
non-functional, allowing for the claim that no agent can be assigned to it. However
it has been observed that for at least one instrument, this isnot the case, and thus the
argument has been undercut by the theory core. The dismissalof argumentd leads to
the effective argument system illustrated in Figure 3.7, and leaves us with only one of
our original three extensions remaining;{a, e, g, h}, which is now both preferred and
grounded (amongst other things).
Note that we do not directly accept arguments based on the theory core. Merely know-
ing that part of the support for an argument is necessarily true does not make the whole
argument sound. Moreover, even if the claim of an argument isobserved to be in, that
does not mean the argument itself is not drawing that claim for invalid reasons — it
merely means that any argument which rebuts that claim is definitely unacceptable. It
is true that if theentiresupport of an argument is necessarily true, then the argument
must be accepted — however we still do not need to take any additional action, because
we know that every attack against that argument will be dismis ed.
The interpretation of arguments allows an agent to infer something about the con-
flicts between possible assumptions drawn from a set hypotheses. The extent to which
arguments illustrate those conflicts is dependent on the thoroughness of argumentation
— the more exhaustive a system of arguments, the better it describ the argument
space within which it exists. Conversely, if a system of arguments fails to explore
the argument space well enough, then the conclusions which would be drawn from an
abstract evaluation of the system may conceal inconsistencies:
17We include the subsumed rule which argumentd relies on in the support ofd for clarity.












Figure 3.8: Additional arguments can ‘fix’ insufficiently expressive argument
systems. On the left, arguments b and c are accepted, despite being mu-
tually exclusive. By adding two additional arguments, only one of the two
arguments is acceptable (centre and right).
Example 3.9 Consider the following system of arguments:
a = 〈 { ¬deformable, ¬fragmentable }, solid 〉.
b = 〈 { soft, strong }, deformable 〉 (attacksa).
c = 〈 { sharp, brittle }, fragmentable 〉 (attacksa).
A naive interpretation of the above arguments would conclude that both argumentsb
andc are acceptable, rejecting argumenta. However if this system of arguments ex-
isted within an argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) in which{strong, sharp} ⊢ durable
and{soft,brittle} ⊢ ¬durable, then it becomes clear that we cannot accept bothb and
c as part of the same extension — we would be able to infer bothdurable and¬durable
from the resulting theory.
There are a number of different arguments which we can add in order to resolve
this matter. For example, we can add two more arguments:
d = 〈 { soft, strong }, ¬(sharp ∧ brittle) 〉 (attacksc ande).
e= 〈 { sharp, brittle }, ¬(soft ∧ strong) 〉 (attacksb andd).
We can then resolve the inconsistency, either by accepting argumentd and so defeating
c and e, or by accepting argumente and so defeatingb andd (illustrated by Figure
3.8).
However whilst it may be that more arguments may make a systemof arguments more
descriptive of a given hypothesis space, it may not always befeasible to exhaustively
generate a ‘complete’ argument system, nor may it in some contexts be even possible
to be certain that a given system of argumentsis complete. This does not invalidate
the use of argumentation however. It merely means that we cannot always rely purely
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on the abstract relationships between arguments when evaluating real systems of argu-
ments.
Consider the problem of deriving consistent belief sets from a hypothesis space
from another perspective — truth maintenance [Doyle, 1979]. In essence, we have a
constraint satisfaction problem wherein we must determinewh ther or not given as-
sertions are ‘in’ or ‘out’ in such a manner as to be totally consistent, particularly with
the assertions which from the beginning weknoware true or false. Argumentation
as described here can be seen in one of two ways; as either a particular form of truth
maintenance, or as a goal-directed way of simplifying the underlying truth mainte-
nance problem. The first viewpoint requires argumentation to be ‘complete’, such that
it fully explores a given hypothesis space, and so the interpretation of arguments after
accounting for observations results in consistent theories. The second viewpoint ac-
knowledges that systems of arguments may well be incompleteat times, and thus the
theory derived from the interpretation of arguments may notactually be fully consis-
tent.
If we take the second viewpoint, then we have to consider how we deal with a
possibly inconsistent theory: we can somehow ensure completeness by completing
the system of arguments (which requires exhaustive argument generation since we do
not necessarily know where any unexplored conflicts actually are); we can treat the
labelling of arguments as a kind of partial solution to a traditional truth maintenance
problem and proceed with that; or we can accept the possibly inconsistent theory and
only generate new arguments upon the identification of an inconsistency, risking that
there may be earlier decisions made using the theory which were not in fact quite as
rational as we had assumed. In reality, any of these approaches an be acceptable,
based on the qualities of the environment in which argumentsare made.
Probably the simplest way to ensure consistent theories is to allow the dismissal
of additional argumentsduring argument interpretation, rather than just immediately
beforehand. Basically, as we instantiate a theory based on the labelling of arguments,
we continue to dismiss any arguments which contradict the partial theory:
Definition 3.15 Given a deductive framework(L , ⊢) and a theory coreΘ producing
a theoryΠ from a system of arguments(A ,⇁), an argument〈Φ,α〉 ∈ A can bedis-
missedif and only ifΦ ⊢ ϕ andΠ ⊢ ¬ϕ for some sentenceϕ ∈ L .
This declarative refinement of Definition 3.13 subsumes thatprior definition, since
from Definition 3.12 we know that the theory core is part of theresultant theory. Note
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that there is no need to update Definition 3.14.
Example 3.10 We have already demonstrated in Example 3.9 that adding new argu-
ments would fix the inherent inconsistency in the interpretation of the resulting argu-
ment system. It should be clear that an interpretation of theext nded argument system
would produce a valid theoryΠ as per Definition 3.12.
We can also fix the inconsistency by dismissing one of arguments b and c after
partially labelling the system — for instance, by acceptingar umentb, we note that
{soft, strong} ⊆Π and{soft, strong} ⊢ ¬(sharp ∧ brittle) according to the argumen-
tation framework(L , ⊢,∆) of Example 3.9. Therefore, by Definition 3.15, we see that
argumentc should be dismissed, because{sharp,brittle} ⊢ (sharp ∧ brittle).
There is one final point to made regarding the interpretationof arguments, one which
particularly illustrates the advantages of using a system of arguments to describe the
provenance of a theory. It is this — if we treat different states of the environment
in much the same fashion as we treat different interpretations of a single environment
state, and then rely on a (changing) body of observations to di miss and indirectly force
the acceptance of particular arguments in the resulting argument system, then we can
construct a stable description of a volatile environment which can be used to maintain
a coherent theory which adapts as circumstances change.
First, consider how a dynamic environment might render a particular interpretation
of the environment unacceptable. As established in the previous section by Defini-
tion 3.15, an argument can be dismissed if it is already evident from already accepted
propositions that the argument cannot hold. Intuitively (for internal argumentation at
least), one would not expect an agent to deliberately compose an argument which it can
already deduce to be false, in which case the most likely reason for the dismissal of an
argument is either an unexplored conflict between two proposition or a change in the
theory core. In question is what todo with dismissed arguments. If they are perma-
nently removed from the system of arguments, then what happens if the environment
returns to a state wherein they are again valid? It would seemb st to minimise the
number of revisions which a system of arguments is subjectedto, in which case it may
be best to retain arguments regardless of their acceptability g ven the current theory
core on the basis that that as long as an agent can determine whch arguments (and
attacks) should be dismissed at any one given point, any interpretations which apply to
alternate environment states will ‘collapse’ by virtue of being indefensible.
88 Chapter 3. An Argumentative Approach to Defeasible Reasoning
Figure 3.9: The system of arguments from Example 3.2 after the dismissal
of different arguments contradicting the theory core of Example 3.11.
Example 3.11 Consider yet again the system of arguments produced by the argumen-
tation framework described in Example 3.7. In Example 3.8, we were able to dismiss
argumentd because it contradicted agent Eliza’s theory core. Assume instead that
Eliza’s theory core was merely as follows:
¬∃X. available(observatory,X)
“All of the observatory’s instruments are non-functional”.
In this case, we would be forced to dismiss argumentg:
g = 〈 { ∃X,Y. assigns(X,observatory,Y)∧ requires(Y,telescope(optical)) },
available(observatory,telescope(optical)) 〉
This would lead to the only valid extension being{c, d, e, h}, as illustrated by 3.9. If
however, at a later point the instruments were to be repaired, then the system would
revert to a state in which{a, e, g, h} was the only valid extension. Thus the system of
arguments can describe both scenarios without modification.
This illustrates a desirable quality of an abstract system of arguments; it can be com-
posed in such a way that it provides a stable description of a dyn mic system, with
observation (i.e. the theory core) being then used to selectth correct interpretation
given the current environment state.
It should be noted that if an agent is unable to determine which arguments do not
apply to the current environment, then interpretations of alternate states will remain
admissible. This does not concern us however, because if an agent lacks the knowledge
required to dismiss key arguments, then it must also lack theknowledge required to
distinguish between alternative states anyway, in which case the issue becomes one
of insufficient knowledge, rather than some flaw in the expressivity of the argument
system.
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Example 3.12 Continuing on from Example 3.8, let us produce a defeasible theory
from the only remaining valid extension of our argument system. The labelling of the
system is as follows:
in — Argumentsa, e, g andh.
out — Argumentsb, c, d and f.
The resulting theory is therefore the set of all assumptionsused in argumentsa, e, g
andh, along with the contents of Eliza’s theory core:
assignable(dante,observatory)
suitable(observatory,experiment)







Along with the rules subsumed within(L , ⊢,∆) (the argumentation framework in which





Thus, Eliza is likely to ask Dante if he could provide the experim ntal data she requires
from the local observatory.
Even under the influence of the theory core, the choice of semantics for determining
acceptance of arguments is dependent on the needs of the agent, s discussed back
in §3.2.1. It is possible to define preference orderings on concrete arguments based
on their content however, making the choice between two equal interpretations of an
argument system easier [Prakken and Sartor, 1995, Kowalskiand Toni, 1996] — for
example based on historical probability, legal precedenceor ven just how large an
argument is. In multi-agent contexts, an agent can also makepref rences based on the
18These rules can be explicitly added to the theory if it is to beus d with a different logical framework.
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provenance of assertions (one peer’s word may be trusted over another) or on notions
of social welfare [Rahwan and Larson, 2008].
We define the requirements for interpreting concrete systems of arguments here,
but not algorithms that implement these requirements. Whilst important, our pri-
mary concern here is defining a logical model for argumentation which allows flex-
ibility of state and hypothesis space (explored in the next sc ion), such that we can
then distribute that model under various conditions and demonstrate its theoretical
feasibility as a model for our contribution. The actual process of interpreting argu-
ments is left to the implementation of individual agents – there have been various
attempts to find good algorithms for evaluating assumptionsused for argumentation as
well as attempts to determine their potential tractability(see [Dimopoulos et al., 1999,
Vreeswijk and Prakken, 2000, Dung et al., 2007, Dunne, 2008]), albeit often subject
to various limitations.
3.2.4 Defeasible Reasoning as Internal Argumentation
The process of defeasible reasoning on the part of an intelligent agent can be seen as
a two part process of hypothesis generation and hypothesis slection. From a com-
bination of introspection and observation of the environmet, an agent can produce
hypotheses which seek to explain phenomena found in the world. By testing these
hypotheses against one another and against what is already known, an agent can deter-
mine which subsets of hypotheses collectively interpret its world in a rational, inter-
nally consistent way.
Assumption-based argumentation can be used as a hypothesisselector, generating
arguments to test hypotheses and evaluating the results. The hypotheses generated by a
hypothesis generator define the hypothesis space to be explor d; the argument space of
an argumentation framework then specifies how arguments should be used to explore
that hypothesis space. The argumentation framework uses deductive logic and the rules
of the domain in which the hypotheses are generated to produce arguments which fit
within the given argument space — these arguments assume hypotheses within the
hypothesis space in order to derive claims which can then be contrasted against those
of other arguments and against any direct observations of the environment made by
the agent. The agent can then interpret the system of arguments g erated by applying
acceptance criteria based on the conclusions it is most interested in, the scepticism by
which it wishes to regard conclusions and the preference bias it extends to otherwise










Figure 3.10: An agent generates a theory based on observations and hy-
potheses interpreted using an argumentation framework.
equal contrasting viewpoints.
In this respect, the argumentation process just described follows the methodology
advocated by Imre Lakatos’ philosophy of science [Lakatos,1970], wherein a scien-
tific programme is composed of ahard coreand aprotective belt. The hard core de-
scribes the fundamental characteristics of the programme,which are not in question,
whilst the protective belt consists primarily of auxiliaryassumptions. The key, if one is
to maintain the programme, is to resolve the inconsistencies w thin the programme by
adapting the protective belt in order to preserve the integrity of the core. In this instance
the hard core is the theory core, comprised of observations of the environment and
other ‘unarguable’ propositions (which may include technially defeasible elements
which the agent has elected not to subject to argumentation)whilst the protective belt
is the set of assumptions accepted as part of the interpretation of the argument system
produced.
We can now pull together all the necessary components of an assumption-based
argumentation system, and define the context in which an agent can produce a defea-
sible theory via internal argumentation. As alluded to in §3.1, thecontextof a theory
describes the provenance of the propositions within that theory. From an interpretation
of a system of arguments, we can infer a theory based on the assumptions used in the
construction of accepted arguments. Thus, an argumentatioframework, along with a
record of arguments generated and a theory core, can act as context for that theory:
Definition 3.16 The theory context C for a theoryΠ can be described by a tuple
(Θ,(L , ⊢,∆),(A ,⇁), lab) where:
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• Θ is the theory core ofΠ.
• (L , ⊢,∆) is an assumption-based argumentation framework in which(A ,⇁) is
generated.
• (A ,⇁) is a system of arguments, the interpretation of which determinesΠ; be-
causeC is considered to be a persistent device,(A ,⇁) is stored alongside the
(L , ⊢,∆).
• An argument labelling functionlab(Θ) :A ⇀ {in,out} is a partial function which
interprets(A ,⇁) according to chosen acceptability semantics.
Theaccepted extensionEA of C is the set of arguments{〈Φ,α〉 ∈ A | lab(Θ,〈Φ,α〉)=
in} in which caseΠ = Θ∪ (
⋃
〈Φ,α〉∈EA Φ).
• Therejected setR of C is the set of arguments{〈Φ,α〉 ∈ A | lab(Θ,〈Φ,α〉) =
out}.
• Theunrejected setU of C is the set of arguments{〈Φ,α〉 ∈ A | lab(Θ,〈Φ,α〉) 6=
out}.
For notational convenience, if an argument〈Φ,α〉 ∈ A for A of C , then we can simply
write 〈Φ,α〉 ∈ C . Also, if Φ ⊢ α according to(L , ⊢) of C , thenΦ ⊢ α according toC .
Whilst an agent can impose any criteria it wishes on argumentacceptance, includ-
ing acceptability semantics not specified in §3.2.1, we can re sonably assume that any
accepted extension ofC is complete(i.e. has no internal conflicts and contains all ar-
gument which it defends from attacks in(A ,⇁) as per Definition 3.7). Otherwise, if
we refer to an acceptable extensionE of C , thenE can beanyadmissible extension
of the argument system(A ,⇁) in C which accounts for dismissible arguments as per
Definition 3.15. For convenience, we also define the sets of rejected and unrejected ar-
guments — in Chapter 5, these sets will prove useful for determining how aggressively
an agent should respond to its peers’ arguments within an interaction portrayal.
The notion of a theory’s context is very useful. It brings together argument genera-
tion and argument interpretation, allowing us to simply refe to the contextC of a given
argumentation process. This gives us a single entity to refer to when we want to change
the ‘programme’ of a defeasible theory. In particular, the tory context describes the
source of an agent’s contribution to asocial (i.e. multi-agent) argumentation process,
and the medium through which it will evaluate any shared system of arguments. Thus,
we have everything we need to move on to a discussion of distributed argumentation;
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an understanding of abstract argumentation, an understanding of argumentation frame-
works in general, and the ability to refer to different contexts of argumentation.
The next chapter then concerns itself with the mapping of arguments from one
context into another; by this means can we consider a social argumentation process
to be a bridge between the private defeasible reasoning systems of individual agents.
This will provide a formal basis by which to understand the portrayal of interactions
described in Chapters 1 and 2, as an interaction portrayal can simply be seen as an




Intelligence cannot exist in a vacuum. It is only by observing the world that new
insights can be attained, and it is only by testing hypotheses in the world that an agent
can construct a robust model of its environment. It has already been demonstrated
however that it is difficult for a lone agent, with only limited access to information
within its environment, to establish the true nature of its world. It would certainly be
wasteful to insist that that agent try to independently determine that nature by itself
when there exist other agents with which it can collaborate,giving the agent access to
the observations and insights of its peers.
Argumentation is an inherently social metaphor, wherein a proponent of some
claim is pitted against an aggressive devil’s advocate who seeks to pull apart any loose
threads found in a given argument. Yet for the most part we havtreated argumenta-
tion as a process of self-correction on the part of a single agent. In this chapter, we
shall redress the balance and consider argumentation as a social pr cess, where multi-
ple autonomous agents test their theories against those of th ir peers. In doing so, we
shall identify many of the challenges faced in trying to conduct a coherent argumenta-
tion process between heterogeneous agents, and we shall also con ider the relationship
between an external system of arguments articulated by peers as part of social argu-
mentation and the internal argument systems which provide context for the beliefs of
individual agents. In doing this, we shall be able to define more f rmally the decision
problem which our portrayal mechanism of Chapter 5 exists tosolve.
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4.1 Mapping Arguments Between Different Contexts
The most obvious way to regard social argumentation is as a hypot esis selection
mechanism like that described in §3.2.4, albeit one in whichthere are multiple pro-
cesses contributing to the generation and interpretation of arguments. From this per-
spective, we should be able to infer a distributed context inwhich argumentation is
conducted. This distributed context would have the same components as any other
theory context:
• A theory coreΘ representing the unarguable within the hypothesis space ofthe
social argumentation process.
• An argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) within which arguments are generated.
• A system of arguments(A ,⇁) contributed by the agents involved in argumen-
tation.
• A labelling functionlab by which(A ,⇁) can be interpreted in order to produce
some common theoryΠ.
The flaw in this approach however is that it conflates a group ofautonomous agents
together into a single entity, one which processes the information given and presents
a single theory. Whilst this may be fine for analysing a socialargumentation process
from the outside, it tells us little about social argumentation from the perspective of the
peers engaged in it. How is the theory core determined? How can agents collectively
decide upon a common argument framework? Can a group of autonom us peers agree
on a single interpretation of a shared argument system?
Instead of viewing multi-agent argumentation as a communalhypothesis selection
process, we can view multi-agent argumentation as a hypothesis g nerationprocess
for the individual agents engaged in argumentation. The insight here is that social
argumentation is merely another means by which new observations and hypotheses
can be introduced to an agent. The arguments articulated by peers serve to introduce
new hypotheses for the recipient to factor into its programme for deriving its theory
for some problem domain — this may or may not lead to a revisionof the recipient’s
beliefs. Those beliefs determine whether or not a counter-argument can be made, and
any counter-argument might serve to introduce new hypotheses to other peers.
Of course, we have already conceived an agent’s defeasible reasoning process as
an argumentation process in and of itself, and this allows usfor the most part to bypass
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the actual theory produced by internal argumentation and instead directly compare the
system of arguments generated socially with the system generatedinternallyas part of
the agent’s theory context.
4.1.1 Mapping Arguments Across Argument Spaces
Consider the relationship between the argument space of a soci l argumentation pro-
cess and the argument spaces in which individual agents generat their private theories.
Evidently the arguments articulated by an agent must be based on arguments it can con-
ceive privately. It is also true however that any other arguments generated by its peers
must also at leastpotentiallybe arguments it has considered, or else it cannot be said
for certain that the agent’s theory truly accounts for the attacks of peers. Thus the ar-
gument space of a shared system of arguments should exist within an intersection of
the argument spaces of all involved agents’ theory contexts.
Of coursein theory, if the argument space of a social argumentation process was
subsumed by the theory contexts of every peer, then there would n t actually be any
reason to discuss anything, because each agent would already have the capability to
generate any argument which could be made by its peers indepently. Of course
this ignores that an agent might not have fully explored the hypothesis space from
which it derives its theory (recall the discussion of argumentation completeness in
§3.2.3), which social argumentation could rectify by providing assistance identifying
conflicts. It also ignores that agents may be able to provide ad itional observations of
the environment, permitting the dismissal of additional interpretations of the arguments
in that shared argument space (likewise discussed in §3.2.3). Finally, it ignores that fact
that the agents engaging in social argumentation do not usually know precisely what
the argument space for a shared argumentation process is going to be, let alone if it
will lie within the intersection of their own individual theory contexts.
Potential argumentation concerns itself with the comparison of argument spaces,
and the mapping of arguments from one space to another. In esse ce, its concern is
with addressing the question of how best to articulate the same rgument in different
circumstances — circumstances in which the fundamental premises upon which claims
can be supported are subject to different levels of abstraction, and in which factors
relevant in one space are considered irrelevant in another.Our interest in this case lies
in the migration of arguments from an agent’s theory contextinto the shared argument
space of a social argumentation process, andvice versa. Critical to this is the notion of
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apotential argument.
A potential argument is an argument which is supported by premis s which can be
derived from other, more fundamental propositions, and as such could be equally well
replaced by any of a number of more concrete arguments:1
Definition 4.1 Given a logical framework(L , ⊢), an argument〈Φ,α〉 is considered to
be apotential argument in relation to another argument〈Ψ,α〉 if, for every sentence
ϕ ∈Φ, it is the case thatΨ ⊢ ϕ.
• For brevity, we often state this relationship as〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ 〈Ψ,α〉.
If there exists a sentenceϕ ∈ Ψ such thatΦ 0 ϕ, then〈Φ,α〉 is a strictly potential
argument for〈Ψ,α〉.
• We state this as〈Φ,α〉⊏ 〈Ψ,α〉.
A potential argumenta for another argumentb is said to bepotentiallyb. Conversely,
b is anelaborationupona. This notion of a potential argument allows us to express
the relationship between arguments of varying levels of detail, as well as allowing us
to identify the common abstraction of two distinct arguments with matching claims. A
potential argument is similar to an enthymeme [Black and Hunter, 2008] — however
instead of concealing common knowledge, in a potential argument the provenance of
certain propositions in the support of the argument is left to be assumed by the observer.
Example 4.1 Consider the following collection of arguments:
a = 〈 { performable(dante,experiment) },
performable(dante,experiment) 〉
b = 〈 { assignable(dante,observatory),
suitable(observatory,experiment),
∀X,Y,Z. assignable(X,Y)∧ suitable(Y,Z)→ performable(X,Z) },
performable(dante,experiment) 〉
c = 〈 { assignable(dante,observatory),
requires(experiment,telescope(optical),
available(observatory,telescope(optical),
∀X,Y,Z. requires(X,Y)∧ available(Z,Y)→ suitable(Z,X),
∀X,Y,Z. assignable(X,Y)∧ suitable(Y,Z)→ performable(X,Z) },
performable(dante,experiment) 〉
d = 〈 { ∀X. performable(X,experiment) },
performable(dante,experiment) 〉
1This notion of potential argument is inspired by that used in[Gaertner and Toni, 2008]; the principle
difference here however is that we focus on a relative relation between arguments rather than on partial
constructions of arguments as part of a dispute derivation.
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Assuming a deductive framework capable of interpreting theabove arguments, we can
deduce that:
• a⊏ b (i.e. argumenta is potentially argumentb and argumentb elaborates upon
argumenta).
• a⊑ a (demonstrating reflexivity in the non-strict case).
• b ⊏ c anda ⊏ c (demonstrating transitivity).
• b 6⊑ a andc 6⊑ b (demonstrating anti-symmetry).
• a ⊏ d (although argumentd is supported by a more generic assertion than for
argumenta, argumentd makes a greater commitment as to how its claim is
derived than argumenta, and thus can be attacked by arguments which have no
bearing ona).
• b 6⊑ d and d 6⊑ b (argumentsb and d are separate, distinct elaborations ofa;
the same applies to argumentsc andd).
Defining potential arguments (and inversely, elaborations) serves as a useful means
to relate arguments formulated under the same logical framework, but within differ-
ent argument spaces. For example, we can take an argument toodetailed to fit within
a given argument space, and find an abstraction which does, orwe can flesh out an
overly-simple argument if we are able to elaborate upon the assumptions made within
it. Neither elaborations of a potential argument or potential arguments for an elabora-
tion are necessarily unique however:
Example 4.2 Assume an argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) in which the following
rules are subsumed by(L , ⊢):
∀X,Y. registered(X,Y)∧ assignable(X,Y)
∀X,Y,Z. requires(X,Y)∧ available(Z,Y)→ suitable(Z,X)
∀X,Y,Z. assignable(X,Y)∧ suitable(Y,Z)→ performable(X,Z)
Given the following argument:
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There exist at least two different potential arguments for argumenta, each of which is
distinct (i.e. neither argument is a potential argument or elaboration of the the other):




c = 〈 { registered(dante,observatory),
suitable(observatory,experiment),
performable(dante,experiment) 〉
Argumentc could just as easily be potentially another argument however:
d = 〈 { registered(dante,observatory),
type(experiment,observation),
preferred(observatory,observation),
∀X,Y,Z. type(X,Y)∧preferred(Z,Y)→ suitable(X,Z) },
performable(dante,experiment) 〉
Argumentsa andd are themselves distinct.
We can now define apotential restriction— a simplification of a set of arguments so
as to fit within a particular argument space:
Definition 4.2 A potential restriction of a set of arguments S into an argument space
∆ within an argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) is any set of potential arguments S′
where:
• For each argumenta∈ S′, it is the case thata∈ ∆ anda⊑ b for some argument
b ∈ S.
• For every argumentb ∈ S, if there exists no argumenta ∈ S′ such thata⊑ b,
then there exists no argumentc∈ ∆ such thatc⊑ b.
By restricting arguments into a more constrained argument space, we can describe
an agent’s beliefs in such a way as top tentiallymatch a number of more nuanced
viewpoints. Even if those viewpoints are jointly inconsistent, they can be said to be in
agreement within the hypothesis space described by the potential restriction.
Example 4.3 Consider the following argument set:
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∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬beneficial(X,abuse(Y))→ trustworthy(X,Y) },
trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉





∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬beneficial(X,abuse(Y))→ trustworthy(X,Y) },
trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
c = 〈 { abused(alanna,access(laboratory)),
analogous(access(laboratory),access(library)),
∀X,Y,Z. abused(X,Y)∧ analogous(Y,Z)→¬trustworthy(X,Z) },
¬trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉












f = 〈 { ¬∃X. research topic(alanna,X),
∀X. researcher(X)→∃Y. research topic(X,Y) },
¬researcher(alanna) 〉
g = 〈 { trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) }, trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
Now consider an argument space∆ wherein the horizon contains any sentence drawn
from the set{researcher(X1,X2), beneficial(X3,X4), abused(X5,X6), analogous(X7,X8)}
or their negations, along with any implication which draws on that set to formulate its
own antecedent; the focus of the argument space is on any instance or refutation of
trustworthy(X9,X10). The following revised set of arguments represents a potential
restriction of the above argument set into∆:
a′ = 〈 { researcher(alanna),
¬beneficial(alanna,abuse(access(library))),
∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬beneficial(X,abuse(Y))→ trustworthy(X,Y) },
trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
c′ = 〈 { abused(alanna,access(laboratory)),
analogous(access(laboratory),access(library)),
∀X,Y,Z. abused(X,Y)∧ analogous(Y,Z)→¬trustworthy(X,Z) },
¬trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
e′ = 〈 { researcher(alanna),
¬beneficial(alanna,abuse(access(library))),
¬trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) },











Figure 4.1: On the left, the system of arguments described in Example 4.3
prior to restriction. On the right, the system of arguments after restriction.
researcher(alanna)∧¬beneficial(alanna,abuse(access(library)))∧
¬trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
f′ = 〈 { ¬∃X. researcher(X) }, ¬researcher(alanna) 〉
Argumentsa and b both share the same potential argumenta′. Argumentc fits into
the argument space without modification. Argumentd is not considered to be relevant
(it does not claim an assertion in the focus, nor does it attack relevant argument).
Argumente is relevant because it attacks argumenta′, its claim being contrary to the
sentence∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬beneficial(X,abuse(Y))→ trustworthy(X,Y) in a′.
Argumentf attacks argumentsa′ and e′. Argumentg is already too abstract for the
argument space; in this case argumenta′ provides a suitably detailed replacement
argument.
Since for our portrayals of distributed interaction we ideally want to do just enough
argumentation to identify any disputes as to the resolutionof a given interaction con-
straint and then resolve them, portrayals should restrict the arguments given by agents
into a quite limited argument space. In essence, we want to restrict any arguments
so that they describe just enough about an agent’s beliefs tosupport its claims whilst
concealing anything which might be controversial, but which does not need to be ex-
pressed in order to differentiate between different resolutions of given constraints on
interaction. We donot want to inadvertently suppress any valid resolutions of a con-
straint.
Alternatively, if we want to elaborate upon arguments as a group in order to fit
them into a broader argument space, we can perform apotential expansion:
Definition 4.3 A potential expansionof a set of arguments S to the extent of an argu-
ment space∆ within an argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) is any set of elaborations
4.1. Mapping Arguments Between Different Contexts 103
S′ where:
• For each argumenta∈ S′, it is the case thata∈ ∆ andb⊑ a for some argument
b ∈ S.
• For every argumentb ∈ S, if there exists no argumenta ∈ S′ such thatb ⊑ a,
then there exists no argumentc∈ ∆ such thatb⊑ c.
If an argument can be elaborated upon to the extent that its support becomes wholly
drawn from the argument space horizon, then it then can be said to be properly placed
within that argument space.
Example 4.4 Consider the following argument set:
a = 〈 { certified(alanna),
¬at capacity(library),
∀X,Y. certified(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→ eligible(X,access(Y)) },
eligible(alanna,access(library)) 〉
b = 〈 { capacity(library,200),
user count(library,193),
∀X,Y,Z. capacity(X,Y)∧user count(X,Z)∧Z<Y→¬at capacity(X) },
¬at capacity(library) 〉
c = 〈 { ¬researcher(alanna) }, ¬researcher(alanna) 〉












∀X,Y. certified(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→ eligible(X,access(Y))
The focus of∆ is on any instance or refutation ofeligible(X11,X12). The following
revised set of arguments represents a potential expansion of ur original argument set
into that argument space:
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∀X,Y. certified(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→ eligible(X,access(Y)) },
eligible(alanna,access(library))
b1 = 〈 { capacity(library,200),
user count(library,193),
∀X,Y,Z. capacity(X,Y)∧user count(X,Z)∧Z<Y→¬at capacity(X) },
¬at capacity(library)
Argumenta′ elaborates upon argumenta, whilst argumentb does not require further
expansion. Argumentc is not relevant here, because its claim does not match the focus
of ∆, nor does it attacka′ or b. However there is another potential expansion of the
arguments above:
a2 = 〈 { researcher(alanna),
∀X. researcher(X)→ certified(X),
¬at capacity(library),
∀X,Y. certified(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→ eligible(X,access(Y)) },
eligible(alanna,access(library)) 〉
b2 = 〈 { capacity(library,200),
user count(library,193),
∀X,Y,Z. capacity(X,Y)∧user count(X,Z)∧Z<Y→¬at capacity(X) },
¬at capacity(library) 〉
c2 = 〈 { ¬published(alanna),
∀X. researcher(X)→ published(X) },
¬researcher(alanna) 〉
In this case, the chosen elaboration of argumenta is attackable by argumentc2.
The above example illustrates an important point; depending upon how an expansion
of a set of arguments is performed, there may be need to generat new arguments to
adequately explore the greater argument space into which that argument was moved.
Of course an agent must beable to elaborate upon an argument — this requires
knowledge about the provenance of propositions that goes beyond that already de-
scribed in the original hypothesis space in which the original argument was created. It
may well be that an agent has more knowledge about a given topic, but had felt it too
detailed for the context in which a given set of beliefs is generated (i.e. the agent was
abstracting its real knowledge in order to produce a simplertheory for solving the prob-
lem at hand, but later found it inadequate). Another option arises in social discourse
— arguments are being expanded because new hypotheses have been introduced to an
agent by a peer. In other words, the additional knowledge requi d is obtained from
another peer, of presumably greater expertise in the domainin question. It is exactly
this kind of scenario which we are interested in, and we shallsee potential expansions
of individual agents’ argument spaces later in Chapter 5 as aside effect of dialogue
with peers.
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4.1.2 Rescoping Argumentation
Changes in the theory core can affect the interpretations ofarguments, and thus the
theory derived from an argument interpretation, as alreadydiscussed. In general, when
a given assertion goes from known to unknown, we treat the assrtion as if it was a
generated hypothesis. Likewise, when a formerly hypothetical assertion becomes ob-
served fact, it is added to the theory core. In either case, the argument space remains
unchanged. It may be however that new information arises which was not previously
given consideration even hypothetically, but which still might be considered pertinent
to debate. Similarly, new hypotheses might be generated to explain certain phenomena
in the environment. In either circumstance, it may be advantageous to extend the argu-
ment space, such that arguments can be constructed based on these new propositions:
Definition 4.4 Given a set of hypotheses N, the argument space∆ = (H,F) of an
assumption-based argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) can beextended into a new
space∆′ = (H ′,F) where:
• R is a set of sentencesϕ ∈ H such that there exists a consistent subset S⊆
((H ∪N)/R) such that S⊢ ϕ.
• N′ is a set of sentencesϕ ∈ N such that there does not exist a consistent subset
S⊆ ((H ∪N)/N′) such that S⊢ ϕ.
• The revised horizon H′ = (H/R)∪N′.
An extended argument space is one where the horizon is redefinto accommodate
additional sentences, allowing the production of arguments based on those sentences.
Of course a system of arguments generated within the original argument space may no
longer fit properly within the new space, and as such an agent will need to perform a
potential expansion of arguments as per Definition 4.3:
Example 4.5 Take the argument set at the beginning of Example 4.4. The horizon
of the argument space∆ in which that set would constitute a valid system of argu-
ments must include all assumptions used in argumentsa, b and c, with the focus on
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∀X. researcher(X)→ published(X),
∀X. researcher(X)→ certified(X).
This revised argument space would excludecertified(X7) from the horizon (as it can
be inferred from the new assertions added to the space) and insert into the horizon
all of the new sentences other thanpublished(X5) (which is already derivable from the
current space). This would then motivate either (or both) ofthe potential expansions
described in Example 4.4.
We have not addressed yet what happens to the attack relations between arguments in
an argument system when those arguments are elaborated upon. Fundamentally, this is
quite simple — when a set of arguments is expanded, all elaborations retain the attacks
generated by or against them, because elaborations retain the same claim (and so still
attack arguments containing assertions contrary to that claim) and an agent can derive
from an elaboration all the results it could from the potential argument (and so can still
be rebutted or undercut by the same attacks):
Theorem 4.1 If a⇁ b, then bothc⇁ d anda⇁ d, if a⊑ c andb⊑ d.
Proof 4.1 Within an assumption-based argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆), it is the
case that〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉 if and only ifΨ ⊢ γ and{α} ⊢ ¬γ for some logical sentence
γ ∈ L as per Definition 3.10. We observe that:
• An elaboration of an argument〈Ψ,β〉 is an argument〈Ψ′,β〉 wherein for every
sentenceϕ ∈Ψ, it is the case thatΨ′ ⊢ ϕ.
• Ψ′ ⊢ γ by virtue ofΨ′ ⊢ ϕ for all sentences inϕ∈Ψ andΨ ⊢ γ, and so any elabo-
ration of the target argument of an attack will remain attacked after elaboration.
Likewise, we observe that:
• An elaboration of an argument〈Φ,α〉 is an argument〈Φ′,α〉 wherein for every
sentenceϕ ∈Φ, it is the case thatΦ′ ⊢ ϕ.
• The claimα is unchanged between an argument〈Φ,α〉 and its elaboration
〈Φ′,α〉, such that〈Φ′,α〉 continues to attack the same arguments as〈Φ,α〉.
Likewise, any argument attacked by〈Φ′,α〉 is attacked by its potential argument
〈Φ,α〉.
Therefore, if〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉 in an assumption-based argumentation framework, then
〈Φ′,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ′,β〉 and〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ′,β〉 if 〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ 〈Φ′,α〉 and〈Ψ,β〉 ⊑ 〈Ψ′,β〉.
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Of course, there may exist new attacks based on contrary relationships between as-
sertions added to the horizon of the extended argument space; these attacks need to
be identified and added to the argument system as normal for argument generation. It
is also worth noting that if two arguments elaborate into thesame argument (reflect-
ing the situation in Example 4.2), then they cannot have attacked one another prior to
elaboration:
Theorem 4.2 If a⊑ c andb⊑ c, thena 6⇁ b.
Proof 4.2 Given an assumption-based argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆), if 〈Φ,α〉
⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉, but there exists an argumentc such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ c and〈Ψ,β〉 ⊑ c, then:
• There exists a contrary relation(α,γ) such thatΨ ⊢ γ and{α} ⊢ ¬γ (by Defini-
tion 3.10).
• For every sentenceϕ ∈Φ and every sentenceϕ ∈Ψ, it is the case thatϕ can be
inferred fromc (shown in Proof 4.1).
• Therefore, given thatΦ ⊢ α, from c we can inferγ and γ, in which case the
support forc is internally inconsistent (as per Definition 3.4).
Thereforec is not a valid argument by Definition 3.10, and therefore if〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉,
then there cannot exist an argumentc such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ c and〈Ψ,β〉 ⊑ c.
By this proof can we have confidence that the elaboration of arguments will not inter-
fere unduly with existing conflicts between arguments.
Instead of expanding an argument space, an agent may want tocon ract the ar-
gument space in which argumentation occurs. It might seem odd t want to do this,
however whilst a larger argument space can potentially describe with greater accuracy
a given problem domain, it also requires the generation of more arguments in order to
adequately describe the space and ensure a consistent labelling of the sentences within,
and it may be the case that this additional argumentation does n t in fact have much
influence on the conclusions which are of interest. For a given problem, it might be
better to abstract aside detail, and work with simpler propositions in order to avoid
further computation. Fundamentally, nothing short of a complete description of ev-
erything will guarantee perfect results, but in many practical problem domains, it is
accepted that adequate (even very good) results can be obtained w th less computation
by using a more abstract depiction of the problem:
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Definition 4.5 The argument space∆=(H,F) of an assumption-based argumentation
framework(L , ⊢,∆) can becontracted into a new space∆′ = (H ′,F ′) excluding a set
of sentences R where:
• R′ ⊆ H is a minimal set of sentences such that there exist no consiste t ubsets
S⊆ (H/R′) for which S⊢ ϕ, whereϕ ∈ R.
• The revised horizon H′ = (H/R′).
• The revised focus F′ = (F/R).
The deliberate use of smaller argument spaces really comes into its own in multi-agent
argumentation, where several agents collaborate to produce a system of arguments.
Since multi-agent argumentation is primarily engaged in inorder to determine the best
way to resolve some problem, there is little point in executing argumentation in an
argument space which includes extraneous information. This means that the argument
space in which multi-agent argumentation is executed will almost certainly be to vary-
ing degrees a contraction of the individual argument spacesin which agents decide
their personal beliefs.
A contracted argument space is one in which certain assertions can no longer be
inferred from the horizon including perhaps certain previously relevant conclusions.
To fit into the new space, a potential restriction of the arguments used in an argument
system may be necessary.
Example 4.6 The potential restriction demonstrated by Example 4.3 could have been
motivated by a contraction of the original argument space∆ in which the system of
arguments described in that example was generated. This could be represented by
the exclusion of instances of the set{ enure(X1,X2), university(X3), postdoc(X4),
needs(X5,X6), only source(X7,X8), research topic(X9,X10) } from the space (a rather
significant pruning), leading to the reduced system of arguments at the end of Exam-
ple 4.3. It would also require a change in the focus of the revis d argument space,
such that argumentd (which claims¬beneficial(alanna,abuse(access(laboratory))))
becomes irrelevant.
When a set of arguments is restricted, all potential arguments retain the same claim
(and so still attack arguments containing contrary assertions), but any attacks against
results which can no longer be derived from the potential arguments (i.e. attacks against
supporting assumptions which have been discarded in favourof derivative assump-
tions) are lost from the argument system. Naturally, this can change the acceptability
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of arguments in an argument system, illustrating if nothingelse the danger in abstract-
ing aside information. Nonetheless, there are notions we can mploy to describe ‘good’
argument spaces, which we can make use of.
The risk inherent in moving arguments into a more limited argument space is that
the common dependencies of arguments may be concealed, hiding the fact that an
attack against one argument may also be an attack against others. Consider two argu-
ments, both of which share a common assumption. Now considerthe insertion of these
arguments into an argument space, where perhaps they must bepotentially restricted in
order to fit. It is important that either the common assumption is not in either restricted
argument and is not inferable from either support set (in which case the common as-
sumption is simply out of scope, and irrelevant), or that thecommon assumption is
inferable frombothargument support sets. Should the assumption be inferable from
one, but not the other, then should that assumption or its derivatives be contradicted
by a new argument, only one of the two original arguments willbe formally attacked,
which may lead to an inaccurate evaluation of the argument system.
If a common premise falls within the argument space of an argumentation frame-
work, then it is important that it is inferable (trivially orotherwise) from the support
sets ofall arguments which depend on it. The easiest way to ensure this is to exploit
the horizon of the argument space, since all arguments already within it are founded
on it:
Definition 4.6 A system of arguments(A ,⇁) is balancedwithin an argument space
∆ with respect to a theory contextC with an accepted extensionE if and only if:
• A ⊆ ∆ (i.e. for every argumenta∈ A , it is the case thata∈ ∆).
• There exist no two arguments〈Φ,α〉,〈Ψ,β〉 ∈ A such that forall elaborations
〈Φ′,α〉 ∈ E of 〈Φ,α〉 such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ 〈Φ′,α〉, there exists a common depen-
dencyϕ such thatΨ ⊢ ϕ andΦ′ ⊢ ϕ, butΦ ⊢ ϕ.
If (A ,⇁) is unbalanced within∆ with respect toC , but A ⊆ ∆, then∆ itself is ill-
formed with respect toΠ, whereΠ is the theory derived fromC .
In essence, all related arguments should be expressed to thesame level of detail. Note
that it is meaningless to evaluate the balance of a system of arguments without an ex-
ternal reference — therefore argument balance is of most concern for agents trying to
express their theories in a more restricted space than the ones in which they formed
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those theories (e.g. a shared argument space created by dialogue between heteroge-
neous agents). Note also that in Definition 4.6, we only insist that a system of argu-
ments be balanced from the perspective ofacceptedarguments generated in a greater
argumentation framework, rather than any and all arguments. Thi is because different
interpretations of that greater framework may promote different dependencies for argu-
ments in the restricted space, and applying even those depenncies an agent does not
itself believe in would be overly demanding (and possibly even unjustifiable for inad-
missible arguments). Finally, note that if an agent acceptstwo alternative elaborations
of one potential argument, and a dependency is present only in one of those elabora-
tions, then the potential argument need not be expanded to include that dependency,
because it can ‘potentially’ be the other elaboration.
Example 4.7 Consider the following system of arguments:
a = 〈 { researcher(alanna),
¬at capacity(library),
∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→ eligible(X,access(Y)) },
eligible(alanna,access(library)) 〉
b = 〈 { speciality(alanna,argumentation),
lecturer(alanna),
∀X,Y. speciality(X,Y)∧ lecturer(X)→ expert(X,Y) },
expert(alanna,argumentation) 〉
c = 〈 { undergraduate(alanna),
∀X. undergraduate(X)∧ researcher(X)→ false },
¬researcher(alanna) 〉
Assume that there exists an agent which accepts one and only one elaboration of argu-
mentb within its theory context:
b1 = 〈 { speciality(alanna,argumentation),
researcher(alanna),
teacher(alanna),
∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧ teacher(X)→ lecturer(X),
∀X,Y. speciality(X,Y)∧ lecturer(X)→ expert(X,Y) },
expert(alanna,argumentation) 〉
Becauseresearcher(alanna) can be derived from the support of argumentb1, which
elaborates upon argumentb, but researcher(alanna) is not found inb despite that as-
sertion having to be part of the horizon of any argument space∆ which can generate
argumentsa, b andc, the system of arguments consisting of argumentsa, b andc is
unbalanced within its argument space from the perspective of the given agent’s theory
context.
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In this case, the unbalanced nature of the argument system conceals the possibil-
ity that argumentc attacks argumentb as well as argumenta (whether this is borne
out or not depends on the ability of any contributing agent topr duce an alternative
elaboration of argumentc which does not rely on{a}). Put in another way, there ex-
ists from the perspective of our agent an inclination to consider the base assumption
lecturer(alanna) to be partially dependent onresearcher(alanna), thus suggesting to it
that the current horizon of∆ could perhaps be modified to be less inter-dependent (and
thus make the base assumptions from any derived theory more independent from one
another).
If an argument space is ill-formed from the perspective of a given outside theory con-
text, then the horizon of the space contains assertions which can be at least partially
inferred from other assertions within it (because an argument’s support is built from
assertions in the horizon, and part of the support for one argument can be partially
inferred from the support of another). It can be proven that tere exists an expansion
of the space which, along with a potential expansion of the arguments within it, would
result in a balanced system of arguments from the perspective of that outside theory
context to which the argument system is compared:
Theorem 4.3 If an argument space∆ is ill-formed with respect to contextC , then there
exists an expansion∆′ of ∆ which is well-formed with respect toC .
Proof 4.3 If an argument space∆ = (H,F) is ill-formed with respect to a theory con-
textC , then:
• There exists an argument〈Φ,α〉 ∈ ∆ which is potentially an argument〈Ψ,α〉 ∈
E , whereE is the accepted extension ofC such thatΨ ⊢ ϕ for someϕ ∈ H.
• There exists no other argument〈Ψ′,α〉 ∈ E such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ 〈Ψ′,α〉 andΨ′ 0
ϕ.
• ϕ /∈Φ.
This means that for some sentenceϕ ∈ H, there exists an internally consistent set of
sentences S⊆ ((H∪Π)/{ϕ}) such that S⊢ϕ and(S∩H) 6= /0 (i.e.ϕ is at least partially
derivable from H), whereΠ is the theory derivable from the accepted extensionE of
C . We observe that there exists a ‘maximal’ argument space∆+ = (H+,F) such that
H+ = (H ∪Π):
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• We can iteratively reduce∆+ by finding sentencesϕ ∈ H+ for which there exists
an internally consistent subset S⊆ (H+/{ϕ}) such that S⊢ ϕ and then removing
ϕ from H+.
• Every sentenceϕ∈H+ removed can be inferred from S; any sentenceψ∈S like-
wise removed later must also be derivable from an internallyconsistent subset
of the remainder of H+, so no deductive capacity is lost.
If there is no sentenceϕ left in H+ for which there exists an internally consistent set
of sentences S⊆ (H+/{ϕ}) such that S⊢ ϕ, then given that for every sentenceψ ∈Π,
there exists an internally consistent subset S2⊆ H+ such that S2 ⊢ ψ:
• There must be no sentenceϕ∈H+ for which there exists an internally consistent
set of sentences S⊆ ((H+∪Π)/{ϕ}) such that S⊢ ϕ and(S∩H+) 6= /0.
• There exists no argument〈Φ,α〉 ∈ ∆+ which is potentially an argument〈Ψ,α〉 ∈
E such thatΨ ⊢ ϕ for anyϕ ∈ H+.
Therefore there exists an expansion of∆ which is well-formed with respect toΠ.
By this proof can we be confident that it will always be possible to achieve a balanced
argument system by elaborating upon arguments — such a process will always termi-
nate. This result can be exploited to refine the definition of an argument space — for
example:
Example 4.8 Consider an argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) wherein the horizon of




Now consider the following argument:
〈 { researcher(alanna),
¬at capacity(library),
∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→ eligible(X,access(Y)) },
eligible(alanna,access(library) 〉
This argument states thateligible(alanna,access(library) can be derived from the hori-
zon of∆ if it is extended to include the rule∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→
eligible(X,access(Y)) (which would also lead toeligible(alanna,access(library) being
rmoved), suggesting that with such an extension, the argument space would be better
able to describe the domain of argumentation (on the basis that the new horizon then
describes a better, flatter axiomatisation of that hypothesis space).
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Whilst in general argument balancing is done with respect toa given outside theory
context (e.g. for evaluating a social argument space from the perspective of an agent’s
own beliefs), it is possible to evaluate the balance of a system of arguments within
a theory context. In this case, Definition 4.6 serves to identify where elements of
the horizon of an argument space are derivable from other elements of the horizon
(in which case the argumentation framework isnot a flat framework as defined in
[Dung et al., 2007]).
The ability to compare argument spaces, and the systems of arguments which might
be generated from those spaces is very important to this thesis, because this ability
allows us to relate any shared system of arguments, created as part of a multi-agent
argumentation process, with the corresponding internal arguments used by an agent
to construct its standing beliefs. Moreover, the shared argument system becomes an
avenue by which we can compare the internal arguments ofall the autonomous agents
involved in argumentation. In order to demonstrate this further though, we need to
further consider the practicalities of multi-agent argumentation, as well as its theoretic
qualities.
4.2 Agent Belief Synchronisation
Perhaps the primary purpose of social argumentation, from ahypothesis generation
perspective, is that it provides justification to extend individual argument spaces to
include new assumptions and thus produce new arguments and new interpretations of
existing arguments. It is not that we expect social argumentation to be conducted from
the outset within the intersection of agents’ individual argument spaces, it is that we
expect thataftersocial argumentation has been conducted, that the arguments produced
will now be found in some form or another within every participant’s expanded theory
context.
Basically, every time an entirely new argument is encountered by an agent, we
expect that the agent revises the programme by which it determin s its own beliefs
such that it accounts for the hypotheses used by that argument. If every agent is able
to factor every argument produced in a social argumentationpr cess into their theory
contexts, then each defeasible theory derived should be admissible with respect to the
combined wisdom of the agent group, and thus will either be broadly compatible with
every other theory, or will at least represent a rational counter-interpretation.
It is vital that we stop to consider what it is agents want to achieve when they
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engage in social argumentation. Superficially, there are a number of reasons why an
agent might engage in dialogue with its peers; it might want information, it might want
to enlist the assistance of peers for some task, it might wantto egotiate some kind
of common contract for future services or behaviour. Underlying all this however is
the observation that all agents still possess their own internal beliefs, and ultimately all
agents will act according to those beliefs. Argumentation is only meaningful where it
influences those beliefs; any external system of arguments will only be useful insofar
as it might be expected in some way to reflect the internal argument systems of its
contributors. The core purpose of social argumentation theis to bring the beliefs of
agents into greater alignment.
Ideally, a group of agents would enter argumentation focused on a particular prob-
lem and at the end of the argumentation process, all agents would c me to a common
consensus as to the correct interpretation of the argumentsarticulated. In practice how-
ever, we already know that a system of arguments, even when itexhaustively explores
a given argument space, may still have more than one admissible interpretation. Se-
lection of a particular interpretation is then to some extent arbitrary given that any
purely logical selection mechanism would be able to be articulated as a set of con-
clusive arguments itself. Thus, despite the best efforts ofagents, a shared system of
arguments may remain ambiguous. We must also consider agentutonomy. No out-
side entity has an inherent right to dictate a particular interpretation of arguments to an
autonomous agent when there exist other just as valid interpretations available (unless
the agent has voluntarily conceded responsibility for thatdecision). Whilst there may
be circumstances where interaction is engaged in specifically to produce a common
interpretation of a contentious concern, that is merely a matter of social commitment
— what an agent fundamentallybelievescan only be determined by the agent itself.
Thus there will be circumstances where no agreement betweenagents can be reached
through no failing of the process by which argumentation wasconducted. If this is the
case, then how do we evaluate a social argumentation process?
For our purposes, tosynchronisetwo theories is to ensure that they both represent
two acceptable interpretations of the same body of evidence:
Definition 4.7 A set of theoriesΠ1, . . . ,Πn (where n> 1) is synchronisedgiven a
theory coreΘ if there exists a system of arguments(A ,⇁) generated within an argu-
mentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) such that:
• For every theoryΠi there exists an admissible extensionE i ⊆ A such thatΠi ⊆




If two theories are synchronised, then those theories are both equally admissible given
the evidence available. Any conflict between the theories isa product of interpreta-
tive bias in the absence of additional information, and as such can only be confidently
resolved by further observation. It isnot necessary for the two theories to be jointly
consistent. Synchronised theories can be generated indepently — the argumenta-
tion framework merely acts as a context in which the theoriescan be compared. Thus,
synchronisation is something which should be viable in a multi-agent context.
There is however a weakness to this notion of synchronisation. It is in fact very
difficult to synchroniseall agent beliefs — not in fact much easier than ensuring con-
sistency between all agent beliefs. Naturally, it would be preferable if we only looked
at synchronisation of agent theories within the argument space of a particular social
argumentation process:
Definition 4.8 A set of theoriesΠ1, . . . ,Πn (where n> 1) is synchronisedwithin an
argument space∆ if and only if for each theoryΠi (where1≤ i ≤ n):
• There exists a system of arguments(A ,⇁)i generated within an argumentation
framework(L , ⊢,∆)i such thatΠi is derived from a complete extensionE i of
(A ,⇁)i in accordance with a theory coreΘi .
• There exists a potential restrictionE ′i of E i into ∆.
• For each theoryΠ j (where1≤ j ≤ n), E ′i is a potential restriction into∆ of an
admissible extension of argument system(A ,⇁) j .
Thus the beliefs of agents are synchronised within a given argument space if the ar-
guments generated within that space from one agent’s beliefs cannot be shown to be
inadmissible using arguments generated from the beliefs ofits peers. The beliefs of
agents may not be synchronisedoutsideof that space, but any arguments which can
be generated from those beliefs beyond the scope of the givenargument space are
considered irrelevant.
Example 4.9 Consider the following system of arguments:
a1 = 〈 { graduated(alanna),
employed(alanna,edinburgh),
university(edinburgh),
∀X,Y. graduated(X)∧ employed(X,Y)∧university(Y)→ researcher(X),
¬at capacity(library).
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∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→ eligible(X,access(Y)) },
eligible(alanna, library) 〉
b1 = 〈 { undergraduate(alanna),
∀X. undergraduate(X)∧ researcher(X)→ false },
¬researcher(alanna) 〉
c1 = 〈 { graduated(alanna),
∀X. graduated(X)∧undergraduate(X)→ false },
¬undergraduate(alanna) 〉
d1 = 〈 { undergraduate(alanna),
∀X. graduated(X)∧undergraduate(X)→ false },
¬graduated(alanna) 〉















Assume that this describes agent Alanna’s beliefs, such that a theory can be derived
from the admissible extension{a1,c1,e1,g1}. Now consider another system of argu-
ments:
a2 = 〈 { researcher(alanna),
¬at capacity(library).
∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→ eligible(X,access(Y)) },
eligible(alanna, library) 〉
b2 = 〈 { student(alanna,edinburgh,artificial intelligence),
degree(artificial intelligence,edinburgh,bachelor(science)),
∀X,Y,Z,A. student(X,Y,Z)∧degree(Z,Y,bachelor(A))→ undergraduate(X),
∀X. undergraduate(X)∧ researcher(X)→ false },
¬researcher(alanna) 〉
c2 = 〈 { graduated(alanna),
∀X. graduated(X)∧undergraduate(X)→ false },
¬undergraduate(alanna) 〉
d2 = 〈 { undergraduate(alanna),
∀X. graduated(X)∧undergraduate(X)→ false },
¬graduated(alanna) 〉
e2 = 〈 { undergraduate(alanna),
∀X. undergraduate(X)∧ eligible(X,access(library))→ false },
¬eligible(alanna,access(library)) 〉
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f2 = 〈 { eligible(alanna,access(library)),
∀X. undergraduate(X)∧ eligible(X,access(library))→ false },
¬undergraduate(alanna) 〉
g2 = 〈 { eligible(alanna,access(library)),
undergraduate(alanna) },
eligible(alanna,access(library))∧ eligible(alanna,access(library)) 〉
In this case, assume that this describes agent Benjamin’s beliefs, such that a theory
can be derived from the admissible extension{b2,d2,g2}. There exists an argument
space∆ such that both arguments sets share the same potential restriction:
a′ = 〈 { researcher(alanna),
¬at capacity(library).
∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→ eligible(X,access(Y)) },
eligible(alanna, library) 〉
b′ = 〈 { undergraduate(alanna),
∀X. undergraduate(X)∧ researcher(X)→ false },
¬researcher(alanna) 〉
c′ = 〈 { graduated(alanna),
∀X. graduated(X)∧undergraduate(X)→ false },
¬undergraduate(alanna) 〉
d′ = 〈 { undergraduate(alanna),
∀X. graduated(X)∧undergraduate(X)→ false },
¬graduated(alanna) 〉
More importantly, each agent’s accepted extension is admissible within this restriction,
and each extension is a potential restriction of an admissible extension in both of the
original argument systems, in spite of their differences.
An argument space issufficiently expressivewith respect to a given theory if the theory
is able to defend itself within the space as well as it could outside of it. In other
words, if an argument within the space is supported by hypotheses which are part of
the given theory is then attacked by another argument in the spaceand it is possible to
formulate a counter-argument from the theory, then it should be possible to construct
that counter-argument or a potential argument for it withine argument space:
Definition 4.9 The argument space∆ of an argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) is suf-
ficiently expressivewith respect to a theoryΠ if and only if:
• There exists a system of arguments(A ,⇁) such thatΠ can be derived from an
admissible extensionE of (A ,⇁).
• There exists a potential restrictionE ′ of E into ∆.

































Figure 4.2: The theories derived from the highlighted interpretations of the
argument systems on the left and right are synchronised, because their po-
tential restrictions into the argument system in the center are both admissible
within the other argument system.
• If there exists an argumenta ∈ ∆ such thata ⇁ b for some argumentb ∈ E ′,
then provided that there exists an argumentc∈ E such thatc⇁ a, there exists
an argumentd ∈ ∆ such thatd⊑ c andd ⇁ a.
If the argument space in which argumentation is conducted isfound to be insufficiently
expressive, then it can be expanded in order to ensure that the theories generated within
it adequately approximate theories generated without. Of course, this only applies to
circumstances where there exists external references by which to evaluate the argu-
ments generated within a space; if a theory is being created wholly within an argument
space, then there is no way to measure the quality of an argument space:
Theorem 4.4 An argument space∆ of an argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) is al-
ways sufficiently expressive with respect to a theoryΠ if Π is determined using a system
of arguments(A ,⇁) generated within(L , ⊢,∆).
Proof 4.4 From Definition 3.12, we see that a theoryΠ is derived from a theory core
Θ and the resulting accepted extensionE of a system of argument(A ,⇁) generated
within the argument space∆ of an argumentation framework(L , ⊢,∆) such thatΠ =
Θ∪ (
⋃
〈Φ,α〉∈E Φ). If ∆ is notsufficiently expressive with respect toΠ, then either:
• There exists no system of arguments(A ,⇁) such thatΠ can be derived from an
admissible extensionE of (A ,⇁).
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• There exists no potential restrictionE ′ of E into ∆.
• There exists an argumenta∈ ∆ such thata⇁ b for some argumentb ∈ E ′ and
every elaborationc ∈ ∆ for which a ⊑ c is defended against by an argument
d ∈ E such thatd ⇁ c, but there exists no argumente∈ ∆ such that for at least
one of those defendersd, it is the case thate⊑ d ande⇁ a.
The first case is evidently false. As for the second case, it can quickly be seen that if
E ⊆ ∆ (i.e. all arguments inE are within∆), thenE is a potential restriction ofE into
∆:
• For each argumenta∈ E , it is the case thata∈ ∆ (becauseE ⊆ ∆) anda⊑ a
(by Definition 4.1).
For the third case, we observe that any argumentd as described above must be within
∆, and therefore there is always a potential argument∈ ∆ such thate⊑ d, beingd
itself. It can be seen thatd ⇁ a, becaused attacks an elaborationc of a, which within
∆ must bea itself. Therefore, an argument space is always sufficientlyexpressive for
any theory derived from arguments generated within itself.
If agents are using social argumentation to synchronise their beliefs, then they will
likely only succeed within the social argument space if thatspace allows an agent to
defend any of its beliefs which happen to fall within that space gainst attacks in that
space which it would be able to defend against outside of it. If this is not the case, then
it might not be possible to properly articulate an agent’s beliefs during the argumen-
tation process, in which case synchronisation will not occur unless all synchronising
peers happen to be independently aware of the prohibited arguments anyway.
Theorem 4.5 If an argument space∆ is not sufficiently expressive with respect toΠ,
then it cannot be certain thatΠ is synchronised with other theoriesΠ within ∆.
Proof 4.5 If an argument space∆ is not sufficiently expressive with respect toΠ, then
either:
• There exists no system of arguments(A ,⇁) such thatΠ can be derived from an
admissible extensionE of (A ,⇁).
• There exists no potential restrictionE ′ of E into ∆.
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• There exists an argumenta∈ ∆ such thata⇁ b for some argumentb ∈ E ′ and
every elaborationc ∈ ∆ for which a⊑ c is defended against by an argument
d ∈ E such thatd ⇁ c, but there exists no argumente∈ ∆ such that for at least
one of those defendersd, it is the case thate⊑ d ande⇁ a.
The first case is evidently false. It also evident that there is always a potential restric-
tion of a given set of arguments into an argument space, thougthat restriction may be
the empty set if there is no overlap between the space in whicht e argument set was
generated and the space into which it is restricted, so the second case must be false
as well. As for the third case, if an argumentb ∈ E is attacked by an argumenta∈ ∆
and every elaborationc of a is itself attacked by an argumentd ∈ E , but there is no
potential argumente∈ ∆ of anyd, thenb will be inadmissible within the argument
system of∆. Thus, unless all other agents consider an elaboration ofb to be admissi-
ble in their own theory contexts, it is unlikely that a potential expansion ofE ′ will be
admissible in every one of those peers’ theory contexts, andthus their theories will not
be synchronised.
Oddly enough, it would seem that any space with which a theoryhas no interaction is
sufficiently expressive if attacks against that theory cannot be expressed there either.
Of course, such a space is notusefulfrom the perspective of that theory. Likewise, it
is trivial to synchronise theories in a hypothesis space in which they do not interact
with one another, but there is no benefit conferred from doingso (this is actually an
important point for our contribution; we want to minimise thamount of argumentation
we do in order to make computation easier and synchronisation easier to obtain, but
we also want to maximise the benefit of doing so).
We have established the position that the purpose of social argumentation is to
permit the synchronisation of agent beliefs within the argument space of the social
interaction. At the very least, we can say that that is the purpose of social argumenta-
tion from the truth maintenance perspective, though there will also exist the purpose
for which the argumentation process was instigated from theoutset — such as creat-
ing a social contract for negotiation or planning. If the social system of arguments is
merely an intermediary between the personal defeasible reasoning processes of indi-
vidual agents however, then it should be possible to achievesynchronisation of agent
theories via that argument system.
A system of arguments is considered to bereconciledwith an agent’s theory con-
text if and only if the accepted beliefs of the agent are admissible within that argument
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system and every admissible extension of the arguments within is potentially an ad-
missible extension of the theory context:
Definition 4.10 A system of arguments(A ,⇁) within an argument space∆ is recon-
ciled with a theory contextC if and only if:
• Every complete extension of(A ,⇁) given theory coreΘ of C is a potential
restriction into∆ of an admissible extension ofC .
• There exists a potential restrictionE ′ of the accepted extensionE of C into ∆
such thatE ′ is an admissible extension of(A ,⇁) givenΘ.
The purpose of reconciliation is to achieve synchronisation of agent beliefs within
a common argument space. If the theory context for every agent engaged in social
argumentation can be shown to be reconciled with the shared system of arguments,
then the theories derived from those theory contexts can be shown to be synchronised
within the argument space of that system:
Theorem 4.6 If a system of arguments(A ,⇁) is reconciled with a set of theory con-
textsC , then the set of all theoriesΠ derived from those contexts is synchronised within
the argument space∆ in which(A ,⇁) was generated.
Proof 4.6 If a shared system of arguments(A ,⇁) within an argument space∆ is
reconciled with the theory contextC of every agentσ ∈ Σ, whereΣ is the set of agents
engaged in an interactionI , then for every theoryΠ derived from a theory contextC
of an agentσ ∈ Σ:
• There exists a system of arguments inC such thatΠ is derived from an admissible
extensionE of that system, whereE is the accepted extension ofC (by Definition
3.16).
• There exists a potential restrictionE ′ of E into ∆ (by Definition 4.10).
• For each theoryΠµ held by an agent µ∈ Σ, it is the case thatE ′ is a potential
restriction into∆ of an admissible extension ofCµ (by Definition 4.10; we know
that E ′ is itself an admissible extension, and we know that every admissible
extension in(A ,⇁) is a potential restriction into∆ of an admissible extension in
every theory contextCµ, because(A ,⇁) is reconciled with every theory context
Cµ).
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These three statements correspond to the requirements of Definition 4.8. Therefore if
(A ,⇁) is reconciled with every theory contextC , then the set of all theoriesΠ derived
from those theory contexts is synchronised with∆.
This then allows us to define the solution state of the distribu ed decision problem
which we wish to solve using our portrayal mechanism. We wantour mechanism to
ensure that every agent in an interaction is able to reconcile their theory contexts with
the portrayal for that interaction. By doing this, the beliefs of those agents will be
synchronised within the argument space of the portrayal, which will (hopefully) lead
to a better outcome for interaction.
4.3 Conducting Distributed Argumentation
Assume then that we have a collection of agents, each of whichderives its beliefs from
a defeasible theory produced by an internal argumentation pr cess. These agents are
given cause to discuss some logical problem, which defines the focus for some social
argumentation process. In question then is what exactly constitutes the context for that
process and how agents in dialogue can determine that context for themselves.
Whilst abstractly the critical components of social argumentation are analogous
to those of internal argumentation, the underlying objectiv is different. Recall that
in §3.2.4, we presented internal argumentation as a scientific programme like that de-
scribed by [Lakatos, 1970], wherein we have a hard core and protective belt with which
to determine the state of some logical theory. In social argumentation (or at least, the
type of social argumentation we are interested in here), we are more interested in pro-
viding a medium through which theories can be tested and challenged, and our primary
goal is to provide a means to intelligently expand the horizons f individual agents’
reasoning.
As alluded to in the previous section, we are not interested in producing a single
theory, but in allowing each agent involved to draw its own interpretation. Therefore
for our purposes, social argumentation takes place within adistributed argumentation
framework(L , ⊢,∆), generating a shared system of arguments(A ,⇁), which is then
interpreted individually by each observing agent according to their (revised) theory
contexts. The main issue then is determining the nature of the distributed framework
(L , ⊢,∆). If agents are able to determine whether or not a given argument can be
generated within(L , ⊢,∆), then agents can freely map arguments from their theory
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contexts into∆.
The distributed logical framework(L , ⊢) used for social argumentation ispoten-
tially the union of all frameworks used within the theory contexts of agents (i.e. if an
argument is valid with respect toanyagent’s theory context, then it is valid in the dis-
tributed framework), and isideally the intersection (i.e. if an argument is valid within
the distributed framework, then it is valid inall theory contexts). If there is indeed a
disparity between the logical frameworks used by agents to contribute arguments to a
social argumentation process, then there will exist the possibility that some arguments
will not be interpretable by all agents:
Definition 4.11 Given a logical framework(L , ⊢), an argument〈Φ,α〉 is invalid if
(Φ∪{α})* L or Φ 0 α.
If (L , ⊢) is the logical framework used in a theory contextC , then it can be stated that
argument〈Φ,α〉 is invalid with respect toC .
Similarly, if a given logical framework permits an expandednotion of logical con-
trary (as discussed in §3.2.2), then there may exist instances where an agent claims that
one argument attacks another, but there is no apparent conflict from the perspective of
another peer:
Definition 4.12 Given a logical framework(L , ⊢), an attack〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉 is in-
valid if there does not exist a contrary relation(α,γ) such thatΨ ⊢ γ and{α} ⊢ ¬γ.
If (L , ⊢) is the logical framework used in a theory contextC , then it can be stated that
attack〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉 is invalid with respect toC .
We can assume that an agent will automatically dismiss any arguments or attacks
invalid with respect to its theory context. If a distributedargumentation framework
permits invalid arguments and attacks, then it will not necessarily be possible to syn-
chronise the beliefs of agents, because certain arguments demed admissible to some
peers will be deemed inadmissible to others, andvice versa. It is possible to avoid mak-
ing invalid arguments (and attacks) by ensuring that nothing is presumed by the logical
frameworks of individual peers, but then we sacrifice the ability to avoid pedantry and
make more succinct arguments (recall §3.2.2). One answer isto u e dialogues which
recognise where arguments are considered insufficient to peers, and allow their re-
statement with more explicit support [Black and Hunter, 2008]. If this is the case, then
we can use the identification of invalid argument and attackss a means to refine the
logical framework under which arguments are constructed.
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Given an argument〈Φ,α〉 generated within a theory contextCσ by agentσ which
is invalid with respect to another agentµ’s theory contextCµ, there should exist an
expanded argument〈Φ′,α〉 such thatΦ′ ⊢ α in any deductive framework(L , ⊢) (i.e.
Φ is sufficient to deduceα without presuming any additional premises or rules). Thus
there exist a non-empty set of sentencesS= (Φ′/Φ) such that/0 ⊢σ ϕ for all sentences
ϕ ∈ S given the logical framework(Lσ, ⊢σ) of Cσ. Given evidence thatS cannot be
presumed in a distributed argumentation framework if all peers are to interpret all
arguments, an agent can effectively demote the sentencesS from being subsumed by
(Lσ, ⊢σ) to being part ofΘ of Cσ (i.e. instead of being self-evident rules of the domain,
agentσ treatsS as merely part of the current environment state; elements ofS then
appear in arguments in a shared argument system, allowing arguments to be interpreted
by peers, but there is no effect on theσ’s interpretation of the argument system).
In practice then, agents can produce arguments which they think to be valid, and
then correct them later as necessary, using the base-line ofa purely deductive logical
framework as a guarantee that all arguments can be made valide entually, provided
that they lie within the argument space of the social argumentation process.
As mentioned in §3.2.2, the argument space in which argumentatio occurs need
not be fully-defined from the outset. Since no agent can be certain as to what arguments
might be produced by peers, it is highly likely that the argument space for a given social
argumentation process will adapt to the arguments already expressed — for example,
in order to ensure that the argument space is sufficiently expressive as per Definition
4.9, or in order to ensure that the arguments within are balanced as per Definition 4.6.
All we really need then is the ability to determine a base argument space, and then have
a process by which that space can be extended on demand (and, if necessary, a process
by which existing arguments are replaced by their potentialexpansion into the extended
space). In Chapter 5, we define the argument space for an interaction portrayal as being
based on producing minimal arguments supporting particular resolutions of constraints
on interaction which are still sufficiently expressive enough to permit synchronisation
within that argument space.
We can say then that each agentσ ∈ Σ, whereΣ is the set of agents engaged in
social argumentation, has aview (Θ,(L , ⊢,∆),(Aσ,⇁σ), lab) of a distributed social
argumentation process, which is based onσ’s theory contextC and the shared system
of arguments(A ,⇁), where:
• Θ is the theory core ofC ; this theory core may be extended by the observations of
other peers ifσ trusts them enough to accept those observations unquestioningly.
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• (L , ⊢,∆) consists of the logical framework(L , ⊢) of C and a social argument
space∆.
• (Aσ,⇁σ) is the shared system of arguments(A ,⇁) after the dismissal of invalid
arguments and attacks.
• lab labels(Aσ,⇁σ) such that iflab(a) = in for somea∈ A , thena⊑ b, where
b ∈ E andE is the accepted extension ofC .
All that remains then is for us to specify a distributed process model for the creation
and maintenance interaction portrayals which will exhibitthe properties defined in this
chapter. The articulation of arguments into a portrayal whilst agents try to reconcile
their theories with the portrayal as interaction progresses will then constitute the dia-
logues we envisaged at the start of this thesis, achieving our desired system.
In summary, what we have now is comprehension of how agent beliefs can be rec-
onciled in a restricted yet focused manner by means of a common potential restriction
of the beliefs of individual agents. That is, given a set of argument systems constructed
under similar logical frameworks, but perhaps within very different argument spaces,
each belonging to a different agent, it might be possible to construct a simpler sys-
tem of arguments which adequately describes each agent’s accepted conclusons within
its own smaller argument space. If such a simpler system can be created, then we
can state that there is some synchronicity between the beliefs of agents as they are
described within each agent’s personal theory context. In this light, the interaction
portrayal mechanism described in the next chapter is basically a means to construct a
shared system of arguments which is a potential restrictionof the private beliefs agents
in an interaction have about the correct outcome of interaction. Using that potential
restriction, belief revision can be performed on the part ofevery peer such that their
beliefs are synchronised within the portrayal argument space. As a consequence, the
resolution of constraints on interaction (being determined by those synchronised be-
liefs) should be admissible to all agents.

Chapter 5
Distributed Portrayals of Interaction
In the first chapter of this thesis, we introduced the notion of an interaction portrayal,
a device by which agents can debate possible resolutions of logical constraints im-
posed on an interaction by an interaction protocol using argumentation. Portrayals are
intended to act as a medium through which agents can disseminate k owledge and in-
fluence one another’s beliefs, in a manner akin to distributed truth maintenance. By
restricting the initial scope of argumentation, and slowlyexpanding that scope only
where necessary to adequately evaluate any conflicting opinions agents might have,
we believe it to be possible to portray interactions whilst they are being enacted, as an
opportunistic process.
The idea is that an interaction in motion defines a decision prblem, based on the
logical propositions which must be satisfied in order to bring about particular out-
comes. In order to ensure that the decisions made by agents during interaction best
reflect their combined wisdom, we desire that agents’ beliefs are synchronised within
an argument space defined by the context of the interaction. The role of the portrayal
mechanism is to identify the current state of the decision problem, and then synchro-
nise agent beliefs accordingly, ‘solving’ the problem until the evolution of the unfold-
ing interaction re-defines it. The portrayal mechanism manages this by providing a
framework in which agents can collectively produce a sharedsystem of arguments,
the eponymous interaction portrayal, which they then can indiv dually reconcile with
their own beliefs. If all agents are able to reconcile the portrayal with their (revised)
beliefs, then those beliefs will be synchronised within theargument space explored by
the portrayal, which we hypothesize will lead to objectively better outcomes for many
practical interactions. Because the content of the portrayal is essentially integrated into
the very belief architectures of the agents involved, the benefits of a portrayal will then
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extend into later interactions.
This chapter concerns itself with the portrayal mechanism aa process for conduct-
ing distributed argumentation of the form described in Chapter 4 in order to augment
interactions of the type described in Chapter 2. In §5.1 we introduce the components
of a portrayal, and examine their contribution to the overall process. In §5.2 we de-
scribe how a new portrayal is created upon the initiation of anew interaction, and then
in §5.3, we describe how a portrayal is defined by the unfolding interaction state. In
§5.4, we describe how new arguments can be posited into a portrayal, as well as pro-
vide the operations necessary to annotate that portrayal and propagate portrayal data
to individual peers. We also specify in §5.4 how agents should re-evaluate their beliefs
in the presence of an updated portrayal.
5.1 Anatomy of an Interaction Portrayal
A portrayal is first created when an agent initiates a new interac ion based on a chosen
interaction protocol. As more agents become involved in thenascent interaction, the
updated state of that portrayal is disseminated to each new pe r in turn. In a distributed
system, we do not assume the existence of a single shared location in which the por-
trayal can be stored, so instead the portrayal state is record d independently by every
agent involved in an interaction within what is referred to as aportrayal instance. Ev-
ery such instance is kept in synchrony with every other instance of the same portrayal
by means of message exchange according to some process model— th se messages
essentially comprise the explication dialogues referred to in the first chapter of this
thesis, with the portrayal instances themselves being the acc ssible portion of the state
of the distributed decision problem which we wish our agentsto solve.
Portrayal instances are kept updated by exchanging messagewhilst the
greater interaction occurs around them.
Argumentation is conducted via portrayal instances whilstPeer A con-
ducts dialogue with both Peer B and Peer C.
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That decision problem can be described as follows:
1. We wish tosynchronise(as per Definition 4.8) the decision theoriesΠ of a set
of agentsΣ engaged in an interaction within an argument space∆ d fined by the
state of interaction such that any decision made by an agentσ ∈ Σ during the
interaction will be based on inferences at least admissible(as per Definition 3.8)
to every other agent inΣ.
2. We do this by constructing a shared system of arguments(A ,⇁) within ∆ using
the same logical frameworks used by agents to derive their thories; this shared
argument system is stored within theportrayalP for the given interaction. It is
assumed that agents possess a common semantics for arguments, or are able to
map their private arguments into such a semantics (deviation s to the precise
logical frameworks used by agents is permitted however — see§5.1.4).
3. We determine∆ from the interaction stateS of the interaction, which we as-
sume is distributed amongstΣ as described in §2.3. FromS we can identify a
set of logical propositionsϒ which must be resolved in order to determine the
outcome of the interaction. The argument space of the portrayal is focused on
arguing different resolutions of members ofϒ and initially permits only direct
assumption of claims; it is then expanded to permit attacks against elaborations
of arguments in(A ,⇁) such that∆ is sufficiently expressive(as per Definition
4.9) with respect to everyσ∈ Σ’s theoryΠ. This ensures that arguments are kept
at a minimum level of necessary detail, but also ensures thatagents are always
able to attack arguments if they feel justified in doing so.
4. In order to operate within an asynchronous distributed enviro ment, we dis-
tribute the actual portrayal itself, producing for each agent σ ∈ Σ a portrayal
instanceP [σ] which contains a copy of(A ,⇁) as well as additional annotations
upon(A ,⇁) which allowσ to identify for every peerµ∈ Σ:
• Any arguments or attacks in(A ,⇁) considered byµ to be invalid;
• Any intersection between(A ,⇁) andµ’s theory core;
• The potential restriction into∆ of the accepted extension ofµ’s theory con-
text.
5. Only once every agentµ∈ Σ hasreconciled(as per Definition 4.10) its theory
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contextC with P is agentσ then permitted to decide a constraint within interac-
tion I . It is expected to do so based on its (possibly revised) theory Π.
Decisions advance interaction, which may lead to the identifica on of new proposi-
tions to be resolved — this changes the argument space of the portrayal and so new
arguments may need to be made in order to re-synchronise agent theories. This con-
tinues until the interaction is complete. This constitutesthedeclarativeor definitional
view of the portrayal mechanism.
5.1.1 Portraying Interaction
What this chapter provides is an algorithmic orproceduralview of the portrayal mech-
anism which describes how the above definitional view can be implemented for a
generic asynchronous distributed system. The basic process model can be summarised
as follows:
1. Upon the initiation of a new interaction, the initiating aentσ shouldportray
the interaction stateS ; an initial portrayal instanceP [σ] is then created which
describesσ’s initial arguments for or against certain portrayable propositions.
The conception of new portrayal instances is specified in §5.2.
2. Being a distributed mechanism, the process model for portayals is perhaps best
understood as a collection of responses on the part of particular agents to certain
events. To every such event we attribute a sub-procedure. In§5.3, we spec-
ify sub-procedures forenvironmentalevents — those events which define the
decision problem driving a portrayal and which make use of the portrayal for
practical ends:
(a) As interaction progresses,σ will interact with other peers. Upon entering
dialogue with a new peerµ, agentσ should addµ to portrayalP such that
µ has its own instanceP [µ], at which pointµ can posit its own arguments
and react to events just asσ can (§5.3.1).
(b) Likewise as interaction progresses, the interaction stateS will advance such
that the set of portrayable propositionsϒ grows. Whenever the local inter-
action stateS [σ] is advanced, an agentσ should check to see if new con-
straints have become portrayable; if new propositions are ident fied, then
all peers should be informed so that new arguments can be posited (§5.3.2).
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(c) Upon being called to resolve any constraint on interaction, an agentσ
should permit all peers to finish argumentation so as to ensurthat all peers
have synchronised their beliefs within the argument space of portrayalP
(§5.3.3).
Given these sub-procedures, we can use portrayals to guide interaction, provided
that the individual portrayal instances used by agents are kept in synchrony.
3. Internally, argumentation is conducted by agents invoking theargue procedure
(§5.4.1) to posit new arguments; arguments are then received by peers which
then invoke thereconcile procedure (§5.4.11) in order to reconcile them with
their own beliefs, which may then cause them to invokeargue again in response.
In such a manner does argumentation continue until all agents have reconciled
with the portrayal. There exist a number of operations availble which are in-
voked either byargue, by reconcile or by one another as circumstances dictate:
• The posit operation (§5.4.2) permits the insertion of new arguments ito
a portrayalP , and is called byargue, usually in response to the addition
of new peers to the interaction or to the identification of newportrayable
propositions used by constraints on the interaction.
• Theelaborate operation (§5.4.3) permits the elaboration of potential argu-
ments, usually to expose vulnerability to attack or in response to inquiries
by peers.
• The attack operation (§5.4.4) identifies where one argument attacks an-
other; for efficiency,attack often subsumesposit andelaborate, and is often
invoked in response to reconciling other agents’ arguments.
• The inquire operation (§5.4.5) is used to request elaborations from other
peers;inquire can be used by agents to extend the scope of argumentation
slightly where there is the promise of useful additional information.
• The observe and unobserve operations (§5.4.6 and §5.4.7) are used by
agents to identify where arguments in a portrayal contradict their theory
cores (i.e. to identify arguments which must be false given avail ble evi-
dence).observe is usually invoked in response to the positing of new argu-
ments by other peers;unobserve is usually invoked in response to changes
in the environment changing an agent’s theory core. See §5.1.5 below.






















Figure 5.1: An example of portrayal refinement as a system of procedures
and operations. Peer A posits an argument (as per §5.4.1), which Peer B
inserts into its portrayal instance (§5.4.2), reconciles with its beliefs (§5.4.11)
and attacks with a counter-argument (§5.4.1 again); Peer C may respond
similarly. Peer A will then insert any new arguments into her own portrayal
instance, and make any counter-arguments deemed necessary.
• Thedismiss andexpand operations (§5.4.8 and §5.4.9) are used by agents
to identify and repair invalid arguments and attacks.di miss is usually in-
voked in response to new arguments or attacks, whilstexpand is invoked in
response todismiss, replacing an invalid argument with one more deduc-
tively explicable where possible. See §5.1.4 below.
• Theaccept operation (§5.4.10) is used by an agent to declare the extension
of a portrayal which it currently chooses to accept as a potential restriction
of its own beliefs;accept is usually invoked after an invocation ofreconcile
if an agent has found need to revise its beliefs. See 5.1.6 below.
These operations all produce messages which are sent to all peers in an interac-
tion, allowing them to keep their portrayal instances update and ensuring that
the beliefs of agents are synchronised as per Definition 4.8.
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4. At the end of its role in interaction, an agent should report the closure of that
role. Once all agents have done so, the portrayal can be disposed f. In the
meantime, all agents can continue to contribute to the portrayal should they be
inclined to do so, and all agents will receive portrayal updates. This is described
in §5.3.4 just after the other environmental events.
5. The computational complexity of the portrayal mechanismi subservient to the
complexity of extracting new arguments from an agent’s theory c ntext. Thus
the efficacy of the portrayal mechanism is dependent on the extent to which
agents are already aware of the arguments supporting or conflicting with their
beliefs. In summary:
• The bulk of computation is in the private argumentation processes used by
agents to define their theory contexts. If an agent goes into interaction with
a fully-formed and interpreted system of arguments, then thcomplexity of
constructing portrayals will be limited to the cost of deriving potential ar-
guments from internal arguments. Conversely, if an agent goes into interac-
tion with just a set of candidate assumptions and constructsnew arguments
in situ, then the primary source of complexity will be the construction and
initial evaluation of arguments.
• It should be noted however that if agents are truly autonomous, then they
must surely perform a certain amount of inference prior to ineraction in
order to determine the need for interaction and select a protocol which
will likely result in a desired outcome. This means that eachgent can be
expected to enter interaction having already enacted an internal argumenta-
tion process (or equivalent defeasible reasoning process)in order to formu-
late expectations for constraints on interaction. In this respect, a significant
portion of possible argumentation will necessarily have ben performed
prior to constructing an interaction portrayal, leaving only argument com-
parison and recombination.
• In the worst case, agents will need to fully elaborate upon their claims, ex-
panding the argument space of the portrayal to encompass that of all agents’
theory contexts. In the average case however, significant computation can
be saved by focusing on the minimal amount of argumentation necessarily
to ensure synchronisation of agent beliefs, depending on the characteristics
of the domain in which argumentation is conducted.
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The portrayal mechanism is decidable given a finite system ofarguments in the
theory context of the executing agent; depending on the logic used, the argumen-
tation process used within an agent’s theory context might not be. Agents must
keep tight control over the argument spaces in which they generate arguments so
as to ensure tractability, in precisely the same way that anyagent in a complex
environment must maintain control of its reasoning processes in order to remain
responsive..
The operations and procedures described in the remainder ofthis chapter can be shown
to ensure the properties described in the previous chapter.First however, it is necessary
to make clear exactly what a portrayal, or more precisely a portrayalinstancecontains.
5.1.2 Specification of a Portrayal Instance
A portrayal instanceis a copy of an interaction portrayal belonging to a specific agent.
For any distributed implementation of the portrayal mechanism, a portrayal is synony-
mous with its instances — from the perspective of any particular agent, a reference
to an interaction’s portrayal is equivalent to a reference to its own instance of that
portrayal:1
Definition 5.1 A portrayal instance P [σ] used by an agentσ with a theory contextC
to describe the state of a portrayalP of an interactionI 2 from the perspective ofσ can
be described by a tuple(Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc) where:
• Σ is the set of identifiers for agents involved inI and which therefore also hold
instances ofP . For every peer µ∈ Σ, it is assumed that there exists a theory
contextCµ which agent µ will use to generate and interpret arguments inP .
• ϒ is the set ofportrayable propositions in I identified by agents inΣ such that
if ϕ ∈ ϒ, thenϕ is evaluated as part of a constraint imposed onI (see§5.2.1
later).
• (A ,⇁) is the system of arguments described byP such that every argument
a ∈ A and every attacka ⇁ b is valid within a theory contextCµ of an agent
µ∈ Σ.
1The distinction between a portrayal and a portrayal instance is that an interaction conceptually
has one portrayal whilst it may in practice have many portrayal instances which individually describe
different views of the portrayal.
2As per Definition 2.1.
5.1. Anatomy of an Interaction Portrayal 135
• Theinvalid argument functioninvA : Σ→ 2A is a function mapping each agent
µ∈ Σ to a set of argumentsinvA (µ) ⊆ A such that ifa∈ invA (µ), thena is an
invalid argument with respect toCµ as per Definition 4.11.
• The invalid attack function inv⇁ : Σ→ 2A × 2A is a function mapping each
agent µ∈ Σ to a set of argument pairsinv⇁(µ) such that if(a,b)∈ inv⇁(µ), then
a⇁ b according to(A ,⇁), buta⇁ b is an invalid attack with respect toCµ as
per Definition 4.12.
• Theobservation functionobs : Σ→ 2Γ is a function mapping each agent µ∈ Σ
to a set of sentencesobs(µ) ⊆ Γ (whereΓ is the set of all sentencesϕ such that
there exists an argument〈Φ,α〉 ∈ A in whichΦ ⊢ ¬ϕ according toCµ) such that
if ϕ ∈ obs(µ), thenΘ ⊢ ϕ according toCµ, whereΘ is the theory core ofCµ.
• Theacceptancefunctionacc : Σ→ 2A is a function mapping each agent µ∈ Σ
to a set of argumentsacc(µ)⊆ A such that ifa∈ acc(µ), thenb ∈ E , whereE is
the accepted extension ofCµ, anda⊑ b according toCµ.
A portrayal instance records the arguments and attacks observed by an agent along
with the set ofportrayable propositions, which is the set of logical propositions identi-
fied thus far in an interaction as being used in constraints onhat interaction and which
therefore need to be discussed by peers. A portrayal instance lso records any argu-
ments or attacks declared invalid by peers (§5.1.4), any relevant propositions which
a peer has claimed to have observed directly (§5.1.5), as well as ach peer’s declared
accepted extension of the argument system within the portrayal (§5.1.6).
For brevity, if an argumenta∈ A for the set of argumentsA of a portrayal instance
P [σ] of a portrayalP , thena∈ P . Similarly, if a⇁ b according toP [σ], then it can be
said thata⇁ b according toP .
From the theory contextC of an agentσ and its portrayal instanceP [σ], we can
infer σ’s view of the distributed context in which the portrayalP is constructed. In this
case, we have a view(Θ,(L , ⊢,∆),(A ,⇁), lab) where:
• Θ is a consistent subset of
⋃
µ∈Σ obs(µ) as described in §5.1.5 below.
• (L , ⊢,∆) consists of the logical framework(L , ⊢) of C and the argument space
∆ of P as described in §5.1.3 below.
• (A ,⇁) is the system of arguments inP [σ] after dismissing every argument in
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invA (σ) and every attacka ⇁ b referenced byinv⇁(σ), and is a potential re-
striction into∆ of the system of arguments inC .
• lab labels(A ,⇁) such that iflab(a) = in for somea∈ A , thena⊑ b,3 where
b ∈ E andE is the accepted extension ofC (i.e. the labelling of(A ,⇁) accepts
the potential restriction ofσ’s beliefs into the portrayal).
Thus the content of a portrayal instanceP [σ] is sufficient to describe the state of a
social argumentation process from the perspective of agentσ provided that it is pos-
sible to infer from it the argument space∆ of P . Fortunately, because we are able to
model the portrayal mechanism in such a way as to specify how and when arguments
are entered into a portrayal, it is possible to reconstruct the argument space of a por-
trayal simply from the system of arguments already within itand the set of portrayable
propositions.
5.1.3 Computing the Argument Space of a Portrayal
The argument space of a portrayal (which we will sometimes refer to simply as the
portrayal space) is determined over the course of interaction by the constraints im-
posed on it by an interaction’s protocol, the arguments already in the portrayal and the
potential attacks that the agents involved in an interaction can make. This final crite-
rion ensures that the argument space of a portrayal is sufficiently expressive, but also
makes it practically impossible for any single peer in an interaction to infer the true
portrayal space for itself. Fortunately, this is not a problem, because it is not necessary
for an agent to know the complete argument space in order for it t determine whether
a given argument drawn from its beliefs is within that space.
Whether or not an argument can be inserted into a portrayal can be determined by
an agent using its portrayal instance and its theory context:
Definition 5.2 An argument〈Φ,α〉 is within the argument space∆ of a portrayalP
with respect to a contextC (i.e.〈Φ,α〉 ∈ ∆ from the perspective of an agent with theory
contextC ) if and only if:
• Either α ∈ ϒ, ¬α ∈ ϒ (whereϒ is the set of portrayable propositions inP ) or
there exists an argumenta′ ∈ P such that〈Φ,α〉⇁ a, wherea∈ C anda′ ⊑ a.
3Recall from Chapter 3 that⊑ b states that argumenta is potentially argumentb if elaborated upon.
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• There does not exist an elaborationb ∈ EA, whereEA is the accepted extension
of C , such that〈Φ,α〉⊏ b andc⇁ b for some argumentc∈ P , butc 6⇁ 〈Φ,α〉,
unless there also exists an elaborationd∈E such that〈Φ,α〉⊏ d 6⊑ b andc 6⇁ d.
• There does not exist a potential argumentsuch that:e⊏ 〈Φ,α〉, bute 6⊑ f for
some argumentf ∈ P ; ande∈ ∆.
An argument is within the portrayal space from the perspectiv of a given agent if it
fulfils three criteria: the argument attempts to resolve a portrayable proposition or else
attacks another argument already in the portrayal; the argument is not potentially an-
other argument in the portrayal (thus conferring no new information); and the argument
is otherwise expressed as simply as possible whilst still acknowledging any necessary
attacks from arguments already in the portrayal (i.e. if, inthe agent’s own belief, an
argument requires a particular supporting proposition to be true, and that proposition
is already contradicted by another argument within the portrayal, then the agent must
make that conflict explicit even if it believes the other argument to be inadmissible;
otherwise it can just keep the argument as simple as possibleunti it needs to defend it
from other attacks).
A portrayal space is effectively self-expanding — it alwayspermits new attacks on
and alternative elaborations of existing arguments, albeit perhaps without much detail
initially. This ensures that the portrayal space always becomes expressive enough to
sufficiently describe the practical differences between agent theories, in accordance
with Definition 4.9 (which in turn ensures that synchronisation of beliefs within the
portrayal space is feasible):
Theorem 5.1 The portrayal space∆ of a portrayalP is sufficiently expressive (as per
Definition 4.9) provided that all agents posit any attacks dictated by their beliefs.
Proof 5.1 The argument space∆ of a portrayalP is sufficiently expressive with respect
to a theoryΠ generated within a theory contextC if and only if:
• There exists a system of arguments(A ,⇁) such thatΠ can be derived from an
admissible extensionE of (A ,⇁) (provided byC ).
• There exists a potential restrictionE ′ of E into ∆ (always true, thoughE ′ may
be empty).
• If there exists an argumenta ∈ ∆ such thata ⇁ b for some argumentb ∈ E ′,
then provided that there exists an argumentc∈ E such thatc⇁ a, there exists
an argumentd ∈ ∆ such thatd⊑ c andd ⇁ a.
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Assume that there exists an argumenta ∈ ∆ as described above and there likewise
exists an argumentc ∈ E such thatc ⇁ a. We know that there exists an argument
〈Φ,α〉 such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ c and〈Φ,α〉⇁ a, because:
• If c⇁ a, then〈Φ,α〉⇁ a (by Theorem 4.1).
• c⊑ c (by Definition 4.1).
We shall assume however that for all possible〈Φ,α〉, it is the case that〈Φ,α〉 /∈ ∆.
This means, by Definition 5.2, that there is no argument〈Φ,α〉 for which:
• Either α ∈ ϒ, ¬α ∈ ϒ (whereϒ is the set of portrayable propositions inP ) or
there exists an argumente′ ∈ P such that〈Φ,α〉⇁ e, wheree∈ C ande′ ⊑ e.
• There does not exist an elaborationf ∈ E such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊏ f and g ⇁ f for
some argumentg ∈ P , but g 6⇁ 〈Φ,α〉, unless there also exists an elaboration
h ∈ E such that〈Φ,α〉⊏ h 6⊑ f andg 6⇁ h.
• There does not exist a potential argumenti such that: i ⊏ 〈Φ,α〉, but i 6⊑ j for
some argumentj ∈ P ; and i ∈ ∆.
It can be seen however that ifa∈ P , then〈Φ,α〉⇁ a, fulfilling the first criterion under
that condition. As for the second criterion:
• If there exists an elaborationf ∈ E such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊏ f and g ⇁ f for some
argumentg ∈ P , but g 6⇁ 〈Φ,α〉, then there exists an argumentk such that
〈Φ,α〉⊏ k ⊑ f, butg⇁ k.
• If f ⊑ c, thenk ⊑ c andk ⇁ a, and thereforek can replace〈Φ,α〉, thus fulfilling
the criterion.
• If c⊏ f, thenf can replacec; given thatk ⊑ f andk ⇁ a, argumentk can replace
〈Φ,α〉, thus fulfilling the criterion.
• Otherwise,c is a separate elaboration of〈Φ,α〉 such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊏ c 6⊑ f, in
which case there exists an argumentl such that〈Φ,α〉⊏ l ⊑ c and l 6⊑ f. There-
fore l ⊑ c and l ⇁ a, sol can replace〈Φ,α〉, thus fulfilling the criterion.
For the third criterion, we simply need to observe that if there is a potential argument
i ∈ ∆ such thati ⊏ 〈Φ,α〉 andi 6⊑ j for some argumentj in P , theni can replace〈Φ,α〉,
becausei fulfils all criteria. Fulfilment of all three criteria contradicts the assumption
that there exists no argument〈Φ,α〉 ∈ ∆ for which〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ c and〈Φ,α〉⇁ a.
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Therefore the argument space∆ of a portrayalP becomes sufficiently expressive
with respect to a theoryΠ generated within a theory contextC upon the insertion
of any argumenta ∈ ∆ such thata ⇁ b for some argumentb ∈ E ′, whereE ′ is the
potential restriction into∆ of the accepted extensionE of C .
If agents use different logical frameworks (i.e. assume different logical sentences to be
common knowledge, and thus unnecessary for expression within arguments), then an
agent might insert into a portrayal arguments and attacks which are invalid to its peers.
The portrayal mechanism provides agents with the ability toreport any invalid argu-
ments and attacks, as well as rectify them (see §5.1.4), but the asynchronous nature of
a distributed system permits the generation of further argumentation in the meantime
(i.e. whilst one agent declares an argument invalid, other ag nts are concurrently elab-
orating upon and attacking that argument). Because howeverin alid arguments are
still part of the portrayal, the argument space still permits attacks against them, thus
allowing the above theorem to still hold. This has no undue eff ct on the interpreta-
tion of the portrayal by agents which consider certain arguments to be invalid however,
because they simply ignore those arguments upon evaluation.
5.1.4 Dismissing Invalid Arguments and Attacks
As discussed in §3.2.2, it is possible to simplify the systemof arguments generated
within an argumentation framework by allowing certain axioms and ‘undeniable’ rules
to be integrated into the logical framework used to construct arguments, allowing
agents to omit those axioms and rules from arguments, as wellas allowing arguments
to be attacked based on notions of mutual exclusion other than explicit negation of
a proposition. It is of course not necessarily the case that such axioms and rules are
common knowledge to every agent engaged in an interaction. It may be the case then
that certain arguments and attacks will be considered by peers to be invalid as per
Definitions 4.11 and 4.12.
The basic purpose of the invalid argument functionnvA and the invalid attack
function inv⇁ of a portrayal instanceP [σ] is to record which arguments and attacks
have been declared invalid by an agent during the life-time of the portrayal; this gives
peers an opportunity to posit more expansive arguments, rather than allowing them to
assume that current arguments adequately support their claims. The rejection of an
argument usually indicates a presumption not held by peers,whilst the rejection of an
attack usually indicates that at least one peer does not recognise that two sentences are
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mutually exclusive. Either case signifies that an agent needs to spell out its reasoning
more explicitly.
Example 5.1 Let us consider the following two arguments regarding agentAlanna’s
trustworthiness.




→ (∃A. incident(Y,A))∨ trustworthy(X,Z) }
∀X. trustworthy(alanna,X) 〉
b = 〈 { leaked(laboratory,data) }, incident(laboratory, leak(data)) 〉
Argumenta is posited by Dante, and argumentb constitutes Charlotte’s response.
The intuition here is that the leaking of data constitutes anincident occurring during
collaboration between Alanna and Dante, which undermines th assertion that there
were no incidents during that collaboration. This intuition may not be immediately
apparent to all agents however. Let us assume that Dante dismisses argumentb such
that b ∈ invA (dante). In this instance, Charlotte can re-factor her attack such that it
more explicitly spells out her point:
b′ = 〈 { leaked(laboratory,data),
∀X,Y. leaked(X,Y)→ incident(X, leak(Y)) },
incident(laboratory, leak(data)) 〉
Dante must then concede that argumentb′ is valid, and respond accordingly. It may
be worth noting thatb′ is more open to attack than argumentb — for example, an
argument could conceivably attack the assertion that a leakconstitutes an incident.
It is evident that the closer an agent adheres to basic deduction, without making any
presumptions about the ability of their peers to understandany implicit reasoning, the
more likely that the agent will not generate any invalid arguments and attacks. On the
other hand, the more complex the domain in which argumentation occurs, the more
burdensome it is to generate complete deductive arguments.Ultimately, the domain in
which argumentation occurs and the sophistication of the agents within it will deter-
mine the level of cleverness which can be presumed in the logical frameworks used by
agents. Concerning invalid arguments:
• The validity of an argumenta∈ P is evaluated by an agentσ with respect to its
theory contextC upon its insertion into portrayal instanceP [σ] (see theinsert
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function, §5.4.2); an invalid argument is declared as such by invocation of the
dismiss operation (§5.4.8).
• An agent can replace an invalid argumenta by invocation of theexpand opera-
tion (§5.4.9) in response to receiving adismiss(a) message from a peer.
• An agent will automatically remove an argumenta from invA (σ) for all peersσ
if it is replaced by an elaborationb in P (even ifb is itself invalid —b will be
declared as such automatically, replacinga; see §5.4.2).
• A peer may attempt to elaborate upon an argumenta∈ P , replacing it with an
argumentb which is invalid with respect to the theory context of agentσ; if
a is valid, thenσ will not consider it to be potentiallyb (by Definition 4.1, the
support for a valid argument cannot be wholly derived from aninvalid argument,
otherwise it would be valid itself) in which case it will treat b as a separate
argument withinP [σ]. This has no undue effect on argumentation asb will be
dismissed prior to interpretation, but will allowσ the continued use of argument
a. If b is later replaced with a valid argumentc, thena will automatically be
replaced byc as well (evident in §5.4.2).
Concerning invalid attacks:
• The validity of an attacka⇁ b according toP is evaluated by an agentσ with
respect to its theory contextC upon its identification in portrayal instanceP [σ]
(see theinsert attack function, §5.4.4), and is declared by invocation of thedis-
miss operation (§5.4.8).
• An agentσ can replace the attacking argumenta of an invalid attack pair(a,b)∈
inv⇁(σ) by invocation of theexpand operation (§5.4.9) in response to receiving
adismiss(a⇁ b) message from a peer.
• Elaborations of an argument automatically inherit the attack relations of that
argument (as justified by Theorem 4.1); if either the attacking argumenta or the
defending argumentb of an invalid attack pair(a,b) ∈ inv⇁(σ) is elaborated
upon, then the elaboration replaces the elaborated upon argument in inv⇁(σ)
(evident in §5.4.2 again).
Assuming that agents are able to replace any invalid arguments or attacks with ones
which are valid to all agents (for example by using theexpand operation to replace
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arguments with ones which more explicitly describe any deduction made), it can be
expected that all invalid arguments and attacks will be purged by the end of interaction.
5.1.5 Asserting Observations into the Portrayal
Agents are permitted to annotate a portrayal by asserting that certain (pertinent) sen-
tences are already known by it to be true or false, regardlessof the arguments sur-
rounding them. This advocacy of certain propositions informs an agent’s peers that
the advocate has no current intention of accepting any interpretation of the portrayal
argument system which contradicts those propositions. An agent should declare any
observation which can be deduced from the theory core of its beliefs which is directly
contradicted by any argument in the portrayal — any such contradictory arguments can
then be formally dismissed as described in §3.2.3.
Ideally, only sentences which areknownto be true by an agent should be asserted
as such, where ‘known’ entails that a sentence can be inferred by sound deduction
from axiomatic terms or direct observation (including introspection of an agent’s own
state). If this is universally the case, then the agents in aninteraction can always
simply take the union of all setsobs(σ) for all agentsσ ∈ Σ of a portrayalP to produce
an internally consistent common theory core. This core can the be used to find all
commonly-admissible argument extensions.
Example 5.2 Consider the following system of arguments, which might be part of a
portrayal:
a = 〈 { permission(charlotte,access(alanna, library)),
controller(charlotte, library),
∀X,Y,Z. permission(X,access(Y,Z))∧ controller(X,Z)→ access(Y,Z) },
access(alanna, library) 〉
b = 〈 { controller(dante, library),
∃!X. controller(X, library) },
¬controller(charlotte, library) 〉
c = 〈 { ¬patron(alanna, library),
∀X,Y. access(X,Y)→ patron(X,Y) },
¬access(alanna, library) 〉
d = 〈 { access(dante, library),
¬patron(dante, library) },
∃X. access(X, library))∧¬patron(X, library) 〉
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a b c d
a b c d
Figure 5.2: The grounded extension of the system of arguments described
in Example 5.2 before and after observations are applied.
By default, argumentsb and d are admissible, whilst argumentsa and c are not. If
however the following observations are made:
obs(charlotte) = { controller(charlotte, library) }
obs(dante) = { ¬access(dante, library) }
We can immediately determine argumentsb and d to be unacceptable (becauseb’s
claim is directly refuted and has been undermined) leaving only argumentsa andc
to choose between. If either argument can be undercut by an undefeated argument, or
if further observations clarify the domain, then the argument system will provide an
unambiguous interpretation.
Complex systems rarely admit ideal circumstances however.Even assuming the com-
petency of agents to determine that a given sentence is ‘known’ rather than simply
believed true, only a small number of propositions can actually be determined to be
certain in a dynamic and unpredictable environment. In practice, it is more useful for
an agent to advocate things which it can confidently infer as true under reasonable
conditions based on the improbability that they might be otherwise. Such an approach
would permit such intuitions as ‘knowing’ that the sky remains blue or that one’s house
has not been moved over to the next valley along, even when outof sight and there-
fore strictly speaking not provable given the full range of pssibility. No matter how
sensibly conducted however, any abduction risks being shown t be incorrect, and so a
balance must be struck between what is or is not subject to argument (this could easily
be contextual — one could imagine a recursive series of defeasibl processes where the
theory core of one process is the product of another, more fundamental one). Given
then that agents are independent, the unavoidable conclusion is that the union of all
setsobs(σ) for all agentsσ ∈ Σ of a portrayalP might not be jointly consistent after
all.
Recall however that portrayals are simply vessels for introducing new concepts and
percepts to the hypothesis spaces of agents, and that ultimately each agent interprets
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that information in accordance with its private defeasiblereasoning mechanism. Whilst
it would be foolish to ignore the observations of one’s peers, should those observations
be inconsistent, one can always be selective. For example, one peer may be considered
more qualified to make observations in a given context than another. Should there be
no clear preference order to selecting one percept over another however, it may be best
simply to treat contradictory elements as normal assumptions or claims and disregard
the advocacy of agents in favour of the topology of the argument system. Concerning
observations:
• An agentσ determines whether the theory coreΘ of its theory contextC justifies
the addition of a new observationϕ into obs(σ) whenever a new argumenta∈ P
is inserted into portrayal instanceP [σ] (seeinsert function, §5.4.2); if so,σ
invokes theobserve operation (§5.4.6).
• If an agent believes that an argumenta∈ P should be dismissed, but the pertinent
observationϕ is not explicitly contradicted bya (i.e. for all elaborationsb ∈ E ,
whereE is the accepted extension of theory contextC , such thata⊏ b, it is the
case that whilst¬ϕ cannot be derived froma, but it can also be seen that¬ϕ can
be derived fromb), then the agent can elaborate upona specifically in order to
then observeϕ in order to dismiss the elaboration (see §5.4.3 and §5.4.6).
• If the theory coreΘ of an agentσ’s theory contextC changes, thenσ should
invoke functionobserve or functionunobserve as necessary to updateobs(σ);
agentσ can invokeobserve to add new assertions toobs(σ) (§5.4.6) or invoke
unobserve to remove assertions fromobs(σ) (§5.4.7).
• When interpreting the system of arguments in theory contextC , an agentσ can
use the results ofobs as a preference ordering on admissible extensions ofC ,
such that arguments supported by peer observations are favoured ver arguments
which are not. Agentσ can, subject to its own sense of caution, add assertions in
obs to theory coreΘ, but only ifσ trusts the peer which made the observation and
the observation does not makeΘ internally inconsistent. The precise mechanism
to do this is particular to the implementation of agentσ.
Ultimately, the basis on which an agent chooses to add peers’observations to its theory
core, or alternatively uses observations for some kind of pre erence ordering of argu-
ments, is at the discretion of the individual agents. An agent’s peers can infer how an
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agentσ treats their observations by examiningacc(σ) within their individual portrayal
instances.
5.1.6 Accepting Extensions of Portrayal Arguments
The purpose of argumentation is to determine which assumptions are reasonable given
the evidence available and which conclusions then follow. Portrayals exist to allow
argumentation to be performed in restricted circumstances, getting the best results pos-
sible in such conditions. Based on the system of arguments ina portrayal and given
the other factors already discussed, each agent in an interaction is expected to select
the argument extension which best aligns with its (possiblyrevised) beliefs. There is
no requirement that all agents select thesameextension — indeed, it is not permis-
sible given the presumed autonomy of individual agents to beth rwise. Ideally, the
combined insights and arguments of all agents would leave only one admissible pre-
ferred extension of the argument system within the portrayal. In practice, the best we
can aim for is that all agents will make decisions which, whilst perhaps not aligned
with the beliefs of all peers, will be admissible to every peer n vertheless. At worst,
disagreements about the environment state (in particular ‘known’ facts) will lead to
agents making decisions which are entirely unacceptable toone or more peers. Even
in this instance however, the portrayal will provide insight into why such a scenario
had come to pass, which could feed into the agent’s future decisions (whether to find
conclusive evidence forestalling some irreconcilable difference or to avoid interacting
with certain agents within certain domains).
The purpose of the acceptance functionacc of a portrayal is to inform agents of
the standing assumptions of their peers; in particular, whether certain arguments have
been defeated or not from the perspective of those peers. An age t can tell from the
acceptance of particular arguments whether a given peer is behaving sceptically or
credulously, or whether the peer has produced a complete interpretation of a given
argument system or just part of it.
Example 5.3 Consider the following system of arguments embedded in a portrayalP :
a = 〈 { researcher(alanna,astronomy),
domain(library,astronomy),
∀X,Y,Z. researcher(X,Y)∧domain(Z,Y)→ eligible(X,Z) },
eligible(alanna, library) 〉
b = 〈 { ¬∃X. published(alanna,X),
∀X,Y.researcher(X,Y)→ published(X,Y) },
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Figure 5.3: A system of arguments, interpreted in three different ways by
Alanna, Benjamin and Charlotte.
¬∃X. researcher(alanna,X) 〉
c = 〈 { researcher(alanna,astronomy),
∀X,Y.researcher(X,Y)→ published(X,Y) },
published(alanna,astronomy) 〉
d = 〈 { ¬published(alanna,astronomy),
∀X,Y. expert(X,Y)→ published(X,Y) },
¬expert(alanna,astronomy) 〉
e = 〈 { publication(alanna, research),
subject(research,astronomy),
∀X,Y,Z. publication(X,Y)∧ subject(Y,Z)→ published(X,Z) },
published(alanna,astronomy 〉
f = 〈 { subject(research,climatology) }, ¬subject(research,astronomy) 〉
Now assume that the acceptance functionacc of a portrayal instanceP [σ] describes
the following:
acc(alanna) = { a, c, f }
acc(benjamin) = { b, d, f }
acc(charlotte) = { f }
Alanna and Benjamin accept opposing (but admissible) interpretations of the argument
system, whilst Charlotte is maintaining a sceptical (grounded) view. If Alanna (or
anybody else) wishes to persuade both Benjamin and Charlotte tha Alanna is eligible
for access to the library (the claim of argumenta), she will need to conclusively defeat
argumentsb andd.
Concerning argument acceptance:
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• The set of argumentsacc(σ) accepted by an agentσ is the potential restriction
into ∆ of portrayalP of the accepted extensionE of C , whereC is the theory
context ofσ.
• If an agentσ posits a new argumenta intoP , whether on its own or as an attacker,
thena is added toacc(σ) automatically, asσ can only posit arguments which are
potentially arguments inE of C .
• An agentσ reassertsacc(σ) entirely by invoking operationaccept; this is done
afterσ reconcilesC with P if acc(σ) is no longer a potential restriction into∆ of
E (see §5.4.10).
• It is possible for there to be an argumenta∈ acc(σ) wherea /∈ P . This is be-
cause elaborations of arguments donot inherit acceptance from their potential
arguments. This is because there may be many elaborations ofthe same poten-
tial argument, not all of which are accepted in the theory context C of a given
peerσ; it is also possible thata has been elaborated into an invalid argument
with respect toC as described in §5.1.4.
Having over-viewed the essential components of a portrayal, we can now concentrate
on how a portrayal is generated and updated.
5.2 Initialising an Interaction Portrayal
The portrayal mechanism first comes into play upon the initiation of a new interaction.
An agent initiates a new interaction by selecting an interaction protocol and adopting
an initial role and accompanying process model. Upon instantiati g that role, the agent
is then able to construct a new portrayal instance which willform the basis of a new
interaction portrayal for the nascent interaction.Portrayal conceptionis the act of cre-
ating a new portrayal based on a newly-adopted process modelan an agent’s starting
beliefs.
Definition 5.3 An initial interaction stateS is portrayed by an agentσ by first identi-
fying the portrayable propositionsϒ already present within the interaction model used
by S and then conceiving a new portrayal instanceP focused onϒ:
portray(S ,σ) ↔
(
context(σ,C ) ∧ portrayable propositions(S ,ϒ) ∧
conceive(C ,ϒ,P [σ]) ∧ assert(σ,P [σ])
)
Where:
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• context(σ,C ) is true ifC is the theory context of agentσ.
• portrayable propositions(S ,ϒ) is true if ϒ is the set of portrayable propositions
described in interaction stateS (see§5.2.1 below).
• conceive(C ,ϒ,P [σ]) is true ifP [σ] is the portrayal instance describing the initial
arguments supporting or debunking instances of the portrayable propositionsϒ
which can be derived from theory contextC (see 5.2.2 below).
• assert(σ,P [σ]) attributes the portrayal instanceP [σ] to agentσ; it can then be
retrieved by invokingportrayal(σ,P [σ]).
Formally, portrayal conception is invoked upon generationof an initial interaction state
S after selection of a protocolP by agentσ. We can thus invokeportray during initial
interaction state selection as described in §2.3.1, modifying Definition 2.11 as shown
below:
Definition 5.4 An interaction stateS models a system stateS if S is the initial state of
an interaction based on a protocolP selected by an agentσ which it considers to be
applicable toS:
models(S,S ) ← selection(σ,S,P) ∧ initial state(P,S ) ∧ portray(S ,σ)
Where all is as described in Definition 2.11 except:
• portray(S ,σ) is true if agentσ is able to create an initial portrayal instance from
interaction stateS .
Note that the portrayal instance is not handed over to the process model for interaction.
Instead the portrayal is developed in parallel with interaction and is referred to by a
modified interaction process as defined in §5.3.
5.2.1 Identifying Portrayable Propositions
It is necessary, if a group of agents are to discuss valid resolutions for constraints
placed upon interaction, that those agents are able to identify the logical propositions
which those constraints depend on prior to their actual resolution. The ability of any
given agent to do this is dependent however on the protocol for interaction and the
interaction state at various points during interaction. Inparticular, a simple harvesting
of propositions used in constraints in a given protocol is not desirable, primarily for
two reasons:
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• It may not be yet known whether a given constraint will apply in this particular
instance of interaction.
• The propositions within a constraint may not be sufficientlyinstantiated to allow
for intelligent discussion.
The first reason should be fairly self-explanatory — portraying unused propositions
will invite arguments into a portrayal which have no bearingo the interaction at hand,
and if so permitted, the computational cost of using a portrayal will be harder to justify.
The second reason is also important however. Consider a proposition “X trustsY”,
where neitherX nor Y is bound to any value. It is likely that the intention of such a
proposition in a constraint within a protocol is to allow agents to evaluate whether a
particularX trusts a particularY, or to select aY given a particularX, or possibly even
to select anX given a particularY. In any of those cases, there is some restriction on
satisfactory instances of the proposition and thus the worthwhile arguments that should
be produced within a portrayal. Less likely is that the intention is to find an arbitrary
pairing ofX andY which satisfies the proposition — in such a case, a portrayal wou d
have to permit arguments for and againstany such arbitrary pairing, which could be
significant in number to say the least.
In order to ensure that arguments are only produced for intended resolutions of a
given constraint, the preferred policy for portrayable propositions is that any propo-
sition is portrayable only when instantiated to the greatest extent to which it can be
instantiated prior to actual resolution. For example, if wehave a proposition “X trusts
Y” with the intention to select aY given a specificX, then we wait untilX is instantiated
before discussingY. We can formalise this notion as follows:
Definition 5.5 The set of portrayable propositionsϒ described by an interaction state
S is the union of portrayable propositions in every role modeladopted inS 4:












• role models(S ,M ) is true ifM is the set of all process modelsM [R,σ] adopted
by agents in the interaction described by interaction stateS such thatM [R,σ]
describes role R as adopted by agentσ.
4Role models were defined back in §2.3.2.2.
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• portrayables(M [R,σ],ϒ) is true if ϒ is the set of portrayable propositions in
process modelM [R,σ].
Propositionportrayable propositions works by extracting the set of process models for
roles adopted by agents so far in the interaction described by interaction stateS and
within every such model, finding the set of propositions portrayable.
Definition 5.6 Trivially, the set of portrayable propositions in a given role clause
M [R,σ] is the subset of propositions inM [R,σ] which have reached a portrayable
state:





ϕ | portrayable(M [R,σ],ϕ)
)
Where:
• propositions(M [R,σ],Γ) is true if Γ is the set of logical propositions referred to
in role clauseM [R,σ].
• portrayable(M [R,σ],ϕ) is true if propositionϕ is portrayable given the state of
role clauseM [R,σ].
Propositionportrayables finds all propositions which might be portrayable in a given
role model, and then checks every such proposition separately against that model. A
proposition is portrayable if there is no intersection between the unbound variables
within the proposition, and any unbound variables otherwise found in the model that
would be encountered prior to the resolution of propositionin any execution of the
model (i.e. all unbound variables within the proposition are introduced by the proposi-
tion and thus can be expected to be bound by satisfying the proposition, rather than by
satisfying an earlier proposition or by receiving a messagefrom another peer).
Definition 5.7 A propositionϕ is portrayable if the set of unbound variables inϕ and







prior variables(M [R,σ],ϕ,VM [R,σ]) ∧
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• unbound variables(Γ,V) is true if V is the set of unbound variables referred to
within propositions in setΓ.
• prior variables(M [R,σ],ϕ,V) is true if V is the set of unbound variables referred
to within role clauseM [R,σ] prior to propositionϕ.
Particular implementations of the portrayal mechanism, protocol specifications or in-
teraction states may slightly influence the results of invoking certain propositional
functions (e.g.propositions or prior variables), especially if termination is to be guar-
anteed. For example, in LCC, one might expect that an agent may only analyse con-
straints in the models for specific roles adopted, rather than in sub-roles which have
not been formally assumed yet, even if the assumption of suchroles is inevitable.
Ultimately, all that is necessary is that propositions are successfully identified as por-
trayable before they are resolved — earlier identification rather than later identification
is nice, but not vital.
Example 5.4 Recall briefly the example of distributed interaction described over the
course of Chapter 2. In particular, recall the adoption of the acquire access protocol
of Chapter 1 as described in Example 2.7. Alanna had assumed the role ofapplicant
in order to acquire access tolibrary:
a(applicant(library), alanna) ::
request⇒ a(advocate(library), Advocate)
← ¬ accessible(alanna, library) ∧ patron(Advocate, library) then . . .
From the outset, the propositions¬ accessible(alanna, library) and patron(Advocate,
library) are portrayable; the former is fully instantiated, whilst the latter provides the
first reference toAdvocate, from which we can infer that it is intended for the advocate
agent to be determined by this constraint, rather than by a (non-existent) earlier one.
Conversely, the propositiontrusts(Controller, Advocate) in thecontroller role model
is notportrayable:
a(controller(Resource), Controller ) ::
recommend(Applicant) ⇐ a(advocate(Resource), Advocate) then
( permit(Applicant, access(Resource))
← . . .∧ trusts(Controller, Advocate) ∧ . . . ).
This is because neither variable term has been instantiatednd both terms areex-
pectedto be instantiated prior to resolution of the constraint (Controller will be instan-
tiated upon an agent adopting thecontroller role, andAdvocate will be instantiated
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for the controller upon reception of ther commend message from the agent in thead-
vocate role). In this case we want both variables instantiated before portrayal, both
to prevent the proliferation of pointless instances and because if the advocate agent
rejects Alanna’s plea, then the constraint will never be tested anyway.
For a new interaction, only the process model for the initialrole adopted by the initi-
ating agent will be analysed, and only propositions found ininitial constraints (imme-
diately prior to the first action taken by the agent in its new role) will likely qualify as
being portrayable.
5.2.2 Portrayal Conception
Theconceive operation constructs a new portrayal instance and generates ini ial argu-
ments within a minimal argument space.
conceive(C , ϒ, P [σ]) — An agentσ with a theory contextC conceives a new portrayal
instanceP focused on a set of portrayable propositionsϒ if and only if:
• Agentσ has initiated a new interactionI adhering to a protocolP.
Assuming that this condition has been met, a new portrayal instanceP [σ] is
defined such thatP [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc), where:
1. Σ = {σ}.
2. For each argumenta∈U , whereU is the unrejected extension ofC , if there
exists a potential argumentb⊑ a such thatb ∈ ∆, thenb ∈ A of P [σ].
3. Whilst there exist any argumentsb ∈ A such thatb /∈ ∆ of P , replaceb
in A with c, wherec ∈ ∆ andb ⊏ c⊑ a given an argumenta∈ U (i.e. if
any conflicting arguments are put into the portrayal, ensurethat they are
sufficiently elaborated upon to illustrate the conflicts betw en them).
4. If there exist two argumentsa,b ∈ A such thatc⇁ d according toC , and
a⊑ c andb⊑ d, thena⇁ b according toP .
5. invA (σ) = /0.
6. inv⇁(σ) = /0.
7. obs(σ) = /0.
8. a∈ acc(σ) if and only ifa∈ P and there exists an argumentb ∈ E , where
E is the accepted extension ofC , such thata⊑ b.
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Portrayal conception draws upon arguments from theunr jectedextension of a theory
context — that is, the arguments which an agent has not ruled out entirely. The reason
we consider unrejected rather than merely accepted arguments is because this affords
the opportunity for an agent’s peers to clarify for it whether or not undecided arguments
should be accepted or rejected. Note that the more extensivean agent’s interpretation
of its own theory context, the less significant the difference between the accepted and
unrejected extension (recall the discussion on argument labelling in §3.2.1). Thus, a
credulous agent will likely posit only what it has already accepted to be true prior to
additional evidence, whilst a sceptical agent will be more lik ly to posit only possibil-
ities, without committing to accepting any of them.
Example 5.5 Let us assume then that Alanna has initiated interaction based on the
acquire access protocol, and has identified that the propositions¬accessible(alanna,
library) andpatron(X, library) are portrayable. Let us assume that Alanna can extract
the following accepted arguments from her theory context:
a1 = 〈 { ¬accessible(alanna, library) }, ¬accessible(alanna, library) 〉
b1 = 〈 { access(benjamin, library),
∀X,Y. access(X,Y)→ patron(X,Y) },
patron(benjamin, library) 〉
Alanna can also extract the following unrejected arguments(she’s not sure about
Dante):
c1 = 〈 { access(dante, library),
∀X,Y. access(X,Y)→ patron(X,Y) },
patron(dante, library) 〉
d1 = 〈 { banned(dante, library),
∀X,Y. patron(X,Y)∧banned(X,Y)→ false,
¬patron(dante, library) 〉
All of these arguments can be mapped into portrayalP :
a′ = 〈 { ¬accessible(alanna, library) }, ¬accessible(alanna, library) 〉
b′ = 〈 { patron(benjamin, library) }, patron(benjamin, library) 〉
c′ = 〈 { patron(dante, library) }, patron(dante, library) 〉
d′ = 〈 { ¬patron(dante, library) }, ¬patron(dante, library) 〉
Alanna will only elaborate upon her arguments if need arises. Thus we have an initial
portrayal instanceP [alanna], where:
• Σ = {alanna}.
• ϒ = {¬accessible(alanna, library),patron(X, library)}.
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• A = {a′,b′,c′,d′}, such thatc′⇁ d′ andd′⇁ c′.
• invA (alanna) = inv⇁(alanna) = obs(alanna) = /0.
• acc(alanna) = {a′,b′}.
Given that no other instances of the new portrayal yet exist,there is no need to com-
municate any new information to peers. Thus initialising a portrayal is very simple
— an agent simply asserts the resolutions it expects for sufficiently instantiated con-
straints imposed on interaction. What we need to consider now is what happens to the
portrayal as the interaction develops.
5.3 Responding to Changes in the Interaction State
In order to function correctly in an asynchronous environmet, the portrayal for an in-
teraction is considered to be an entity which exists parallel to the interaction, develop-
ing at its own pace in response to the arguments, counter-arguments and observations
made by the peers involved with it. Of course to be useful, there must be points at
which an interaction process and an interaction portrayal actually interact with each
other. Aside from portrayal conception at the outset of a newi teraction, there are four
notable points of intersection between portrayal and interaction:
The addition of new peers — Whenever a new agent is involved with the interaction,
that agent should be able to contribute to the interaction portrayal.
Advancement of local interaction state— Whenever an agent makes progress in an
interaction, such that a message is dispatched or received,a new role is adopted,
or some action deemed significant is performed, there is a possibility that the set
of portrayable propositions in an interaction changes.
Constraint resolution — The primary purpose of an interaction portrayal is to ac-
tually help agents resolve constraints imposed upon interaction by its protocol
‘better’. Thus any active lines of argument need to be resolved immediately prior
to attempting to satisfy an interaction constraint.
The end of interaction — Finally, interactions come to an end. Rather than have an
agent cease contributing to a portrayal at the end of its own role in interaction
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Figure 5.4: Upon being inducted into an interaction by peer A, peer B must
validate the portrayal instance it has been given whilst existing peers (such
as peer C) update their portrayal instances to account for B’s presence.
however, it would be preferable if agents were able to continue making and ab-
sorbing arguments until the entire distributed interaction c mes to a close should
they so desire.
Once we know how an interaction portrayal interacts with theint raction process for a
distributed dialogue based on an interaction protocol, we can then concentrate on the
independent development of the portrayal itself.
5.3.1 Adding Peers to the Interaction
Obviously there needs to be more than one agent involved withthe development of an
interaction portrayal for there to be any discussion withint at portrayal. An agent is
attributed a new portrayal instance when it is first inductedinto the interaction to which
a portrayal is attached. In other words, an agent is attributed a portrayal instance when
it first receives a message from any other agent acting out a role in a given interaction.
There must therefore be, in the execution model for distributed interaction, a point
at which the model is able to identify a new agent to induct into the interaction — this
point will be at the first dispatch of a message to the new agent. We can demonstrate
when a new copy of a portrayal’s argument system is transferred to a peer within the
rewrite rules defined in Definition 2.15 for LCC role clauses —it is a simple matter to
then extrapolate equivalent circumstances in other protocol languages:
Definition 5.8 Upon dispatching a message M in role R to an agentσr in role Rr ,
an agentσ should designate the act of message dispatch as closed within its process
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modelM [R,σ]:
M⇒ a(Rr ,σr)
R,Mi ,Mi ,S [σ],{m(a(R,σ),a(Rr,σr),M)}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c(M⇒ a(Rr ,σr))
if portrayal(σ,P [σ]) ∧
(
member(σr ,P [σ]) ∨
add peer(P [σ],σr)
)
This rewrite rule replaces the rewrite rule for message dispatch in Definition 2.15. It
adds two alternate conditions, either of which must be satisfied:
• portrayal(σ,P [σ]) is true ifP [σ] is the instance of portrayalP held by agentσ.
• member(σ,P [σ]) is true if σ ∈ Σ, whereΣ is the set of agents with instances of
portrayalP .
• add peer(P [σ],σ) confers a copy of portrayal instanceP [σ] to a peerσ and
informs all peers µ∈ Σ that σ is to be added to the set of agents involved in
portrayalP .
By this means can we ensure that every agent inducted into an interaction has a copy
of the portrayal and is able to contribute to it.
Operationadd peer adds a new agent to the portrayal by conferring a copy of a
portrayal instance to the given agent and updating the set ofagents known to have
portrayal instances in every other portrayal instance known to exist:
add peer(P [σ],µ) — An agentσ gives peer µ a copy of its portrayal instanceP [σ] and
informs all other peers µ∈ Σ of P [σ] that µ should be added toΣ if and only if:
• Agentσ is the sender and agent µ is the recipient of at least one messag
M ∈ I , whereI is the interaction dialogue to which portrayalP is attached.
• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc) and µ/∈ Σ.
A messageinstance(P [µ]) is then dispatched to agent µ, where:
• P [µ] = (Σ∪{µ},ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc).
A messagenew peer(µ) is also dispatched to all agents inΣ. Moreover, untilσ
receives a messageacknowledged(µ) from every agent inΣ, agentσ will relay a
copy of any (other) message received to µ.
In order to ensure that a new peer does not miss any important arguments or other
declarations between being inducted into interaction and being made known to all other
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peers in the interaction, the agent responsible for conferri g a portrayal instance to
the peer ensures that it receives a copy of every portrayal-oriented message the agent
receives itself.
Upon reception of a messageinstance(P [σ]), an agentσ should assertP [σ] as its
own and attempt to reconcile it with its own theory context:















• received(σ,M) is true if agentσ has received a message M from one of its peers
in Σ of P .
• portrayal(σ,P [σ]) is true ifP [σ] is the portrayal instance ofP held by agentσ.
• validate(P [σ]) attempts to reconcile the theory contextC of agentσ with por-
trayal P such thatC andP fulfil Definition 4.10.
Thevalidate predicate checks whether or not any argument or attack in a new portrayal
instance should be dismissed either due to observation or due to being invalid:
validate(P [σ]) — Given a new portrayal instanceP [σ] by means other than portrayal
conception, an agentσ with theory contextC should validate the arguments and
attacks withinP provided that:
• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc) andσs∈ Σ.
If this condition is met, then:
1. For each argument〈Φ,α〉 ∈ A , if an elaboration〈Ψ,α〉 ∈ C of 〈Φ,α〉 is
dismissed as per Definition 3.15 because of a sentenceϕ such thatΘ ⊢ ϕ
and Ψ ⊢ ¬ϕ (whereΘ is the theory core ofC ), and there exists no alter-
native elaborationa∈ U (whereU is the unrejected extension ofC ), such
that 〈Φ,α〉⊏ a:
• There must exist an argument〈Ψ′,α〉 such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ 〈Ψ′,α〉 ⊑
〈Ψ,α〉 and Ψ′ ⊢ ¬ϕ, and for which there is no alternative argument
〈Ψ′′,α〉 such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ 〈Ψ′′,α〉⊏ 〈Ψ′,α〉 andΨ′′ ⊢ ¬ϕ.
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• If 〈Ψ′,α〉= 〈Φ,α〉, then invokeobserve(P [σ]′,{ϕ}).
• Otherwise, invokeelaborate(P [σ]′,〈Φ,α〉,〈Ψ′,α〉) before then invok-
ing observe(P [σ]′,{ϕ}).
2. For each argumenta∈ A , if a is invalid with respect toC as per Definition
4.11, then invokedismiss(P [σ]′,a).
3. For every attack relationa ⇁ b according toP , if a ⇁ b is invalid with
respect toC , then invokedismiss(P [σ],a⇁ b).
4. Invokereconcile(P [σ],A ).
The above predicate will invokeobserve (§5.4.6) if it believes an argument can be
dismissed by observation, elaborating upon that argument if necessary to illustrate its
belief. It does this by finding the simplest argument which isstill evidently dismissable
given an observed percept; if that simplest argument is subsumed by the argument
already within the portrayal, then the argument itself is left untouched. Otherwise, an
elaborate operation is invoked (see §5.4.3). It will also invokedismiss (§5.4.8) for any
argument or attack which it believes to be invalid. Finally,it invokesreconcile. The
reconcile function is specified in §5.4.11; it ensures that any arguments in a portrayal
which are new to a given agent are absorbed into the agent’s theory context and it
then motivates the articulation of any arguments the agent can make which fit into the
portrayal argument space.
Upon reception of a messagen w peer(µ), an agentσ with a portrayal instance
P [σ] should updateP [σ] and acknowledgeµ:
Definition 5.10 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messagenew peer(µ):













• received(σ,M,σs) is true if agentσ has received a message M fromσs in Σ of P .
• acknowledge(P [σ],µ,σs) returns an updated portrayal instanceP [σ] such that
agent µ is within the set of agentsΣ of P [σ].
Functionacknowledge ensures that an agent is known to be involved with a portrayal
and is acknowledged as such to the peer responsible for induct g the agent:
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P [σ]′ = acknowledge(P [σ],µ,σs) — Given an existing portrayal instanceP [σ] and in
response to the inclusion of an agent µ into a portrayalP by a peerσs, an agent
σ should acknowledge µ provided that:
• There exists an agent µ with a role in the interaction to whichportrayalP
is attached.
• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc) andσs∈ Σ.
If these conditions are met, then:
1. P [σ]′ = (Σ∪{µ},ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc).
2. A messageacknowledged(µ) should be sent to agentσs.
If these conditions arenotmet, thenP [σ]′ = P [σ].
This ensures that agents can be added to an active portrayal pocess in an asynchronous
distributed system without inadvertently missing any important information.
5.3.2 New Portrayable Constraints on Interaction
Whenever interaction advances, an agent can check to see if th set of portrayable
propositions has changed so as to affect the argument space of the interaction portrayal.
New portrayable propositions can emerge if prior constrains are resolved, new roles in
interaction are adopted, new messages are received from peers or an action prescribed
by the interaction protocol is executed — essentially, anythi g which might affect the
variable space of the interaction.
Definition 5.11 An agentσ with a process modelM [R,σ] need not update the argu-




portrayal(σ,P [σ]) ∧ portrayables(P [σ],ϒP ) ∧
portrayables(M [R,σ],ϒR) ∧ ϒR⊆ ϒP
)
Otherwise, agentσ must extend∆ so thatσ and its peers can produce arguments for
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Figure 5.5: Upon identifying additional portrayable propositions, all peers are
invited to posit new arguments supporting or refuting those propositions.
• portrayal(σ,P [σ]) is true ifP [σ] is the portrayal instance ofP held by agentσ.
• portrayables(P [σ],ϒ) is true if ϒ is the set of portrayable propositions inP , as
per Definition 5.1.
• portrayables(M [R,σ],ϒ) is true if ϒ is the set of portrayable propositions in
process modelM [R,σ], as per Definition 5.6.
• extend space(P [σ],ϒ′) informs all peersσ ∈ Σ, whereΣ is the set of agents with
instances ofP according toP [σ] that a set of new portrayable propositionsϒ′
has been identified, which may lead to the insertion of new arguments intoP .
The reportray predicate invokes thextend space operation if new portrayable propo-
sitions are encountered, which ensures that all portrayal instances are updated with
respect to the extended argument space of a portrayal. This may then lead to the invo-
cation of new arguments for or against resolutions of the newpropositions identified.
We can invokereportray itself whenever we update the local interaction state as de-
scribed in §2.3.2.2, modifying the step case of Definition 2.14 as shown below:
Definition 5.12 An agentσ will dispatch a set of messages(Mo∪Mn) in response to
receiving messages Mi as it transitions from a local interaction stateS [σ]i to a state
S [σ] f :











role model(S [σ]i,M [R,σ]i) ∧
M [R,σ]i
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mn
−−−−−−−−−→M [R,σ] j ∧
reportray(M [R,σ] j) ∧
updated state(S [σ]i,M [R,σ] j ,S [σ] j) ∧











Where all is as described in Definition 2.14 except:
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• reportray(M [R,σ]) is true if an agentσ can update its portrayal instanceP [σ]
using role modelM [R,σ].
Meanwhile, theextend space operation extends the argument space of a portrayal to
include the given logical propositions, opening the portrayal to new lines of argument:
extend space(P [σ],ϒ′) — An agentσ with a theory contextC adds a set of logical
propositionsϒ′ to the set of portrayable propositions in portrayalP if and only
if:
• ϒR is the set of portrayable propositions in the process modelM [R,σ] of
agentσ in a role R as per Definition 5.6.
• ϒ′ = ϒ/ϒR, whereϒ is the set of portrayable propositions in portrayal
instanceP [σ] andϒ′ 6= /0
A messagextend space(P [σ],ϒ′) is then dispatched to all agents inΣ of P .
An agent should only extend the argument space of a portrayalif recent developments
in the interaction to which the portrayal is attached means that the agent is able to more
precisely identify the logical constraints which must be resolved in order to complete
its role in the interaction. This is determined by thereportray predicate.
Upon reception of a messageextend space(ϒ′), an agentσ with a portrayal instance
P [σ] should invoke theextend arguments function:
Definition 5.13 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messagextend space(ϒ′):
update(σ,P [σ],P [σ]′) ←
(
received(σ,extend space(ϒ′)) ∧
P [σ]′ = extend arguments(P [σ],ϒ′)
)
Where:
• received(σ,M) is true if agentσ has received a message M from one of its peers
in Σ of P .
• extend arguments(P [σ],ϒ′) returns an updated portrayal instanceP [σ] such
that ϒ′ ⊆ ϒ of P [σ].
Functionextend arguments ensures that the given propositions are added to the set
of portrayable propositions recorded by an agent’s portrayal instance. It also looks to
see if the new portrayal space permits the addition of new arguments from an agent’s
theory context:
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P [σ]′ = extend arguments(P [σ],ϒ′) — Given an existing portrayal instanceP [σ] and
in response to the addition of new portrayable propositionsϒ′ into a portrayal
P , an agentσ should extend the portrayal space ofP to includeϒ′ provided that:
• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc) and(ϒ′/ϒ) 6= /0.
If this condition is met, then:
1. P [σ]′ = (Σ,(ϒ∪ϒ′),(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc).
2. Invokeargue(P [σ]′).
We define procedureargue in §5.4.1.
5.3.3 Resolving Constraints on Interaction
For any interaction augmented by an interaction portrayal,we insist that any con-
straints on interaction be resolved only once the portrayalbecomes stable given the
current set of portrayable propositions; by this, we mean tht every agent in the in-
teraction has reconciled its theory context with its portrayal instance, and thus their
beliefs have been synchronised within the portrayal space:
Definition 5.14 A portrayalP is stableif and only if for every agentσ ∈ Σ, whereΣ is
the set of agents possessing instances ofP , portrayal instanceP [σ] is reconciledwith
C , whereC is the theory context of agentσ.
Therefore there must be, in the execution model for distributed interaction, a point
at which the model references the portrayal attached to interaction; this point will be
immediately prior to an attempt to satisfy a logical propositi n in a constraint imposed
by the protocol for an interaction.
We can demonstrate when the portrayal state is referenced bythe rewrite rules
defined in Definition 2.15 for LCC role clauses — from this, an equivalent case can be
extrapolated for any equivalent protocol language:
Definition 5.15 A sub-clause P constrained by a logical constraint C within arole
modelM [R,σ] describing an agentσ’s role R in an interactionI can only be unfolded
if C can be satisfied admissibly given the portrayal ofI :
P←C
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ E if portrayed(S [σ],C) ∧
satisfied(σ,C) ∧
P
R,Mi ,M j ,S [σ],Mo
−−−−−−−−−→ E
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This rewrite rule replaces the rewrite rule for constrainedaction in Definition 2.15. It
adds a new condition which must be satisfied:
• portrayed(S [σ],C) is true if the portrayalP of the interaction described by in-
teraction stateS is stableas per Definition 5.14 and C is admissible inP [σ].
The purpose of propositionportrayed(S [σ], C) is to put interaction on hold until any
arguments which might influence the resolution of constrainC have played out, tem-
porarily synchronising the portrayal mechanism with the main interaction process.
Definition 5.16 A logical constraint C has been portrayed within interaction stateS
if and only if C is admissible according to the portrayalP of the interaction described
by S , andP is considered stable by executing agentσ:
portrayed(S [σ],C) ↔
(




• portrayal(σ,P [σ]) is true ifP [σ] is the portrayal instance ofP held by agentσ.
• stable(P [σ],P [σ]′) stalls the local interaction process until agentσ considersP
to be stable. This has no effect on other agents, nor does it prevent agentσ from
responding to portrayal updates in the meantime or engagingin other activities
not linked to this specific interaction — because the portrayal might be updated
during this hiatus,stable returns the most current portrayal instanceP [σ]′ upon
returning control.
An agentσ can determine portrayal stability by dispatching a messagetabilise to every
peerµ∈ Σ and awaiting a messagestabilised from all µ. Upon receiving a message
stabilise from agentσ, a peerµ is expected to respond withstabilised upon being able
to confirm that its portrayal instanceP [µ] is reconciled with its theory contextC . Agent
µ can easily determine this based on whether it is engaged in any activity involving the
portrayalP — if µ is (in this respect) idle, thenµ can respond immediately; ifµ is
engaged in any operations (such asreportray in §5.3 or insert in §5.4.2), or has any
unresolved received messages to deal with (such as messagesof type posit in §5.4.2
or observe in §5.4.6), then it must effectively clear its action queue before dispatching
stabilised.
Only oncestabilised has been received from all agentsµ∈ Σ can agentσ consider
the portrayal to be stable.5
5Of course in an asynchronous system, it is possible that changes have occurred to the portrayal such
that a peer’s theory context is no longer reconciled with itsportrayal instance after sendingstabilised,
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5.3.4 Completing Interaction
A portrayal is disposed of at the end of interaction, once every agent has completed
all of its assigned roles in interaction. Until that point, all agents continue to maintain
their portrayal instances, even if individually they have alre dy completed their own
contributions to the interaction being portrayed. This allows an agent to continue to
provide arguments regarding constraints imposed on other agents’ roles.
In order to determine when a distributed interaction has been brought to a close,
each agent needs to inform its peers when it completes all of its roles in interaction;
once all peers have reported this, the portrayal can be itself closed. Thus, we augment
the base case of Definition 2.14:
Definition 5.17 The local interaction stateS [σ] of an agentσ cannot advance without
an event to trigger that advancement. This forms a base case for local state transition:
transition(S [σ], /0, /0,S [σ]) ← portrayal(σ,P [σ]) ∧ close(P [σ])
Where:
• portrayal(σ,P [σ]) is true ifP [σ] is the portrayal instance ofP held by agentσ.
• close(P [σ]) informs all peers µ∈ Σ, whereΣ is the set of agents with instance of
P according toP [σ] that σ has finished its role(s) in the interaction to whichP
is attached, bringingP closer to the end of its life.
Functionclose simply dispatches a messageclosed to all peersµ∈ Σ. Once all agents
σ ∈ Σ have dispatched such a message, the interaction is determined to have ended,
and the portrayalP is disposed of; since the information inP is already absorbed into
the theory context of every agent inΣ, there is no further action to take. Until such an
event however, all agents inΣ can contribute and draw information fromP .
It is possible, if rare, for an agent to adopt a new role in the int raction to whichP
is attachedafter dispatching a messageclosed, in which case the agent can cancel the
closure with a messager open dispatched to all peers.
Now that we know how to construct a portrayal and how to updateit in line with
the state of the interaction to which it is attached, we can now focus on how to actually
generate arguments within the portrayal, and on how those arguments then influence
the beliefs of agents.
but before resolution of constraintC. In an asynchronous system this scenario is unavoidable andwoul
effectively be considered to have occurred after resolution.
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5.4 Generating Arguments within a Portrayal
An agent manipulates an interaction portrayal by performing operations which dis-
patch messages to all peers (including itself) motivating some kind of response. These
operations all have conditions applied to them that limit when they can be invoked,
ensuring that only arguments and annotations of arguments justified by the portrayal
space and the theory context of the given agent are inserted in o the portrayal. The
nature of the response to a message declaring some update of the por rayal depends on
the type of message received and the state of an agent’s portrayal instance at the point
of reception. If a portrayal is updated with new arguments, an agent must reconcile
those arguments with its own theory context. If new arguments can be drawn from that
theory context in turn which now fit into the revised argumentspace of the portrayal,
then the agent can update the portrayal accordingly, provoking more responses from
peers.
Within an asynchronous system however, it cannot be ensuredthat messages no-
tifying peers of updates to a portrayal will be received in the order expected. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to ensure that operators are to all intents and purposes associa-
tive, insomuch as the order in which operations are applied is un mportant.
At the same time, all response functions are assumed to be execut d in a serialised
fashion such that whilst any specific function is being invoked (such asinsert), any
further responses to other events will be held off until the function terminates. This
ensures that the integrity of the portrayal instance is maintained. In particular, a func-
tion might invoke operations such asobserve anddismiss which invite response from
the executing agent as well as its peers; the correct behaviour in these circumstances is
to immediately return control to the function upon dispatching any required messages,
and then waiting until the function itself completes beforehandling any self-requested
response. The reader should note that all functions are written with this behaviour
specifically in mind. It is also assumed that messages are responded to in the order that
they are received.
5.4.1 Identifying Arguments to Insert into a Portrayal
The argue predicate tries to generate new arguments within the argument space of a
portrayal using an agent’s theory context.argue is most commonly invoked byrecon-
cile in order to generate attacks against existing arguments in aportrayal (see §5.4.11
below), but is also called when the portrayal space is extended due to changes in the
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state of the interaction to which a portrayal is attached (thus permitting new arguments
in support of, or against, new claims; see §5.3.2) or the theory c ntext itself changes
due to outside influences:
argue(P [σ]) — Given a portrayal instanceP [σ], an agentσ with a theory contextC
and an unrejected extensionU of C should insert new arguments intoP if and
only if:
• There exists an argumenta∈ ∆, where∆ is the argument space ofP , such
thata /∈ P anda⊑ b, whereb ∈ U .
If this condition is met, then:
1. Whilst there exists an argumentc∈ U such that:
(a) c⇁ d for some elaborationd ∈ C upon an argumente∈ P such that
e⊑ d.
(b) There does not exist an alternative elaborationf ∈ E , whereE is the
accepted extension ofC , uponesuch thate⊑ f 6⊑ d andd 6⊑ f.
(c) There does not exist an attackg ⇁ e according toP already, where
g⊑ c.
Invokeattack(P [σ],g⇁ e), whereg∈ ∆ andg⊑ c.
2. Whilst there exists an argumentc∈ U such that:
(a) There does not exist an argumentd ∈ P such thatd⊑ c.
(b) There does exist an argumente∈ ∆, where∆ is the argument space of
P , such thate⊑ c.
Invokeposit(P [σ],e).
If this condition isnotmet, then do nothing.
Functionargue invokes a number of instances of theposit (§5.4.2) andattack (§5.4.4)
operations. Operationposit asserts new arguments into a portrayal where deemed to
be within the portrayal space as per Definition 5.2. Operation attack asserts attacks re-
lations between arguments within a portrayal. Notably,attack can subsume the initial
positing of the attack argument and can also elaborate upon atarget argument already
within the portrayal so as to ensure that it is clearly attacked by the chosen attacking
argument. Thus it is only necessary to directly invokeposit if directly claiming a reso-
lution of a portrayable proposition (rather than trying to undercut or rebut an existing
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argument), or if producing an alternative elaboration of a potential argument within the
portrayal which has already been elaborated upon as a distinct argument (in order to
restore the admissibility of a claim in the presence of attacks against other supporting
arguments; see §5.1.3 and §5.4.2 below).
‘Outside influences’ include any event not part of the portrayal mechanism; such
events include actions taken as part of the interaction to which interaction is attached,
events which are part of other interactions and changes in age t or environment state.
In essence, anything that might change the context of the theory with which an agent
may make decisions in interaction, and thus which might affect the generation and
interpretation of arguments within a portrayal, can cause an invocation of theargue
function. Given that this regards an agent’s personal theory c ntext, and is not caused
by the portrayal mechanism, it is up to the individual autonomous agent to monitor
such events and invokeargue at its own discretion.
The complexity of generating arguments usingar ue is tied to the underlying me-
chanics of the theory context from which arguments are drawn; in essence, an agent is
simply looking for arguments already privately evaluated which will affect the state of
the portrayal given its current argument space. For the mostpart:
• If argue is invoked byreconcile, then it will produce an attack against the most
recent argument inserted into the portrayal, or, if an argument has been elabo-
rated upon in order to be attacked by another agent, it will re-establish support
for that argument’s claim by positing an alternative argument with that same
claim.
• If argue is invoked byextend arguments (§5.3.2), then it will posit a few basic
arguments claiming specific instantiations of any new portrayable propositions.
• If argue is invoked by a change in the environment, then it will generally only
produce a single argument, either as an attack against a prior argument, or as a
new claim regarding the resolution of a constraint on interaction.
Thus, whilst theargue procedure can in theory simultaneously generate an array of
arguments making new claims, attacking existing argumentsa d positing alternative
elaborations upon existing arguments, in practiceargue usually only inserts one or two
arguments at a time, and will often add no new arguments at all. The most common
exception is in the case where an agent is newly added to an already quite advanced
interaction, in which case the agent may be able to make several n w arguments in
response to those already present.
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Example 5.6 Continuing on from Example 5.5, let us assume that Alanna determines
that¬accessible(alanna, library) andpatron(benjamin, library). The immediate conse-
quence of this is that Benjamin in the role ofadvocate is sent arequest message by
Alanna. In doing this, Alanna is also compelled to send on to Benjamin a copy of the
portrayal instanceP [alanna] as specified in§5.3.1.
Benjamin then has to reconcile the content ofP [benjamin] (his copy ofP [alanna])
as specified by procedurevalidate. Assume that after executingreconcile (see§5.4.11),
Benjamin is able to produce the following potential arguments:
a′′ = 〈 { source(library,archives),
¬read data(alanna,archives),
∀X,Y,Z. accessible(X,Y)∧ source(Y,Z)→ read data(X,Z) },
¬accessible(alanna, library)
e′ = 〈 { read data(alanna,archives) }, read data(alanna,archives) 〉
In this case, Benjamin can attack argumenta′ if he assumes that Alanna’s reasoning
followsa′′ and then arguese′. Given that Benjamin does not (as yet) know of an alter-
native means of derivinga′, invokingargue will in turn invokeattack(P [benjamin],e′
⇁ a′′).
Leaving aside Alanna’s response for now, the adoption of role advocate by Ben-
jamin produces new portrayable propositions;controller(Controller, library) and trust-
worthy(alanna, access(library)). Thus we can expect theextend space operation to be
invoked by Benjamin (§5.3.2), which will lead toargue being invoked by both Alanna
and Benjamin. If we assume that Alanna can produce the following potential argu-
ment:
f′ = 〈 { trustworthy(alanna,access(library) }, trustworthy(alanna,access(library) 〉
. . . and if we assume that Benjamin can produce the following argument:
g′ = 〈 { controller(charlotte, library) }, controller(charlotte, library) 〉
. . . thenposit(P [alanna], f′) andposit(P [benjamin],g′) will be invoked by Alanna and
Benjamin respectively.
Finally, let us skip ahead. Assume that Charlotte has accepted Benjamin’s rec-
ommendation, and has granted Alanna access tolibrary. By protocolacquire access,
Charlotte enactspermit(alanna,access(library), which changes the environment into
one in which Alanna has the desired access. This invokesargue yet again, this time
allowing Alanna to defeat her own claim¬accessible(alanna, library) and thus demon-
strate to herself the success of the interaction she started.
5.4. Generating Arguments within a Portrayal 169
posit




dismiss (§4.4.8) reconcile (§4.4.11)
elaborate (§4.4.3)
Figure 5.6: Upon the positing of an argument by Peer A, each agent should
make any relevant observations before either dismissing the argument as
invalid or reconciling it with its own beliefs.
5.4.2 Positing Arguments into a Portrayal
Theposit operation is used to add new arguments to a portrayal.
posit(P [σ],〈Φ,α〉) — An agentσ with a theory contextC and an unrejected extension
U of C posits a new argument〈Φ,α〉 into portrayalP if and only if:
• Φ ⊢ α and 〈Φ,α〉 is minimal (i.e. there exists no subset S⊂ Φ such that
S⊢ α) according toC .
• There exists an argumenta∈ U such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ a.
• There does not exist an argumentb∈ P such that〈Φ,α〉⊑ b or b⊑ 〈Φ,α〉.
• 〈Φ,α〉 ∈ ∆, where∆ is the argument space ofP .
A messageposit(〈Φ,α〉) is then dispatched to all agents inΣ of P (including
agentσ).
Theposit operation ensures that agents only posit arguments which are relevant to the
interaction being enacted and which they have not already privately rejected.
An agent should refrain from knowingly positing into a portrayalP an argumenta
which it believes to potentially be an existing argumentb already present inP : if an
agent can formulate another argumentc such thata⊏ c which is distinct fromb (such
thatc 6⊑ b andb 6⊑ c, and thusc andb are separate arguments which happen to share
a as a potential argument), then it should positc — otherwise it has no basis on which
to justify positing a new argument.
Likewise, if an agent wishes to posit an argumenta for which an existing potential
argumentb exists, then that agent should perform anelaborateoperation onb rather
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than positing a new argument; it is worth noting that ifb has alternative elaborations
known to other peers, then those peers can always posit any alternative elaboration as
a distinct argument as described just above.
Finally, a posited argument should be within the argument space of the portrayal.
Note that whilst an argumenta can be within the argument space∆ of a portrayalP if it
attacks another argumentb already inP , it is necessary to perform anattack operation
in order to formally assert the attack relationa⇁ b in P (regardless,a would still be
within ∆).
Provided that all conditions are fulfilled, an agent will send a messageposit(a) to
all agents possessing instances of portrayalP . Given the positing of a new argument
by an agent, there are three basic responses which its peers can immediately make:
Insert a New Argument — If the posited argument is genuinely new, such that it
adds to the information expressed by the portrayal, then therecipient should add
it to its portrayal instance:
Peer A posits a new argument X to peers B, C and itself:
If argument X is not present at all in an agent’s portrayal instance,
then it will be inserted into it.
The agent which posited the argument will naturally respondt its own action in
this fashion.
Expand Existing Arguments — Any delay propagating existing arguments to all
agents may lead to an agent positing what it (wrongly) thinksto be an original
argument. If the posited argument is merely an elaboration upon existing argu-
ments in the portrayal, then the recipient should simply replace those existing
arguments with the posited one:
Peer A posits an argument X, unaware that peer B has also posited
an argument Y :
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If Y ⊏ X, then peer C, receiving Y first, will insert Y in its portrayal
instance and then expand it into X.
It is possible (if rare) for more than one argument in a portrayal to potentially
be the same elaboration, in which case all such potential arguments are simply
replaced by the single elaboration.
Ignore the Posited Argument — If the posited argument is already present in the
portrayal, or if it is potentially an existing argument, then the posited argument
is redundant and can be ignored:
Returning briefly to the example of the previous case, if X⊑Y, then
peer C will insert argument Y into its portrayal instance andthen
ignore X afterwards.
This response might occur if, for example, two separate agents both posit the
same argument simultaneously.
In order to solicit the correct one of these responses, upon reception of a message
posit(a), an agentσ with a portrayal instanceP [σ] should invoke theinsert function:
Definition 5.18 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messageposit(a):
update(σ,P [σ],P [σ]′) ←
(
received(σ,posit(a)) ∧
P [σ]′ = insert(P [σ],a)
)
Where:
• received(σ,M) is true if agentσ has received a message M from one of its peers
in Σ of P .
• insert(P [σ],a) returns an updated portrayal instanceP [σ] such thata∈ P .
Functioninsert serves to ensure that a given argument is represented withinthe por-
trayal, and checks whether or not it is valid, as well as whether t ere are any additional
observations to be made:
P [σ]′ = insert(P [σ],〈Φ,α〉) — Given an existing portrayal instanceP [σ] and in re-
sponse to an argument〈Φ,α〉, a peerσ with theory contextC should insert
〈Φ,α〉 into P provided that:
• There exists no argumenta∈ P such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ a.
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• S is the set of all argumentsb ∈ P such thatb ⊏ 〈Φ,α〉.
• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc).
If these conditions are met, then:
1. P [σ]′ = (Σ,ϒ,(A ′,⇁), inv′
A
, inv′⇁,obs,acc), where:
(a) A ′ = (A /S)∪{〈Φ,α〉}.
(b) For every agent µ∈ Σ, if a ∈ invA (µ) for some argumenta ∈ S, then
a /∈ inv′A (µ); otherwise ifa∈ invA (µ), thena∈ inv
′
A (µ).
(c) If a⇁ b, wherea∈ S andb ∈ A , then〈Φ,α〉⇁ b; if (a,b) ∈ inv⇁(µ)
for any peer µ∈ Σ, then(〈Φ,α〉,b ∈ inv′⇁(µ).
(d) If b ⇁ a, wherea∈ S andb ∈ A , thenb ⇁ 〈Φ,α〉; if (b,a∈ inv⇁(µ)
for any peer µ∈ Σ, then(b,〈Φ,α〉) ∈ inv′⇁(µ).
(e) Otherwise, if(a,b) ∈ inv⇁(µ), then(a,b) ∈ inv′⇁(µ) for all peers µ∈
Σ.
2. If an elaboration〈Ψ,α〉 ∈ C of 〈Φ,α〉 is dismissed as per Definition 3.15
because of a sentenceϕ such thatΘ ⊢ ϕ andΨ ⊢ ¬ϕ, and there exists no
alternative elaborationa∈ U , whereU is the unrejected extension ofC ,
such that〈Φ,α〉⊏ a:
• There exists an argument〈Ψ′,α〉 such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ 〈Ψ′,α〉 ⊑ 〈Ψ,α〉
and Ψ′ ⊢ ¬ϕ, but there is no argument〈Ψ′′,α〉 such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑
〈Ψ′′,α〉⊏ 〈Ψ′,α〉 andΨ′′ ⊢ ¬ϕ.
• If 〈Ψ′,α〉= 〈Φ,α〉, then invokeobserve(P [σ]′,{ϕ}).
• Otherwise, invokeelaborate(P [σ]′,〈Φ,α〉,〈Ψ′,α〉) before then invok-
ing observe(P [σ]′,{ϕ}).
3. If 〈Φ,α〉 is invalid with respect toC as per Definition 4.11, then invoke
dismiss(P [σ]′,〈Φ,α〉); otherwise invokereconcile(P [σ]′,{〈Φ,α〉}).
If these conditions arenotmet, thenP [σ]′ = P [σ].
Any attacks involving potential arguments are inherited bytheir elaborations, as are
any dismissals of potential attacks specified by the invalidrgumentation function
inv⇁. Any dismissals of potential arguments are discarded on theassumption that if
〈Φ,α〉 is still considered to be invalid by a peerµ∈ Σ, thenσ will receive a new mes-
sagedismiss(〈Φ,α〉) (see §5.4.8). Agentσ will also invoke thedismiss if it believes
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〈Φ,α〉 is invalid andobserve (§5.4.6) if it believes the argument can be dismissed by
observation (σ will also minimally elaborate upon〈Φ,α〉 if necessary to illustrate how
the observation conflicts with the argument). Note that if〈Φ,α〉 is indeed invalid ac-
cording toσ, then this fact isnot added toinvA (σ) at this point — instead, operation
dismiss is invoked, andinvA (σ) will be updated in response to that. Similarly, any
observations or elaborations occur in response to their specific update operations. If
〈Φ,α〉 is valid, thenσ will invoke reconcile, which will integrate〈Φ,α〉 into σ’s theory
context and make counter-arguments as necessary (§5.4.11).
5.4.3 Elaborating Upon Arguments in a Portrayal
Theelaborate operation is used to elaborate upon arguments in a portrayalwhere ex-
isting arguments are no longer considered to be sufficientlydetailed to describe the
conflicts affecting an interaction.
elaborate(P [σ],a,〈Φ,α〉) — An agentσ with a theory contextC and an unrejected
extensionU of C elaborates upon an argumenta within portrayalP , producing
an expanded argument〈Φ,α〉, if and only if:
• a∈ P anda⊏ 〈Φ,α〉.
• Φ ⊢ α and 〈Φ,α〉 is minimal (i.e. there exists no subset S⊂ Φ such that
S⊢ α) according toC .
• There is an admissible argumentb ∈ U such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ b.
• Either:
– 〈Φ,α〉 ∈ ∆, where∆ is the argument space ofP .
– Φ ⊢ ϕ andΘ ⊢ ¬ϕ, whereΘ is the theory core ofC , and there exists no
argument〈Φ′,α〉 such thatΦ′ ⊢ ϕ and〈Φ′,α〉⊏ 〈Φ,α〉 (see§5.4.6).
– elaborate has been invoked in response to aninquire operation (see
§5.4.5).
A messagelaborate(a,〈Φ,α〉) is then dispatched to all agents inΣ of P .
An agent can elaborate upon any argument in a portrayal for which it knows of a more
concrete formulation if it has a justification for insertingthat more concrete formula-
tion into the portrayal. An agent is justified in elaboratingupon an argument if either:
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dismiss (§4.4.8) reconcile (§4.4.11)
elaborate (§4.4.3)
Figure 5.7: Upon the elaboration of an argument by Peer A, each agent
should make any relevant observations before either dismissing the elabora-
tion as invalid or reconciling it with its own beliefs.
• There exists an argumenta∈ P such thata /∈ ∆ with respect to the theory context
C of an agentσ; this can happen if another argumentb is added toP such thatb
attacks all elaborations ofa in E of C , whereE is the accepted extension ofC
(i.e. if σ believes thata can only be justified ifb is defeated within the portrayal,
buta is not expressed to a sufficient level of detail to show thatb ⇁ a), in which
caseσ can elaborate upona to rectify this situation.
• There exists an argumenta∈ P such that for all elaborationsb of a in an agent
σ’s theory contextC , it is the case thatc⇁ b for some argumentc∈ U , where
U is the accepted extension ofC , in which caseσ will want to attacka using
some potential argument ofc. To do this however in a manner considered valid
by its peers, agentσ may have to elaborate upona such that it exhibits a vulner-
ability to c (i.e. the elaboration ofa must be supported by a proposition directly
contradicted by the claim ofc as per the definition of attack in Definitions 3.10).
• There exists an observationϕ ∈ Θ, whereΘ is the theory core of theory context
C , such that all elaborationsb of a in E (the accepted extension ofC ) infer¬ϕ,
in which case an agent believes thata should be dismissed; first however,a must
be elaborated upon to the point that it itself infers¬ϕ.
• Agent σ has received a messageinquire(a) such that a peer has declared an
interest in the reasoning underlyinga, andσ is able to comply (§5.4.5).
Oddly enough, the first two reasons to elaborate upon arguments are generallynot
handled directly by thelaborate operation. Instead, an agent can invokeattack, which
will elaborate upon the defending argument directly so as toillustrate the attack re-
lation being posited (see §5.4.4). Given that invokingattack is more efficient than
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invoking elaborate and thenattack, and that theargue predicate described in §5.4.1
will invoke attack in such circumstances, theelaborate operation itself can be expected
to only be used for the latter two cases. Even then, the third case is activated in paral-
lel with anobserve operation, and the final case is activated in response to aninquire
operation.
Nevertheless, in the case of the third example (inquiry), anagent will send a mes-
sageelaborate(a,b) to all agents possessing instances of a portrayalP . The responses
an agent can make to the elaboration of existing arguments ina portrayal are in truth
almost identical to the responses an agent can make to the positing of new arguments.
This is due to the nature of communication between three or more agents in an asyn-
chronous distributed system, where messages can arrive outof their expected order
due to arbitrary delays afflicting the medium through which dialogue is conducted. All
that really changes are the particular scenarios in which certain responses might occur:
Expand Existing Arguments — If the elaboration received is a valid elaboration of
existing arguments in the portrayal , then the recipient should simply replace
those existing arguments with their elaboration:
Peer A elaborates upon an argument X to peers B, C and itself:
Provided that argument X is present in an agent’s portrayal instance,
then it will be replaced by argument Y .
As with the equivalent response to aposit operation (in §5.4.2), it is possible
for many arguments to expand into a single concrete argument— ot just the
argument identified in the original message. In fact, it may even be that the
intended potential argument is not available to be replaced, due perhaps to delays
in the propagation of arguments between portrayal instances. The agent which
decides to elaborate an argument will naturally respond to its wn own action by
expanding that argument within its own portrayal instance.
Insert a New Argument — If the argument to be elaborated is not present in a por-
trayal, and moreover if there exist no alternative arguments to elaborate in its
stead, then the recipient should treat the elaboration received as if it was a new
argument:
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Peer A elaborates upon an argument posited by peer B:
If elaboration Y reaches peer C before argument X, then C willbe
insert Y into its portrayal instance and then ignore X.
This response might occur if, for example, an agent elaborates on an argument
posited by another, whereupon a third agent, by the vagariesof a ynchronous
networking, receives notification of the elaboration befornotification of original
posit. When the original posit is received, it will be ignored, being now merely
a potential argument for an existing argument in the portrayal.
Ignore the Elaboration — Finally, if the elaboration received is already present in
the portrayal, or if it is merely a potential argument for another argument already
present in the portrayal, then the elaboration is redundantand can be ignored, just
as for the equivalent case in §5.4.2:
Peer A elaborates upon argument X, as does peer B:
Assuming that peer C receives A’s elaboration Y first, then C will
either replace it with B’s elaboration Z if Y⊏ Z, or ignore Z if Z⊑Y.
As illustrated above, typically this occurs because two separate agents have both
elaborated upon the same argument simultaneously.
Upon reception of a messageelaborate(a,b), an agentσ with a portrayal instanceP [σ]
should invoke theinsert function just as in §5.4.2:
Definition 5.19 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messagelaborate(a):
update(σ,P [σ],P [σ]′) ←
(
received(σ,elaborate(a,b)) ∧
P [σ]′ = insert(P [σ],b)
)
Where:
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• received(σ,M) is true if agentσ has received a message M from one of its peers
in Σ of P .
• insert(P [σ],a) returns an updated portrayal instanceP [σ] such thata∈ P .
Note that despite elaborating upon a specific argumenta, we do not appear to refer
to it within function insert. This is an artefact of the specification ofinsert, wherein
we recognise the possibility that multiple arguments mightbe elaborated into the same
elaboration, or that there will exist an argument to be elabor ted upon in a portrayal
instance which is not in fact the argument expected. In practice however, one can
expect thata is within the setS of arguments to be replaced ini sert (if not S in its
entirety), and that actually informing one’s peers of the spcific argument intended to
be replaced might save (a small amount of) computation.
5.4.4 Attacking Arguments Within a Portrayal
The attack operation is used to identify (and introduce) conflicts within a portrayal,
being generally invoked by theargue function (§5.4.1):
attack(P [σ],〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉) — An agentσ with a theory contextC and an unre-
jected extensionU of C attacks an argument〈Ψ,β〉 within portrayalP if and
only if:
• There exist argumentsa,b ∈ C such thata ∈ U , both 〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ a and
〈Ψ,β〉 ⊑ b, and it is the case that〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉 becauseΨ ⊢ γ and
{α} ⊢ ¬γ for some sentenceγ ∈ L according toC .
• There exists an argumentc such thatc⊑ d for some argumentd ∈ P and:
– c⊑ 〈Ψ,β〉.
– There does not exist an argumente∈ E , whereE is the accepted ex-
tension ofC , such thatc⊑ eand〈Φ,α〉 6⇁ e.
– There also does not exist an argumentf such thatc⊑ f ⊏ 〈Ψ,β〉 and
〈Φ,α〉⇁ f.
• There is no existing argumentg∈ P such that〈Φ,α〉⊏ g or g⊏ 〈Φ,α〉.
• 〈Φ,α〉 ∈ ∆, where∆ is the argument space ofP including argument〈Ψ,β〉.
• There do not exist any argumentsh, i ∈ P such thati ⇁ h according toP
and〈Ψ,β〉 ⊑ h, h⊑ 〈Ψ,β〉, 〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ i or i ⊑ 〈Φ,α〉.
178 Chapter 5. Distributed Portrayals of Interaction
attack






Figure 5.8: Upon Peer A attacking an argument within the portrayal, each
agent should ensure that both target and attacking arguments are inserted
into their portrayal instances, and that the attack itself is recorded; if the
attack is considered to be invalid, agents can dismiss it.
A messageattack(〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉) is then dispatched to all agents inΣ of P .
Attacks are motivated by an agent’s awareness of counter-arguments (described within
its theory context) which have not yet been applied to arguments in the portrayal.
It is necessary for there to be an argument in the portrayal tottack. It may be
necessary though for the argument to be elaborated upon before it can be undercut by
the intended attack — in such a case,attack automatically performs the elaboration as
part of the attack operation. Any elaboration should be the minimum required for a
valid attack. However, should an agent be aware that there exist more than one distinct
elaborations of an argument (i.e. at least two elaborationswhere no elaboration is po-
tentially another), and at least one of those elaborations is accepted by the agent, then
that agent should ‘give the benefit of the doubt’ and refrain from attacking (because if
any of the elaborations of a potential argument is admissible, then the potential argu-
ment is admissible). Given a choice of elaborations, all of which an agent can defeat
but all of which involve different attacks, the agent shouldsimply select one arbitrarily
and attack it. If another peer still accepts a different elabor tion of an attacked argu-
ment to the one selected, then it is now free to posit the alterna ive elaboration (as noted
in §5.1.3 and §5.4.2). Of course, that alternative elaboration may simply get attacked
again.
One hypothetical circumstance exists where an agent might be able to attack an
argument which shares a common potential argument with an argument already in the
portrayal; this covers the scenario in which an argument hasbeen elaborated in order to
be attacked, but all attacks are later defeated, and yet an aler tive elaboration can be
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attacked as well. Note however that if the original elaborati n remains undefeated, then
its claim will still follow, regardless of the inadmissibility of alternative elaborations,
and thus this circumstance doesnot permit the addition of alternative elaborations to
the portrayal, given that it has no bearing on the ultimate admissibility of the claims
for which the portrayal exists to test.
It is not strictly necessary for the attacking argument to be alreadypresent in the
portrayal, though it can be. In practice, it is expected thatmost new arguments will
be added to the portrayal as a side-effect of anattack operation, as opposed to aposit,
which will mainly be used to introduce new resolutions for interaction constraints.
The incidental positing of new arguments is still subject tohe requirements ofposit
(§5.4.2) however — these requirements are duly subsumed by the above specification.
Finally, any new attack must not already be known to exist in the portrayal; this
includes variants of the attack for different potential restrictions of the conflicting ar-
guments. If an agent wishes for some reason to change the structure of the arguments
involved in an existing attack, then the agent should elaborte upon those arguments
subject to the constraints of theelaborate operation. Attack relations between argu-
ments are passed on to elaborations of those arguments, as isevidenced by Proof 4.1.
Provided then that all conditions necessary to launch an attack are fulfilled, an
agent will send a messageattack(〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉) to all peers possessing instances of
portrayalP . The responses available to a peer depend on the state of boththe attacking
and defending argument within its portrayal instance:
Do Nothing with the Defending Argument — If the argument being attacked is al-
ready present within the portrayal, or if it is merely a potential argument for
another argument already present in the portrayal, then there is no need to add it
to the portrayal:
Peer A attacks an argument X posited by peer B:
If peer C receives the attack after receiving argument X fromB, then
peer C will have already (one way or another) inserted X into its
portrayal instance.
This is the default case.
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Expand Existing Arguments for Attack — If the argument being attacked is a valid
elaboration of existing arguments in the portrayal, then threcipient should sim-
ply replace those existing arguments with the defending argument:
Rather than attacking a posited argument X, peer A attacks anel b-
oration Y of X:
Assuming peer C has received the original argument X prior tore-
ceiving the attack against Y , then C will simply expand X intoY prior
to considering the attack proper, as will peer B later.
As discussed in §5.4.3 and this section, if there exists an argument in the por-
trayal which lacks the concrete detail to be undercut by an attack, then the at-
tacking agent can resolve this by elaborating upon it specifically to attack it;
remember that peers can always invoke aposit operation to add an alternative
elaboration as a distinct argument if one should be available to restore the ad-
missibility of the attacked claim (§5.4.2). This case may also occur if, for at least
one peer, the attack against a prior elaboration of an argument arrives before no-
tification of the elaboration itself.
Insert a new Argument to Attack — If the defending argument is not present in the
portrayal, and moreover if there exist no alternative arguments to elaborate in its
stead, then the recipient should simply add the defending argument:
Returning to the previous example, if peer C hadnot received argu-
ment X prior to receiving the attack against its elaborationY , then C
will insert Y into its portrayal instance and later ignore the positing
of X.
This is another response which may occur if delays in communication in an
asynchronous system lead to messages being received by a peer out of order.
Insert the Attacking Argument — If the attacking argument is not yet present in the
portrayal, and moreover if there exist no alternative arguments to elaborate in its
stead, then the recipient should add it to the portrayal:
Peer A can attack an argument X with a new argument Y should Y be
in the argument space and capable of defeating X:
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If argument Y is not present at all in an agent’s portrayal instance,
then it will be inserted into it.
This is how many arguments are posited in practice — as attacks against existing
arguments. Therefore this is considered to constitute the default case.
Do Nothing with the Attacking Argument — If the attacking argument is present
within the portrayal, or if it is merely a potential argumentfor another argument
already present in the portrayal, then there is no need to addit to the portrayal:
Peer A can use an argument Z to attack X and then attack Y with the
same argument:
Since argument Z will be added to every agent’s portrayal insta ce
due to the first attack (provided the attacks arrive in order), it will not
need to be inserted again.
This response may occur if another agent has independently made the same
attack as the original attacker, if the attacking argument has been previously
posited without the realisation that it constitutes an attack on another argument,
or if it has been posited as part of an attack against another argument entirely.
Expand Existing Arguments to Attack With — If the attacking argument is a valid
elaboration of existing arguments in the portrayal, then the recipient should sim-
ply replace those existing arguments with the attacking argument:
Peer A attacks an argument X using argument Z, unaware that peer
B has already attacked X, albeit with an argument Y such that Y⊏ Z:
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If peer C receives A’s attack after that of B, then C will expand Y into
Z in order to keep all portrayal instances synchronised. Peer B will
do likewise.
This is another response which may occur if delays in communication in an
asynchronous system lead to messages being received by a peer out of order
(since conflicts are focused on the claim of the attacking argument against some
element of the attacked argument, elaboration of an existing argument is never
necessary to make it a valid attacker).
Upon reception of a messageattack(a⇁ b), an agentσ with a portrayal instanceP [σ]
should ensure that argumentsa andb are withinP before invoking theverify attack
function:
Definition 5.20 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messageattack(a⇁ b):









P [σ]b = insert(P [σ],b) ∧
P [σ]a = insert(P [σ]b,a) ∧









• received(σ,M) is true if agentσ has received a message M from one of its peers
in Σ of P .
• insert(P [σ],a) returns an updated portrayal instanceP [σ] such thata∈ P , as
specified in§5.4.2.
• insert attack(P [σ],a⇁ b) returns an updated portrayal instanceP [σ] in which
a⇁ b has been verified inP .
Functioninsert attack ensures that a given attack relation exists within the portrayal
and is valid:
P [σ]′ = insert attack(P [σ],a⇁ b) — Given an existing portrayal instanceP [σ] and
in response to an attacka ⇁ b, a peerσ with theory contextC should ensure
thata⇁ b according toP provided that:
• a,b ∈ P
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• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc)
If these conditions are met, then:
1. P [σ]′ = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁)′, invA , inv⇁,obs,acc), wherea⇁ b according toP ′.
2. If a⇁ b is invalid with respect toC , then invokedismiss(P [σ]′,a⇁ b).
If these conditions arenotmet, thenP [σ]′ = P [σ].
All insert attack does in practice is ensure an attack is noted in whatever repres ntation
of the portrayal argument system an agent might use, and thencheck for validity from
the executing agent’s perspective. Note that the invocations of insert for the defending
and then attacking arguments serve to ensure reconciliation, so we have no need to
invokereconcile within insert attack.
5.4.5 Requesting Additional Elaboration Upon Arguments
The inquire operation is used by an agent to request that a peer elaborateupon a given
argument if the agent has decided that insufficient information has been made avail-
able:
inquire(P ,〈Φ,α〉,µ) — An agentσ can request that another agent µ elaborate upon
an argumenta within portrayalP if and only if:
• It is the case that〈Φ,α〉 ∈ P .
• Agent µ∈ Σ, whereΣ of P is the set of agents currently involved in the
interaction for whichP exists.
• Agentσ has an interest in the inference of one or more sentencesϕ ∈Φ as
described below.
A messageinquire(a) can then be dispatched to agent µ.
Any agent can request that any other agent elaborate if they can upon a given argument,
as long as the argument exists within a portrayal. The motivation for such an event is at
the discretion of the inquiring agent — of all parts of the portrayal mechanism, this is
the one that confers the most freedom to agents, essentiallyallowing them to arbitrarily
expand the portrayal space in order to gather more information. It should be noted that
theinquire operation is not needed to portray an interaction — arguments are generally
elaborated upon in order to be attacked, and if no admissibleattacks exist against any
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Figure 5.9: Upon Peer A making a request of Peer B to elaborate upon a
given argument, Peer B can do so provided that it is able, or else decline; if
Peer B does not recognise the inquired-upon argument in the first place, it
will automatically insert it into its portrayal instance anyway.
elaboration of an argument, then it is not necessary to elaborate upon that argument
to synchronise agent theories within the portrayal space. On the other hand, there are
instances where an intelligent agent might simply want moreinformation.
The most likely circumstance in whichinquire might be invoked by an agentσ
is where there exists a logical constraint imposed on interac ion which is specifically
imposed onσ in its enactment of a given role in the interaction, such thatσ is the
agent which must actually resolve a propositionα. If σ itself does not have a means
to infer α as being true or false other than by assumption, then it mightwant to know
how another agent is able to derive a claim made in the portrayal, even if it would
not otherwise be elaborated upon (which might be the case if no other agent is able to
undercut the claim).
Typically the agent asked to elaborate upon an argumenta will be the agent which
positeda, but this is not compulsory. It may be worth noting that the inquire operation,
dependent on the temperament of the agents involved in an interaction, may not see
common use — this is because agents can instead invite further discussion by elab-
orating upon arguments on their own initiative, often specifically to attack, and then
allowing their peers to respond with alternative elaboratins or counter-attacks as they
wish.
Provided that all conditions are fulfilled, an agent will send a messageinquire(a)
to another agentσ. Upon reception of an inquiry, agentσ must first ensure that it has
the subject of inquiry within its portrayal:
Subject of Inquiry is Present — If the subject of the inquiry is present within the
portrayal, or if it is merely a potential argument for another argument already
present in the portrayal, then the agent is free to elaborateupon it or otherwise:
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Peer A inquires about an argument X to peer B:
Assuming that argument X is present in B’s portrayal instance, and B
is able to construct a more concrete argument Y , then B can elaborate
upon X to all agents handling the portrayal.
This is the default case.
Existing Arguments Need to be Expanded— If the given argument is already an
elaboration of existing arguments in portrayalP , then the recipient may as well
replace those existing arguments with the elaboration as ifthat argument had just
been inserted into the portrayal as per §5.4.2 or §5.4.3:
Given an elaboration Y by peer B, peer A seeks further elaboration
by peer C:
Even if elaboration Y is not yet present in C’s portrayal instance, C
can still elaborate on it further if it first expands the original argument
X and is able to construct an even more concrete argument thanY.
This response may occur if an agent is asked to elaborate uponan argument it
has not yet received itself (since generally agents are asked to laborate upon
their own arguments however, this case should be quite rare).
The Subject of Inquiry Needs to be Inserted— If the given argument is not present
in the recipient’s portrayal instance, and moreover if there exist no alternative ar-
guments to elaborate in its stead, then the recipient may as well add the argument
to its copy of the portrayal:
Peer A inquires about an argument X originally posited by peer B to
peer C:
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Even if argument X is not present in C’s portrayal instance, Ccan still
elaborate upon it if it has sufficient information in its theory context.
This response may occur for much the same reasons as for the previous case.
Therefore, upon reception of a messageinquire(a), an agentσ with a portrayal instance
P [σ] should insert the subject of inquiry if missing from its portrayal instance, and then
see if it can elaborate upon it further:
Definition 5.21 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messageinquire(a):













• received(σ,M,σs) is true if agentσ has received a message M from peerσs in Σ
of P .
• insert(P [σ],a) returns an updated portrayal instanceP [σ] such thata∈ P , as
specified in§5.4.2.
• answer inquiry(P [σ],a,σs) either performs an elaboration ofa or dispatches a
messagedecline(a) to agentσs.
Functionanswer inquiry determines whether or not an agent can elaborate a given ar-
gument, and will then inform the inquirer as to its decision.
P [σ]′ = answer inquiry(P [σ],a,σs) — Given an existing portrayal instanceP [σ] and
in response to an inquiry on an argumenta from a peerσs, an agentσ with
theory contextC and an accepted extensionE of C should elaborate upona
provided that:
• a∈ P .
• There exists an argumentb ∈ E such thata⊑ b.
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• There exists an elaborationc such thata⊏ c⊑ b.
If these conditions are met, then:
1. Invokeelaborate(P [σ],a,b).
If these conditions arenot met, then a messagedecline should be sent to agent
σs.
Outwith the bounds of the argument space of the portrayal, itis difficult to define pre-
cisely how far an agent should elaborate upon an argument subject to inquiry without
knowledge of the specific logical construction of the argument in question. As such,
it ultimately falls to the discretion of the elaborating agent. As a general rule, the
elaboration should be non-trivial (such that it imparts genuinely new information), but
should only be elaborated upon to the full extent of an agent’s k owledge if the differ-
ence between the potential argument in the portrayal and ‘full’ argument in an agent’s
theory context is already quite small.
5.4.6 Observing Unarguable Propositions
The observe operation is used by agents to identify particular assertions used in ar-
guments in a portrayal which they hold to be evidently true orfalse, regardless of the
apparent naive admissibility of those assertions in the portrayal argument system:
observe(P [σ],S) — An agentσ with context theoryC advocates the set of logical
sentence S within a portrayalP if and only if:
• For each sentenceϕ ∈ S, it is the case thatΘ ⊢ ϕ, whereΘ is the theory
core used withinC .
• For each sentenceϕ ∈ S, there exists an argument〈Φ,α〉 ∈ P such that
Φ ⊢ ¬ϕ according toC .
• For each sentenceϕ ∈ S, it is the case thatϕ /∈ obs(σ) according toC ,
whereobs(σ) is the set of sentences already advocated byσ in P [σ].
A messageobserve(S) is then dispatched to all agents inΣ of P .
Theobserve operation is used by an agent to inform its peers about assertions which
logically follow from arguments already in the portrayal whic the agent is certain are
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Peer A Peer B
annotate
observe(X)
Figure 5.10: Upon Peer A asserting an observation of the environment, each
agent should update its record of Peer A’s observations.
true or false.6 This certainty arises from outside of the argumentation framework in
which these assertions are being evaluated (i.e. the truth status of these assertions has
been directly deduced by introspection or observation). Basically, the agent is stating
that it does not consider to be admissible any set of arguments which contradict those
assertions, such arguments being ‘clearly false’ given theadvocate’s knowledge.
Observations in a portrayal can be used to dismiss argumentsas per Definition
3.15. Agents are free to take into account or ignore the observations of their peers
when evaluating the portrayal — generally it is better to tryand interpret arguments
given all peers’ observations, but since it cannot be ensured that the aggregation of
such will be consistent, an agent must sometimes treat theirpe rs’ opinions as merely
a heuristic for choosing between interpretations (see §5.1.5).
The decision by an agentσ with theory contextC to enact the advocate operation
is generally motivated by one of two occurrences:
• An agent has posited (or elaborated upon) a new argument〈Φ,α〉 in portrayalP
such that there exists at least one sentenceϕ for whichΦ ⊢ ϕ andΘ ⊢ ¬ϕ (where
Θ is the theory core ofC ), andϕ /∈ obs(σ) or ¬ϕ /∈ obs(σ) respectively (where
obs is the advocacy function ofP ).
• There has been a change in the environment, motivating a change inΘ of C such
that there exists at least one sentenceϕ entailed by some admissible extension in
P for whichΘ ⊢ ¬ϕ, and¬ϕ /∈ obs(σ) respectively.
If an agent wishes to advocate something which directly contradicts a prior observa-
tion, then it can do so — peers will automatically remove the original assertion when
they update their instances of the portrayal advocacy functio . If an agent merely
wishes to retract a prior observation (because the assertion in question has merely be-
come uncertain rather than empirically untrue), then it should invoke theunobserve
operation (§5.4.7).
6For a given standard of certainty — recall the discussion in §5.1.5.
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Note that we only concern ourselves with positing observations which contradict
rather than support suppositions made in arguments within aportrayal. This is for
much the same reason as given in §3.2.3 — if an assertion supported by an observation
is attacked, then the observation can be used to dismiss thatattack; if an assertion
supported by an observation is not attacked, then it will be assumed as part of an
interpretation of the portrayal argument system anyway.
Given the decision to advocate a particular observation, a messageobserve(S) will
be sent to all agents possessing instances of portrayalP , t which point those agents
will update their observation functions with respect to theobserver:
Definition 5.22 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messageobserve(S):
update(σ,P [σ],P [σ]′) ←
(
received(σ,observe(S),σs) ∧
P [σ]′ = annotate(P [σ],S,σs)
)
Where:
• received(σ,M,σs) is true if agentσ has received a message M from peerσs in Σ
of P .
• annotate(P [σ],S,σs) updates portrayal instanceP [σ] such that the sentences in
set S are recorded as having been observed by peerσs.
Functionannotate updates the observation functionbs for the given agent:
P [σ]′ = annotate(P [σ],S,σs) — Given an existing portrayal instanceP [σ] and in re-
sponse to the observation of the logical sentence set S by a peer σs, an agentσ
should updateobs(σs) provided that:
• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc).
• R= {ϕ ∈ obs(σs) | ¬ϕ ∈ S}
If these conditions are met, then:
1. P [σ]′ = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs′,acc) where:
(a) If ϕ ∈ S, thenϕ ∈ obs′(σs).
(b) If ϕ ∈ obs(σs) andϕ ∈ R, thenϕ /∈ obs′(σs).
(c) Otherwise, ifϕ ∈ obs(µ) for any agent µ∈ Σ of P , thenϕ ∈ obs′(µ).
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If these conditions arenotmet, thenP [σ]′ = P [σ].
Note that whilstannotate automatically removes any directly contradicted past ob-
servations when updating the observation function for effici n y, it does not do full
consistency checking — it is the responsibility of the observer to determine that its
observations are internally consistent. If an agent is unable to provide consistent ob-
servations, then it is unlikely that peers will choose to include its observations within
their theory cores; on the other hand, if the source of observations is sound, no incon-
sistencies should arise in the first place provided that observations are kept updated.
Finally, agents will record observations made even if thereis no apparent argument
which the observation can be used to dismiss — this is to account f r the circumstance
in which a third agent receives the observation made by one agent prior to the argument
made by another agent which motivated that observation.
5.4.7 Withdrawing Prior Observations
The unobserve operation is used by agents to retract advocacy of observations used
in arguments in a portrayal. This is done in response to a change in the state of the
environment removing a previously observed percept:
unobserve(P [σ],R) — An agentσ with theory contextC disavows the set of logical
sentences R within a portrayalP if and only if:
• For each sentenceϕ ∈ R, it is the case thatϕ ∈ obs(σ) according toC ,
whereobs(σ) is the set of sentences already advocated byσ in P [σ].
• For each sentenceϕ ∈ R, it is the case thatΘ 0 ϕ, whereΘ is the theory
core used withinC .
A messageunobserve(R) is then dispatched to all agents inΣ of P .
Theunobserve operation is used by an agentσ o essentially retract its advocacy of an
assertion. This operation is usually motivated by a change ithe environment causing
a change in the theory coreΘ of a theory contentC such that there exists at least one
sentenceϕ ∈ obs(σ) (whereobs is the advocacy function of portrayalP ) for which
Θ 0 ϕ (i.e. assertionϕ has become false or unknown). There is no need to unobserve
any assertion for which its negation is due to be observed however, because theobserve
operation will cause any directly contradicted prior observations to be overwritten (see
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Figure 5.11: Upon the retraction of observations by Peer A, each agent
should update its record of Peer A’s observations; if a retraction appears
to proceed an assertion, then peers can also throw an observation error.
§5.4.6); therefore,unobserve is mainly reserved for previously observable assertions
which become unknowable.
Given the decision to disavow a particular observation, a messageunobserve(R)
will be sent to all agents possessing instances of portrayalP , at which point those
agents will update their observation functions with respect to the observer:
Definition 5.23 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messageunobserve(R):
update(σ,P [σ],P [σ]′) ←
(
received(σ,unobserve(R),σs) ∧
P [σ]′ = unannotate(P [σ],R,σs)
)
Where:
• received(σ,M,σs) is true if agentσ has received a message M from peerσs in Σ
of P .
• unannotate(P [σ],R,σs) updates portrayal instanceP [σ] such that the sentences
in set R are no longer recorded as being observed by peerσs.
Functionunannotate updates the observation functionbs for the given agent:
P [σ]′ = annotate(P [σ],R,σs) — Given an existing portrayal instanceP [σ] and in re-
sponse to the un-observation of the logical sentence set R bya peerσs, an agent
σ should updateobs(σs) provided that:
• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc)
• R⊆ obs(σs).
If these conditions are met, then:
1. P [σ]′ = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs′,acc) where:
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(a) If ϕ ∈ obs(σs) andϕ ∈ R, thenϕ /∈ obs′(σs).
(b) Otherwise, ifϕ ∈ obs(µ) for any agent µ∈ Σ of P , thenϕ ∈ obs′(µ).
If R* obs(σs), then:
1. P [σ]′ = annotate(P [σ],(R∩obs(σs)),σs).
2. Dispatch a messageobservation error(R/obs(σs)) to σs.
Otherwise,P [σ]′ = P [σ].
If an agent is told to withdraw an observation on the part of a peerbeforethe agent
receives notification of the original observation, then there may have been a disordering
of messages. In order to avoid ending up with an incorrect record of observations, an
agent can send anobservation error, which informs a peer that their observations do
not appear to have been received in order and returns the portion f sentence setR
which is in doubt. In response to such a message, the peer should either:
• Repeat theunobserve operation for the portion ofR in doubt, if the peer believes
that there is a laggingobserve message in transit such that by the time the second
unobserve message is received, the missing observations will have been recorded
by the recipient.
• Do nothing, if the peer believes that the laggingobserve message has been lost
(in which case there is nothing to correct).
Because we are considering an asynchronous system in which atrue state of common
knowledge cannot be reached [Halpern and Moses, 1990], we cannot ensure absolutely
that the set of observations in a portrayal instance is perfectly correct. We are able to
minimise this problem for arguments by making the portrayalprimarily additive (we
never simply remove arguments without an elaboration to replac them), such that ar-
guments can be received out-of-order with little difficulty(though it is still possible for
arguments to become lost in the ether) — however we cannot do this for observations,
which genuinely can be retracted as often as they are added to. As a general heuristic,
we would expect that an agent would repeat anunobserve message once in response to
aobservation error, and then to ignore furtherobservation error messages for the same
set of logical sentences until the theory core of the agent changes again.
5.4. Generating Arguments within a Portrayal 193
dismiss




Figure 5.12: Upon the dismissal of an argument or attack by Peer A, each
agent should update its record of invalid arguments / attacks and, if able,
should provide a clarification of the dismissed argument or a clarification of
the attacking argument in a dismissed attack.
5.4.8 Dismissing Invalid Arguments and Attacks
The dismiss operation is used by agents to identify arguments and attacks which are
not valid with respect to their theory contexts. This operation is only used forpublic
dismissals due to invalid arguments or attacks — it isnot used by agents to privately
dismiss arguments which have been observed to be false, but which are still valid
inferences given the assumption of the argument’s support (operationobserve handles
this; §5.4.6). The operation has two variants. For invalid arguments:
dismiss(P [σ],a) — An agentσ with theory contextC dismisses an argumenta within
portrayalP if and only if:
• There exists an argumenta∈ P .
• a is invalid with respect toC as per Definition 4.11.
• a /∈ invA (σ), whereinvA is the invalid argument function ofP [σ].
A messagedismiss(a) is then dispatched to all agents inΣ of P .
An argument is considered for validity upon being inserted into the portrayal (see
§5.4.2). An argument declared invalid indicates a peer which is unable to infer the
argument’s claim from its support. In turn, this indicates that an agent has presumed
a certain proposition or rule as being known to all agents (and believed to be always
true by all agents) such that it need not be explicitly mentioned in arguments, and that
presumption is false. Equivalently, for invalid attacks:
dismiss(P [σ],a⇁ b) — An agentσ with theory contextC dismisses an attacka⇁ b
within P if and only if:
• a⇁ b according toP .
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• a⇁ b is invalid with respect toC as per Definition 4.12.
• (ab) /∈ inv⇁(σ), whereinv⇁ is the invalid attack function ofP [σ].
A messagedismiss(a⇁ b) is then dispatched to all agents inΣ of P .
An attack is considered for validity upon being made explicit within the portrayal (see
§5.4.4). An attack declared invalid indicates a peer which is unable to determine how
the claim of the attacking argument undercuts or rebuts the targe argument. This also
indicates a presumption on the part of an agent, in this case that two assertions are
mutually exclusive, which is not shared by the peer.
In either case, there should be scope to repair the invalid argument or attack by
making the claim or contradiction clearer. We rely on a base-line of deductive reason-
ing; if the claim of an argument can be inferred purely by deduction on the supporting
assumptions used by that argument, then it should be valid toall peers. Likewise, if
an attacking argument actually directly claims the negation of a proposition deducible
from the target argument, then the attack should also be valid to all peers.
Given the decision to dismiss an argument, a messagedismiss(a) is sent to all
agents possessing instances of portrayalP . Upon reception of such a message, an
agentσ will update its invalid argument function with respect to the dismissing peer:
Definition 5.24 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messagedismiss(a):
update(σ,P [σ],P [σ]′) ←
(
received(σ,dismiss(a),σs) ∧
P [σ]′ = invalid argument(P [σ],a,σs)
)
Where:
• received(σ,M,σs) is true if agentσ has received a message M from peerσs in Σ
of P .
• invalid argument(P [σ],a,σs) updates portrayal instanceP [σ] such that argu-
menta is recorded as having been dismissed by peerσs.
Function invalid argument updates the invalid argument functioninvA for the given
agent:
P [σ]′ = invalid argument(P [σ],a,σs) — Given an existing portrayal instanceP [σ]
and in response to the dismissal of an argumenta by a peerσs, an agentσ
with theory contextC and an accepted extensionE of C should updateinvA (σs)
provided that:
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• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc)
If this condition is met, then:
1. P [σ]′ = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), inv′A , inv⇁,obs,acc) where:
(a) a∈ invA (σs).
(b) Otherwise, ifb ∈ invA (µ) for any agent µ∈ Σ of P , thenb ∈ inv′A (µ).
2. If there exists an argumentb∈ E such thata⊑ b, then invokeexpand(P [σ],
a,〈Φ,α〉), where:
(a) 〈Φ,α〉 ∈ ∆ (where∆ is the argument space ofP ).
(b) a⊑ 〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ b.
(c) Φ ⊢ α in anydeductive framework(L , ⊢) (i.e. 〈Φ,α〉 is a replacement
for a which presumes nothing, but is still minimal with respect tothe
portrayal space ofP ).
If these conditions arenotmet, thenP [σ]′ = P [σ].
Given the decision to dismiss an attack, a messagedismiss(a⇁ b) is sent to all agents
possessing instances of portrayalP . Upon reception of such a message, an agentσ
will update its invalid argument function with respect to the dismissing peer:
Definition 5.25 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messagedismiss(a⇁ b):
update(σ,P [σ],P [σ]′) ←
(
received(σ,dismiss(a⇁ b),σs) ∧
P [σ]′ = invalid attack(P [σ],a⇁ b,σs)
)
Where:
• received(σ,M,σs) is true if agentσ has received a message M from peerσs in Σ
of P .
• invalid attack(P [σ],a⇁ b,σs) updates portrayal instanceP [σ] such that attack
a⇁ b is recorded as having been dismissed by peerσs.
Functioninvalid attack updates the invalid argument functioninv⇁ for the given agent:
P [σ]′ = invalid attack(P [σ],〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉,σs) — Given an existing portrayal in-
stanceP [σ] and in response to the dismissal of an attack〈Φ,α〉⇁ 〈Ψ,β〉 by a
peerσs, an agentσ with theory contextC and an accepted extensionE of C
should updateinv⇁(σs) provided that:
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• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc)
If this condition is met, then:
1. P [σ]′ = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv′⇁,obs,acc) where:
(a) (〈Φ,α〉,〈Ψ,β〉)∈ invA (σs).
(b) Otherwise, if(a,b) ∈ inv⇁(µ) for any agent µ∈ Σ of P , then(a,b) ∈
inv′⇁(µ).
2. If there is an argumenta ∈ E such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ a, invokeexpand(P [σ],
〈Φ,α〉,〈Φ′,¬γ〉), where:
(a) 〈Φ′,¬γ〉 ∈ ∆ (where∆ is the argument space ofP ).
(b) 〈Φ′,α〉 ⊑ a.
(c) 〈Φ′ ⊢ α〉 and Ψ ⊢ γ in any deductive framework(L , ⊢) (i.e. 〈Φ′,¬γ〉
is a replacement fora which directly contradicts〈Ψ,β〉 and which is
still minimal with respect to the portrayal space ofP ).
If these conditions arenotmet, thenP [σ]′ = P [σ].
For bothinvalid argument andinvalid attack, we do not care if an agent receives noti-
fication of an invalid argument or attack before notificationof the argument or attack
itself, since we can still record the invalid argument or attack even without it being
present in the argument system — such an occurrence does not have any effect on the
interpretation of the argument system itself anyway.
5.4.9 Validating Invalid Arguments and Attacks
Theexpand operation is used to replace invalid arguments, or the attacking argument
of an invalid attack, with an expanded argument which more explicitly states its con-
tribution to a portrayal argument system:
expand(P [σ],a,b) — An agentσ with context theoryC and an accepted extension
E of C expands upon an argumenta, replacing it with an argumentb within a
portrayalP if:
• a∈ P and for at least one agent µ∈ Σ of P , it is the case thata∈ invA (µ),
whereinvA is the invalid argument function of portrayal instanceP [σ].
• There exists an argumentc∈ E such thata⊑ c.
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dismiss (§4.4.8) reconcile (§4.4.11)
elaborate (§4.4.3)
Figure 5.13: Upon one of its arguments or attacks being declared invalid,
Peer A can expand upon arguments in order to make their consequence
clearer, at which point its peers can re-evaluate replacement arguments.
• b ∈ ∆ anda⊑ b⊑ c.
• b = 〈Φ,α〉 such thatΦ ⊢ α in any deductive framework(L , ⊢).
Or if:
• a∈ P and for at least one agent µ∈ Σ of P , it is the case that(a,〈Ψ,β〉) ∈
inv⇁(µ), whereinv⇁ is the invalid attack function of portrayal instance
P [σ].
• There exists an argumentc∈ E such thata⊑ c.
• b ∈ ∆ andb⊑ c.
• a = 〈Φ,α〉 andb = 〈Φ′,¬γ〉 such thatΦ′ ⊢ α andΨ ⊢ γ in any deductive
framework(L , ⊢).
In either case, a messageexpand(a,b) is dispatched to all agents inΣ of P .
‘Expansion’ of arguments in this case is different from elaboration of arguments inso-
much as instead of revealing the provenance of assumptions,expansion actually makes
explicit parts of the support for the argument which were subsumed by the logical
framework with which the original argument was created. In this case there are two
variants of expansion: one which reinforces the support foran argument by making it
clearer how the claim is inferred from the conclusion; and one in which the claim itself
is replaced to more clearly demonstrate how it attacks another argument.
Given the decision to expand a given argument, a messageexpand(a,b) will be
sent to all agents possessing instances ofP , at which point those agents will replace
the argumenta with the expanded argumentb:
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Definition 5.26 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messagexpand(a,b):
update(σ,P [σ],P [σ]′) ←
(
received(σ,expand(a,b)) ∧
P [σ]′ = replace(P [σ],b)
)
Where:
• received(σ,M) is true if agentσ has received a message M from one of its peers
in Σ of P .
• replace(P [σ],a,b) updates portrayal instanceP [σ] such that argumenta is re-
placed by argumentb.
Functionreplace simply replaces an argument with another.replace is identical to
insert (§5.4.2), but with a very minor difference:
P [σ]′ = replace(P [σ],a) — Given an existing portrayal instanceP [σ] and in response
to the expansion of an argumenta, a peerσ with theory contextC should insert
a into P provided that:
• There exists no argumenta∈ P such that〈Φ,α〉⊏ a.
• S is the set of all argumentsb ∈ P such thatb⊑ 〈Φ,α〉.
• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc).
If these conditions are met, then do as for functioninsert; otherwise,P [σ]′ =
P [σ].
The difference is thatreplace can replace arguments which, to an agent, are function-
ally identical to the given argument — this is because to an agent which considers
valid an argument invalid to a peer, the expansion of an argument does not actually
expand the inferences which can be made from that argument. Otherwise,replace pos-
sesses the same qualities asinsert, including the ability to handle the replacement of
an argument which has not yet arrived due to asynchronous mesaging.
5.4.10 Asserting Acceptance of Portrayal Arguments
Theaccept operation is used by agents to identify the set of arguments in a portrayal
which reflect their actual underlying beliefs as described by their theory contexts:
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accept
Peer A Peer B
interpret
accept(X)
Figure 5.14: Upon the declaration of accepted arguments by Peer A, each
agent should update its record of Peer A’s accepted extension of the por-
trayal argument system.
accept(P [σ],S) — An agentσ with context theoryC and an accepted extensionE of
C declares the acceptance of a set of arguments S within a portrayal P if and
only if:
• For every argumenta∈ S, it is the case thata∈ P .
• Argument set S is a potential restriction ofE into the argument space∆ of
P .
• Argument set S6= acc(σ) of P .
A messageaccept(S) is then dispatched to all agents inΣ of P .
The accept operation is used by an agent to indicate the set ofarguments it currently
accepts for the purpose of making decisions in the interaction to which the portrayal
is attached, and by extension the assumptions which it has chosen to make. Thus its
peers can compare the agent’s accepted argument set with their own, and determine
the current efficacy of the arguments made so far.
An agentσ will declare its acceptance of arguments upon portrayal conception
(§5.2.2) or after reconciling arguments in a portrayal withits theory context (§5.4.11)
if the output ofacc(σ) of its portrayal instanceP [σ] is not a potential restriction of
its (revised) beliefs. Thus, there exists the possibility of re-declaration of acceptance
every time new arguments are added to the portrayal, or if there is a change in an
agent’s theory context from an external source.
Given the decision to declare acceptance of a given set of argumentsS, a mes-
sageaccept(S) is sent to all agents possessing instances ofP , leading the recipients to
immediately revise their acceptance functions accordingly:
Definition 5.27 An agentσ updates its portrayal instanceP [σ] upon reception of a
messageaccept(S):
update(σ,P [σ],P [σ]′) ←
(
received(σ,accept(S),σs) ∧
P [σ]′ = interpret(P [σ],S,σs)
)
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Where:
• received(σ,M,σs) is true if agentσ has received a message M from peerσs in Σ
of P .
• interpret(P [σ],S,σs) updates portrayal instanceP [σ] such that the arguments
in set S are recorded as having been accepted by peerσs.
Functioninterpret updates the observation functionacc for the given agent:
P [σ]′ = interpret(P [σ],S,σs) — Given an existing portrayal instanceP [σ] and in re-
sponse to the acceptance of the argument set S by a peerσs, an agentσ should
updateacc(σs) provided that:
• P [σ] = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc).
If this condition is met, then:
1. P [σ]′ = (Σ,ϒ,(A ,⇁), invA , inv⇁,obs,acc′) where:
(a) acc′(σ) = S.
(b) Otherwise,acc′(µ) = acc(µ) for all other agents µ∈ Σ of P .
If this condition isnotmet, thenP [σ]′ = P [σ].
If an agent declares acceptance of an argument which is not yet present in the portrayal,
then the acceptance of the argument is noted, but the argument its lf is not added
to the portrayal’s system of arguments — if there is a delayedargument to come,
then it will be added when that happens. Note that the acceptance function isnot
automatically updated when constituent arguments are elaborated upon, because the
elaboration might not be one accepted by a given agent in its theory context. There
also exists the case in which an elaboration is declared invalid, whereupon the potential
argument might be acceptable, but not the elaboration (see §5.1.4).
5.4.11 Reconciliation
Thereconcile procedure precipitates the reconciliation of an agent’s portrayal instance
with its theory context as per Definition 4.10. In particular, the reconcile function
ensures that all arguments in a portrayal instance are present in some form within
an agent’s theory context before checking to see if it knows any suitable counter-
arguments:




Figure 5.15: Upon the addition of new arguments to the portrayal, each agent
must reconcile those arguments with its own beliefs, revising accepted argu-
ments if necessary and searching for any counter-arguments.
reconcile(P [σ],S) — Given a portrayal instanceP [σ] containing a set of unverified
arguments S, an agentσ in contextC should reconcileC with P , where:
• N is the set of all arguments〈Φ,α〉 ∈ S valid according toC for which
there exists no argumenta∈ C such that〈Φ,α〉 ⊑ a.
If N 6= /0, thenC should be revised:
1. R is the set of all argumentsb ∈ C such thatb ⊏ 〈Φ,α〉 for some argument
〈Φ,α〉 ∈ N.
2. Extend the argument space∆C of C to include the set
⋃
〈Φ,α〉∈N Φ as per
Definition 4.4.
3. Replace argumentsA in C with the potential expansion of(A /R)∪N into
∆C as per Definition 4.3 and recompute the accepted extensionEA of C .
4. If acc(σ) is not a potential restriction ofEA into the argument space∆P of
P (whereEA is the accepted extension ofC ), then invokeaccept(P [σ],S),
where S is the subset of the potential restrictionE ′ of EA into ∆P such that
if ϕ ∈ S, thenϕ ∈ P .
Regardless, invokeargue(P [σ]).
The reconcile procedure verifies whether or not any new arguments added to apor-
trayal have been considered privately by peers. If an agent encounters an argument not
represented within its theory context, then it should extend its hypothesis space in order
to account for the premises used by the argument, and then perform a potential expan-
sion of its private argument system so that the new argument is duly represented and its
influence on existing arguments is duly factored into its reasoning. If it then finds that
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it does not accept that argument, then it can prepare counter-arguments; if it concedes
the argument, then it should formally accept the argument within the portrayal.
Together with theargue predicate,reconcile defines the process by which it can be
ensured that a portrayal is reconciled with an agent’s theory c ntext as per Definition
4.10. As stated in §4.2 and proven by Proof 4.6, if all agents can reconcile a shared
system of arguments with their theory contexts, then the beliefs of those agents will
be synchronised within the argument space of that argument system (assuming that all
invalid arguments and attacks are removed, and that no accepted xtension of a theory
context is contradicted by any peer’s observations). If we can demonstrate that the
portrayal mechanism as described in this chapter will reconcile a portrayal with every
theory context used by an agent with an instance of the portrayal, then we can show
that agents beliefs will be synchronised by the act of constructing a portrayal.
In order to clarify what we need to demonstrate, we first reiteate Definition 4.10
with respect to interaction portrayals:
Definition 5.28 A portrayal instanceP [σ] with an argument space∆ is reconciled
with a theory contextC of agentσ if and only if:
• Every complete extension ofP [σ] given the theory coreΘ of C is a potential
restriction into∆ of an admissible extension ofC .
• There exists a potential restrictionE ′ of the accepted extensionEA of C into ∆
such thatE ′ is an admissible extension ofP givenΘ.
We will now demonstrate that pending additional updates to ap rtrayalP from other
peers, and other external changes to agentσ’s heory contextC , an agentσ which en-
acts predicatereconcile followed byargue will find that its (updated) portrayal instance
P [σ] is reconciled with its (revised) contextC :
Theorem 5.2 If, for any agentσ∈ Σ ofP , its portrayal instanceP [σ] is not reconciled
with its theory contextC , then the portrayal mechanism will continue to invoke the
reconcile andargue procedures until reconciliation is attained.
Proof 5.2 Assume that the portrayal instanceP [σ] of a portrayalP with argument
space∆ held by an agentσ is not reconciled with the theory contextC of σ. This
means that either:
1. There exists a complete extensionE ′ of P [σ] given theory coreΘ of C which is
not a potential restriction into∆ of an admissible extensionE of C .
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2. There does not exist a potential restrictionE ′ of the accepted extensionEA of C
into ∆ such thatE ′ is an admissible extension ofP givenΘ.
Consider each case in turn:
1. Consider the first case. By Definition 4.2, we can infer thatere is no admissible
extensionE of C where:
(a) For each argumenta∈ E ′, it is the case thata∈ ∆ of P anda⊑ b for some
argumentb ∈ E .
(b) For every argumentb ∈ E , if there exists no argumenta ∈ E ′ such that
a⊑ b, then there exists no argumentc∈ ∆ such thatc⊑ b.
Now consider each sub-case in turn:
(a) Every argumenta∈ E ′ is in P . If argumenta∈ P anda /∈ ∆ given theory
contextC , then:
• There must exist an elaborationb ∈ EA, whereEA is the accepted
extension ofC , such thata⊏ b, because procedurer concile ensures
that (non-strict) elaborations of arguments in a portrayalare always
added to an agent’s theory context, and ifa∈ P , buta /∈∆, thenb∈ EA
by the second criterion of Definition 5.2 (otherwise ifa∈ P thena∈ ∆
always).
• It must be the case thatc ⇁ b for some argumentc ∈ P , but c 6⇁ a,
unless there also exists an elaborationd ∈ Ea such thata⊏ d 6⊑ b and
c 6⇁ d (from the second criterion of Definition 5.2; the first and third
criteria are already fulfilled ifa ∈ P and a has not been dismissed
already as invalid).
• b ∈U , whereU is the unrejected argument set ofC (becauseEA⊆ U
by Definition 3.16), so functionargue will invoke anattack operation
attack(P [σ],c⇁ b); this will replacea with b in P , andb ∈ ∆.
Therefore after an invocation ofargue, for every (revised) argumenta ∈
E ′, it is the case thata ∈ ∆. Assume then that there exists no admissible
extensionE of C such that for each argumenta ∈ E ′, it is the case that
a⊑ b for some argumentb ∈ E . This indicates that either:
i. There is no argumentb∈ C such thata⊑ b for some argumenta∈ E ′.
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ii. There exists no set of arguments S⊆ A of C which for each argument
a∈ E ′ defends an argumentb ∈ C such thata⊑ b (recall Definition
3.7), and which is conflict-free (recall Definition 3.8).
As already observed, when predicatereconcile is invoked upon the insertion
of a new argumenta, if there is no argumentb ∈ C such thata⊑ b, then
reconcile adds an elaboration ofa to C — thus the portrayal mechanism
will rectify (i). As for (ii), we observe that if every set of arguments S which
defends an elaborationb of every argumenta∈E ′ is not conflict-free, then:
• For every set S, there must exist an attackc ⇁ b for some argument
c∈ S.
• If c ∈ U , whereU is the set of unrejected arguments inC , then an
invocation of predicateargue will insert an attackd ⇁ e, whered⊑ c
anda⊑ e⊑ b, at which pointa will no longer be withinP andE ′ will
no longer be a valid extension ofP (because it will include bothd and
e, and will no longer be conflict-free).
• If c∈ R , whereR is the set of rejected arguments inC , then either:
– ccan be dismissed given theory coreΘ of C as per Definition 3.15,
in which casea ∈ P can be dismissed (since upon invocation of
insert for a new argumentf, observe is invoked iff is dismissable
by Θ, elaboratingf if necessary).
– There must exist an argumentg ∈ EA, whereEA is the accepted
extension ofC , such thatg ⇁ c and an invocation of predicate
argue will thus invoke anattack operationattack(h ⇁ i), where
h⊑ g anda⊑ i ⊑ c.
In either case,a will no longer be withinP andE ′ will no longer be a
valid extension ofP .
Therefore if there is no admissible extensionE of C such that for each
argumenta∈ E ′, it is the case thata∈ ∆ of P anda⊑ b for some argument
b ∈ E , then either an admissible extensionE will be made inC , or E ′ will
be rendered inadmissible, upon which pointreconcile will be re-invoked
until stability is reached.
(b) Assume that there exists no admissible extensionE f C such that for every
argumentb ∈ E , if there exists no argumenta∈ E ′ such thata⊑ b, then
there exists no argumentc∈ ∆ such thatc⊑ b. This is easily rectified by
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inserting argumentc into portrayalP . If the argue predicate is invoked,
then such an argumentc shall be inserted intoP .
Therefore, if there exists a complete extensionE ′ of P [σ] given theory coreΘ of
C which is not a potential restriction into∆ of an admissible extensionE of C ,
then eitherE ′ will be made inadmissible, or arguments will be added toC such
that there exists an admissible extensionE as described.
2. Now consider the second case. Again by Definition 4.2, we can infer that there
is no potential restrictionE ′ into P where:
(a) For each argumenta∈ E ′, it is the case thata∈ ∆ of P anda⊑ b for some
argumentb ∈ E .
(b) For every argumentb ∈ E , if there exists no argumenta ∈ E ′ such that
a⊑ b, then there exists no argumentc∈ ∆ such thatc⊑ b.
Again, consider the two sub-cases:
(a) If a /∈ ∆ of P , thenP will be revised, as shown in the first part of this proof.
Moreover, we know that any argumentb ∈ E is also an argumentb ∈ U ,
and thus if there is no argumenta∈ P such thata⊑ b, then we know that
argue will insert such an argumenta into P .
(b) We know that any argumentc ∈ ∆ described as above will be added by
argue into P , ensuring that there exists an argumenta∈ P by examination
of step 1 ofargue, such thata⊑ b.
Thus it is easy to see that there will be a potential restrictionE ′ of the accepted
extensionE ofC . All that remains then is to show that such a potential restriction
E ′ is an admissible extension ofP . Assume otherwise. Either:
(a) E ′ is not conflict-free.
(b) There exists an argumenta∈ E ′ such thata is not defended byE ′.
If E ′ is not conflict-free, then there exists two argumentsa,b ∈ E ′ such thata⇁
b. By Theorem 4.1 however, ifa ⇁ b, then there exist two argumentsc,d ∈ E
such thata⊑ c, b⊑ d andc⇁ d. In that case,E is not valid accepted extension,
and should be changed. Likewise, ifa is not defended byE ′, then there exists an
argumente∈ P such thate⇁ a:
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• If there exists an argumentf ∈ C such thate⊑ f, then there must exist an
argumentg such thatg ⇁ f (otherwiseE does not defend againstf, and
is thus not a valid accepted extension ofC ). Because∆ of P is sufficiently
expressive (Theorem 5.1),argue will insert an argumenth into P such that
h ⇁ eandh⊑ g, removing the threat toa andE ′.
• If there exists no argumentf ∈ C such thate⊑ f, thenreconcile will add e to
C , such that accepted extensionE will have to be revised unless there exists
an argumentg as described just above, which will be added in potential
form byargue to P .
In any case, either an admissible extensionE ′ will be created inP , or accepted
extensionE in C will be rendered inadmissible.
Therefore, if the portrayal instanceP [σ] of a portrayalP with argument space∆ held
by an agentσ is not reconciled with the theory contextC of σ, then eitherP [σ] or C
or both will be modified until reconciliation holds.
It can be seen that the portrayal mechanism invokesreconcile whenever new informa-
tion is added to the portrayal, and thatargue is either invoked byreconcile, invoked by
extend arguments (upon the extension of the portrayal space as described in §5.3.2) or
invoked upon changes to the theory context in general, ensuring that moves towards
reconciliation are always made when appropriate.
The consequence of this is a mechanism by which the beliefs ofagents engaged
in interaction will inevitably move into synchrony in thoseareas related to the tasks at
hand. Irrelevant details are left alone until such time perhaps as they become impor-
tant for determining some constraint on some future interacion; attention is focused
entirely on inferences which might actually affect the outcme of portrayed interac-
tions at the present time. This is done through the lens of argumentation theory, where
we view the beliefs of an agent as a persistent argumentationprocess conducted by the
agent privately; the role of the interaction portrayal is topr vide a medium through
which such a private process can be efficiently influenced by the observations and as-
sertions of peers, which of course have their own private argument systems.
In summary, this chapter has specified in full the mechanism by which interaction
portrayals are constructed and maintained over the course of a pr tocol-driven interac-
tion of the sort described in Chapter 2. It has demonstrated how to construct a system
of arguments incrementally during dialogue, and has demonstrated how to deal with
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such complications as the addition of new peers to an interaction, the observation of
new empirical evidence and the introduction of invalid arguments and attacks as a con-
sequence of mismatches in the argumentation frameworks used by individual agents
to conduct argumentation. Furthermore, it has been shown that the resulting process
model ensures that reconciliation of agent beliefs will eventually happen within the
argument space of the resulting interaction portrayal.
However to really understand how dialogue might unfold within a group of agents
involved in a portrayed interaction, we need a more in-depthdemonstration of the
portrayal mechanism in action.

Chapter 6
A Demonstration of a Portrayed
Interaction
It will be recalled that our original motivation for this thesis’ contribution lies in a
desire to augment protocol-driven interactions. Specifically, we looked for a means
by which to permit the spontaneous generation of dialogue between agents such that
constraints on interaction could be discussed prior to their resolution. It was felt by
this means we could help ensure that agents made decisions inthe most enlightened
manner possible.
From the perspective of the designer of a functional agent system, such a mecha-
nism would offer two advantages. The first is that the protocols for interaction could
be kept as lightweight and generic as possible — the intuition being that there would
be no need to specify specific routines for discussing the properties of a given entity
if there was a generic means to generate discussion automatically. The second benefit
would be that the agents involved in interaction would be given an additional means to
disseminate information and test their beliefs against those of peers — agents would
naturally become better informed by the act of interaction,and groups of agents would
develop greater common ground.
This chapter concerns itself with demonstrating the portrayal mechanism in action.
In doing so, it is hoped that it is made more clear to the readerhow portraying inter-
action can prove useful in practice. We detail what might nowbe considered to be the
archetypical portrayed interaction, in which one agent acquires the patronage of an-
other in order to acquire some resource from a third agent. Wealso consider how the
interaction might unfold differently under different circumstances, and consider how
such an interaction might unfoldwithout the benefit of a portrayal.
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Figure 6.1: Alanna acquires Benjamin’s assistance in acquiring access to a
library from Charlotte.
6.1 An Archetypical Portrayal of Interaction
In Chapter 2 we described a simple interaction between threeag nts. In this interac-
tion the first agent (named Alanna) is able to acquire access to a privileged library by
petitioning the second agent (Benjamin) to recommend her tothe third agent (Char-
lotte), that third agent having some measure of control overth library in question. In
Chapters 3 and 5, we have referred to this interaction where it suited us to illustrate
elements of argumentation or interaction portrayal respectively. Now we revisit this
interaction in full, specifying in detail how the portrayalmechanism would augment it
so as to ensure the ‘best’ outcome under various conditions.
6.1.1 Premise and Protocol
Within a distributed system, we have an agent named Alanna. Alanna is assigned the
task of compiling a report on some topic of concern, but has observed that in order
to fulfil her objective, she needs some body of additional information (which we will
simply refer to asdata). This can be expressed easily enough by a logical proposition:
needs(alanna,data)
We shall assume that Alanna is able, by virtue of private inference (or possibly inter-
rogation of peers), to infer that there exists only one source of data, and that source is
the eponymous librarylibrary.1 Unfortunately,library is only accessible by a privileged
few, and Alanna is not one of them. Any attempt by Alanna to accessdata in library
will result in a refusal to reveal the requested information. Thus Alanna can easily
observe that:
1This system of inspired nomenclature will be applied throughout this chapter.
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¬accessible(alanna, library)
Since Alanna is unable to simply change this fact under her own power, Alanna must
enlist the assistance of peers who can.
As in any sufficiently complex society, there exist a number of established proto-
cols by which certain classes of interaction should be conducted. The established pro-
tocol in this system for acquiring access to a restricted resource is theacquire access
protocol described originally in Chapter 1. The LCC [Robertson, 2004] protocolac-
quire access allows an agent to acquire access to a privileged resource byhaving an
existing patron of that resource recommend it to one of the resource’s controllers. It
defines three roles:
Applicant — An agent acting in roleapplicant requests the advocacy of an existing
patron of a inaccessible resource. If the advocate accepts the applicant’s request
and the resource’s controller accepts the advocate’s recommendation, then suc-
cess is confirmed upon being able to access the resource:
a(applicant(Resource), Applicant) ::
request⇒ a(advocate(Resource), Advocate)
← ¬ accessible(Applicant, Resource) ∧ patron(Advocate, Resource) then
( fail← decline⇐ a(advocate(Resource), Advocate)
else
fail← reject⇐ a(controller(Resource), Controller )
else
succeed← permit⇐ a(controller(Resource), Controller ) ∧
accessible(Applicant, Resource) ).
Advocate — The agent designated theadvocate will present an applicant’s case to the
resource’s controller should it consider the applicant trustworthy:
a(advocate(Resource), Advocate) ::
request⇐ a(applicant(Resource), Applicant) then
( advocate(Applicant) ⇒ a(controller(Resource), Controller )
← controller(Controller, Resource) ∧ trustworthy(Applicant, access(Resource))
else
decline⇒ a(applicant(Resource), Applicant) ).
Controller — Thecontroller permits access to a resource only if an applicant is both
eligible and has been advocated by a peer it already trusts:
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a(controller(Resource), Controller ) ::
advocate(Applicant)⇐ a(advocate(Resource), Advocate) then
( permit(Applicant, access(Resource))
← controls(Controller, permissions(Resource)) ∧
trusts(Controller, Advocate) ∧ eligible(Applicant, access(Resource)) then
permit⇒ a(applicant(Resource), Applicant) )
else
reject⇒ a(applicant(Resource), Applicant) ).
As towhythis is the established protocol for such activity, there could be any number of
reasons. Perhaps there has been a history of agents abusing resources, and it has been
agreed by the controllers of those resources that new agentswill only be permitted
access if they have the support of an existing user. Perhaps te above protocol evolved
naturally from the tendency of applicants to ask for assistance from friendly peers, who
found the best way to assist if they already had access themselves was to simply ask
more powerful peers to grant the applicant the requested privileges. Perhaps it was
simply forced upon the system from on high. In any case, this protocol makes a good
exemplar for demonstrating portrayals for two reasons:
• The protocol is simple, but nottoosimple. In particular, the interaction requires
the coordination of three peers — two peers simply would not demonstrate well
how a portrayal serves as an intermediary between multiple agent theories, nor
would it sufficiently demonstrate the support for asynchronicity of the portrayal
mechanism specified in Chapter 5.
• The protocol is dependent on a number of high level, variablysubjective con-
straints which can be resolved in many different ways in manydifferent domains.
These constraints are therefore good examples of the kind ofconstraint for which
additional discussion between peers can have a significant benefit.
In any case, this interaction protocol is capable of granting Alanna her desire. The
consequent interaction can then be seen to have four basic parts:
1. Initiation of the interaction by Alanna, which includes etablishing the inac-
cessibility of the library and the selection of a patron (Benjamin) to act as her
advocate.
2. Benjamin taking on the role of Alanna’s advocate, which requires that Benjamin
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knows the library controller (Charlotte) and that he is satisfied that Alanna can
be trusted with access to the library.
3. Charlotte accepting Benjamin’s recommendation, which requires that Charlotte
indeed has control over the library, that Benjamin is trusted in his given role and
that Alanna is eligible to be granted access.
4. Confirmation of access granted, being dependent on a response by Charlotte and
an indication that the environment has changed in Alanna’s favour.
Without further delay, let us consider the start of interaction.
6.1.2 Initiating Interaction
The first thing Alanna needs to do is to initiate interaction (as per §2.3.1), selecting
protocolacquire access, associating herself with the role ofapplicant and associating
the resource in question withlibrary:
a(applicant(library), alanna) ::
request⇒ a(advocate(library), Advocate)
← ¬ accessible(alanna, library) ∧ patron(Advocate, library) then . . .
Alanna then needs only to satisfy the first pair of constraints before dispatching a mes-
sage to her chosen advocate. Let us briefly consider each propositi n in turn:
accessible(Agent, Resource) — accessible is an example of an objective predicate
which can typically be determined by direct observation on the part ofAgent
— as a result, we would expect that argumentation would be unncessary here,
especially in this case where the constraint will be resolved byAgent itself. Nev-
ertheless if interaction is successful, then we can expect th state of this propo-
sition to change, and a portrayal will internalise this and portray any relevant
consequences (see 6.1.4 below).
patron(Agent, Resource) — patron is an example of a domain-specific predicate which
may or may not be easy to determine. Essentially, we do not know what a ‘pa-
tron’ of a given resourceis in a generic sense; instead we rely on agents in a
given domain knowing for themselves. Such reliance is necessary for protocols
not tied to a specific problem domain.
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We designate Alanna’s beliefs as theoryΠA. The contextCA for ΠA can be described
by an argumentation process conducted within an assumption-based argumentation
framework(L , ⊢,∆)A, with a theory coreΘA (as per Definition 3.16). Let us assume
that fromCA, Alanna can construct the following accepted arguments such that the set
of supporting assumptions are all inΠA:
aA = 〈 { ¬accessible(alanna, library) }, ¬accessible(alanna, library) 〉
bA = 〈 { access(benjamin, library),
∀X,Y. access(X,Y)→ patron(X,Y) },
patron(benjamin, library) 〉
cA = 〈 { access(dante, library),
∀X,Y. access(X,Y)→ patron(X,Y) },
patron(dante, library) 〉
We justify argumentaA by observation — Alanna is able to directly determine that
library is inaccessible to her, and thus does not need to justify sucha laim further
(i.e.¬accessible(alanna, library) ∈ ΘA). ArgumentsbA andcA are standard arguments
based on the assumptions that Benjamin and Dante can accesslibrary and that any
agent which can access a resource is a patron of that resource— th se arguments have
proven to be admissible withinCA. Any counter-arguments that Alanna can conceive
within the argument space∆ of the argumentation framework withinCA have either
been defeated, or Alanna has simply chosenbA andcA over other, equally admissible
arguments — we will not concern ourselves with the precise details at this time.
At this point, in accordance with §5.2, Alanna can conceive an w portrayal focused
on the two propositions¬accessible(alanna, library) andpatron(X, library) (all other
constraints specified byacquire access require further development of the interaction
before they will be portrayed, not least the adoption of the rol s they are found in). Exe-
cutingconceive(CA,{¬accessible(alanna, library),patron(X, library)},P [alanna]) (as in
§5.2.2) will produce a portrayal instanceP [alanna] where:
• Σ = {alanna}
• ϒ = {¬accessible(alanna, library),patron(X, library)}
• A = {a′,b′,c′} (see below); there are no attacks between arguments inA .
• invA (alanna) = inv⇁(alanna) = obs(alanna) = /0.
• acc(alanna) = {a′,b′,c′}.
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The set of argumentsA of P [alanna] is the potential restriction of argumentsaA, bA
andcA into the argument space ofP (as per Definition 4.2). This results in a set of
trivial ‘identity’ arguments:
a′ = 〈 { ¬accessible(alanna, library) }, ¬accessible(alanna, library) 〉
b′ = 〈 { patron(benjamin, library) }, patron(benjamin, library) 〉
c′ = 〈 { patron(dante, library) }, patron(dante, library) 〉
We keep arguments simple because they might not be disputed —we wish to refrain
from argumentation which probably will not have effect on the outcome of interaction.
If more detail is required later, than we can elaborate upon arguments on demand. Of
course, there is always the possibility that despite being in apparent agreement about
the correct resolution of a constraint, more detailed examin tion of arguments will re-
veal cause for belief revision. We can only be certain that this is not the case however
by comparing the belief systems of agents in their entirety,which for real-world sys-
tems can be expected to be prohibitively expensive computationally. Pragmatically
though, we do not need such assurance — as long as the consequec s of portrayal are
in the worst caseequal to the case where no argumentation is performed at all,even
heavily restricted argumentation is adequate for our purposes.
Portrayals permit a sceptical agent to posit undecided arguments — this allows an
agent which prefers not to commit to controversial arguments to still critique the argu-
ments of peers even where it does not necessarily accept the atack either (otherwise
it will not always be possible to reconcile context with portrayal). Even at the point
of portrayal conception, a sceptical or uncertain agent canposit a set of arguments
which is not conflict-free with an aim to see how peers later respond. In Example 5.5,
we described an alternative to the above scenario in which agent Alanna posited an
additional argument into the portrayal:
d′ = 〈 { ¬patron(dante, library) }, ¬patron(dante, library) 〉
In this scenario, Alanna is able to infer both that Dante is and is not a patron oflibrary,
and is undecided as to which to accept. As such, she posits both arguments into the
portrayal and notes that they rebut — in doing so she invites peers to attack or accept
either assertion in the hope that evidence is provided sufficient to decide the matter to
her own satisfaction.
Whilst normally arguments in a new portrayal will be expressed as initially triv-
ially as possible, it is possible for initial portrayal arguments to begin in an already
partially elaborated state if there exists dispute betweenarguments. Imagine that in
CA, argumentbA above was expressed instead as follows:
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bA = 〈 { access(dante, library),
∀X,Y. access(X,Y)→ patron(X,Y),
patron(dante, library)→ patron(benjamin, library) },
patron(benjamin, library) 〉
If we also assume thatd′ is within P [alanna], thend′⇁ bA according toCA, butd′ 6⇁
b′. By Definition 5.2 (second criterion) then,b′ /∈ ∆, becauseb′ does not acknowledge
the necessary conflict with argumentd′ (however ifboth versions ofbA were inCA,
then b′ would be in ∆, because Alanna can claim that Benjamin is a patron of the
library without necessarily rejectingdA first). In this case, we would instead posit
argumentb′′ into P [alanna]:
b′′ = 〈 { patron(dante, library),
patron(dante, library)→ patron(benjamin, library) },
patron(benjamin, library) 〉
This would then give us a portrayal containing argumentsa′, b′′, c′ and d′, where
c′⇁ d′, d′⇁ c′ andd′⇁ b′′.
For the remainder of this example however, we shall assume that the original por-
trayal instanceP [alanna] specified earlier (without argumentdA or the alternativebA) is
the one used. In this case, Alanna can easily determine that¬accessible(alanna, library)
andpatron(benjamin, library), and will thus dispatch a messagerequest to Benjamin:
a(applicant(library), alanna) ::
c(request⇒ a(advocate(library), benjamin)) then . . .
This brings Benjamin into the interaction.
6.1.3 Establishing Advocacy
Let us assume then that Benjamin is inducted into the interaction in the role ofadvo-
cate. We can now produce a model for Benjamin’s contribution to dialogue:
a(advocate(library), benjamin) ::
request⇐ a(applicant(library), alanna) then
( advocate(alanna) ⇒ a(controller(library), Controller )
← controller(Controller, library) ∧ trustworthy(alanna, access(library))
else
decline⇒ a(applicant(library), alanna) ).
It befalls Benjamin to determine the controller oflibrary and the trustworthiness of
Alanna. Again, let us consider the available propositions:
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controller(Agent, Resource) — controller is another objective predicate which can in
most domains be determined by direct observation. The most likely complica-
tion is simply that a given agent might not be able to identifyAgent for itself and
may have to ask other peers.
trustworthy(Agent, Action) — trustworthy is a highly subjective predicate, the resolu-
tion of which is primarily subject to the preferences of the resolving agent. This
makes it an excellent candidate for portrayal — agents can state their basis for
consideringAgent to be trustworthy (or not) in the context ofAction and can
point out perceived flaws in each other’s reasoning. Becausethe predicate is so
subjective however, it is quite possible the end result of argumentation will be a
set of rebutting arguments all equally admissible — the finaldecision will then
lie with the agent assigned the proposition to satisfy. Nevertheless, there is still
value in laying out the different arguments and their internal assumptions, if only
for the information disseminated in doing so.
Before Benjamin can begin to examine the options available to him however, he must
establish his own portrayal instanceP [benjamin]. In accordance with §5.3.1, Alanna
will send a copy ofP [alanna] to Benjamin alongside messagerequest; Benjamin will
then invokevalidate(P [benjamin]) (whereP [benjamin] = P [alanna]). For each argu-
ment in the portrayal, Benjamin will check three things:
1. Does the argument conflict with Benjamin’s observations?
2. Is the argument logically invalid?
3. Are the attacks associated with the argument logically inval d?
Since the portrayal is that this point very simple, the answer to all three questions is
no for all arguments. Benjamin can proceed then to invokereconcile(P [benjamin],A ),
whereA is the set of arguments inP .
The role of thereconcile procedure (§5.4.11) is to check the arguments in a por-
trayal with the private arguments an agent can conceive within its own theory context,
and to trigger further argumentation. The first thing to do isto extract the arguments
in P which arenot represented in Benjamin’s beliefs — in this case, only argument
a′. Having found such an argument, Benjamin’s theory contextCB is then revised
accordingly:
• R is the set of all argumentsb ∈ CB such thatb ⊏ a′ — in this caseR= /0.
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• The argument space∆ of CB is extended to include¬accessible(alanna, library)
as per Definition 4.4 — in this case, this merely entails adding the proposition to
the set of hypotheses from which arguments can be constructed.
• A in CB is replaced with the potential expansionA ∪ {a′} into (the extended)
∆ as per Definition 4.3 — in this case, this merely entails adding a′ to A , and
factoring in any conflicts (of which there are none).
Benjamin must then establish which arguments he currently accepts. It can be seen
thatacc(benjamin) = {a′,b′,c′}, just as for Alanna; thus ther concile procedure will
executeaccept(P [benjamin],{a′,b′,c′}) (specified in §5.4.10) which will update the
acceptance functionacc in all portrayal instances. Operationaccept will be invoked
whenever an agent finds itself forced to change its beliefs during reconciliation.
Benjamin must now invokeargue(P [benjamin]) (§5.4.1). In this scenario, Ben-
jamin accepts all of Alanna’s arguments so far, but is able toposit an additional argu-
ment:
d′ = 〈 { patron(eliza, library) }, patron(eliza, library) 〉
Argumentd′ seems rather extraneous. After all, the constraint to whichit is attached
has already been resolved. This illustrates a difficulty in the design of the portrayal
mechanism — at which point should an agent stop making suggestions? After all, if
this interaction fails, Alanna might wish to try again with adifferent patron, at which
point knowledge of additional patrons might be very useful.It may also be possible in
some interaction protocols to backtrack, and try differentsolutions as they emerge.2 In
many practical circumstances however, there is probably a limit to how many different
instances of a proposition should be suggested within a portrayal — but the exact
determination of this limit is really a matter for the individual implementation, since
considered in the abstract, any limit would be arbitrary. For this thesis, we err on the
side of permissiveness.
Now that there is more than one agent in the interaction, any changes to the por-
trayal must be communicated to all peers. Theposit operation (§5.4.2) is used to
dispatch a messageposit(d′) to Alanna, who then invokesinsert to insert the argument
into P [alanna]. insert acts just asvalidate, but for single arguments; thus it also en-
actsreconcile, thenargue. In this case, Alanna has nothing further to add, and merely
responds by acceptingd′ into acc(alanna).
2LCC by default doesnot allow this, but can be extended to do so [Osman, 2003].
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Having acquired and updatedP [benjamin], Benjamin can now attend to his own
role in interaction. Having adopted theadvocate role, Benjamin must re-portray his
role so as to identify any new portrayable propositions (as per §5.3) — Benjamin will
need to invokeextend space(P [benjamin],{controller(X, library), trustworthy(alanna,
access(library))}).
extend space works by sending a message to all peers, permitting them to imme-
diately start making arguments regarding the given proposition . In this case, Alanna
can make the following argument withinCA:






∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬beneficial(X,abuse(Y))→ trustworthy(X,Y) },
trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
. . . and so Alanna canposit argumente′ in P :
e′ = 〈 { trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) }, trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
Meanwhile, Benjamin can make the following arguments inCB:
fB = 〈 { controller(charlotte, library) }, controller(charlotte, library) 〉
gB = 〈 { abused(alanna,access(laboratory)),
analogous(access(laboratory),access(library)),
∀X,Y,Z. abused(X,Y)∧ analogous(Y,Z)→¬trustworthy(X,Z) },
¬trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
Thus Benjamin asserts the following intoP :
f′ = 〈 { controller(charlotte, library) }, controller(charlotte, library) 〉
g′ = 〈 { ¬trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) }, ¬trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
Both peers now have to reconcile the other’s argument(s). Upon reception ofe′, Ben-
jamin determines thate′ is potentially another argument inCB:
eB = 〈 { postdoc(alanna),
∀X. postdoc(X)→ researcher(X),
¬beneficial(alanna,abuse(access(library))),
∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬beneficial(X,abuse(Y))→ trustworthy(X,Y) },
trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
This argument is attacked withinCB however by yet another argument:
hB = 〈 { ¬∃X. research topic(alanna,X),
∀X. researcher(X)→∃Y. research topic(X,Y) },
¬researcher(alanna) 〉
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Thus, when Benjamin invokesargue(P [benjamin]), he will as a consequence invoke
attack(P [benjamin],h′⇁ e′′) (§5.4.4), introducing the following arguments intoP :
e′′ = 〈 { researcher(alanna),
¬beneficial(alanna,abuse(access(library))),
∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧¬beneficial(X,abuse(Y))→ trustworthy(X,Y) },
trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
h′ = 〈 { ¬researcher(alanna) }, ¬researcher(alanna) 〉
When Alanna receives messageattack(h′ ⇁ e′′), she executesinsert(P [alanna],e′′),
insert(P [alanna],h′) andinsert attack(P [alanna],h′⇁ e′′) in turn:
• Upon invokinginsert(P [alanna],e′′), argumente′ in P [alanna] will be replaced
by e′′, sincee′ ⊏ e′′. Becausee′′ is still potentially argumenteA within CA, rec-
onciliation is trivial; becauseA is accepted withinCA, no counter-argument is
made.
• Upon invokinginsert(P [alanna],h′), argumenth′ is inserted intoP [alanna]. Ar-
gumenth′ can be refuted by observation however (Alanna knows that sheis a
researcher), so Alanna invokesobserve(P [alanna], researcher(alanna)) (§5.4.6).
• Upon invokinginsert attack(P [alanna],h′⇁ e′′), Alanna ensures thath′ ⇁ e′′
is established inP [alanna]. Alanna also checks thath′ ⇁ e′′ is a valid attack
according toCA (it is, even if Alanna rejectsh′).
The effect ofobserve(P [alanna], researcher(alanna)) is to send a message to Benjamin
to the effect thatresearcher(alanna) ∈ ΘA. Benjamin can then choose to either treat
researcher(alanna) as part of his own theory coreΘB, or treat it as an influence on
his own preferences when interpreting the arguments withinCB. In this case, Ben-
jamin takes the viewpoint that Alanna is a sincere, competent agent, and shall add
researcher(alanna) to ΘB.
It might be wondered why an attackerpresumesthe elaboration of a given defend-
ing argument rather than asking for an elaboration from the original positing agent.
Basically, this approach reduces the amount of dialogue between peers (no need to
ask for elaboration before attack), and solves the problem of determininghow far to
elaborate upon a given argument. Imagine an argument which,w t in an agent’s the-
ory context, involves a substantial chain of inference frombase premises to the final
claim. Given a potential argument and a request for elaboration, how does an agent
determine the extent to which it lays out its reasoning? For substantial examples, a full
elaboration may be cumbersome and invite a lot of dispute that perhaps will have no
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effect on the final result. There may also be considerable variation between how agents
infer their beliefs from base premises despite general agreement as to end conclusions;
in an open system, the existence of a shared protocol suggests a common ontology
for explicit constraints, but that shared ontology may decay the further agents examine
each other’s reasoning. Using incremental elaboration maysimply lead to an agent
being requested multiple times to elaborate upon an argument. Si ce for synchroni-
sation an agent need only elaborate upon claims which another agent is certain can
only be made using certain assumptions which it can itself attack, we can choose an
aggressive form of elaboration whereupon an attacker presum and a defender either
concedes, counters or provides an alternative explanation; this will exhibit incomplete
behaviour as far as finding every way that one agent’s beliefscan attack another’s,
but would still provide ample opportunity for improving theoutcome of interaction in
many situations.
Concurrent to Benjamin receiving argument′, Alanna receives argumentsf′ and
g′. Alanna acceptsf′ without question, but disputesg′. Within CA, argumentg′ is
potentially another argument:
gA = 〈 { ∃X. abused(alanna,access(X)),
∀X,Y. trustworthy(X,access(Y))→¬∃Z. abused(X,access(Z)) },
∀X. ¬trustworthy(alanna,access(X)) 〉
Alanna can defeat this argument with another:
iA = 〈 { ∀X. ¬evidence(alanna,abuse(access(X))),
∀X,Y. abused(X,Y)→ evidence(X,abuse(Y)) },
¬∃X. abused(alanna,access(X)) 〉
Thus, when Alanna invokesargue(P [alanna]), she will introduce argumentsg′′ andi′
into P :
g′′ = 〈 { ∃X. abused(alanna,access(X)),
∀X,Y. trustworthy(X,access(Y))→¬∃Z. abused(X,access(Z)) },
∀X. ¬trustworthy(alanna,access(X)) 〉
i′ = 〈 { ¬∃X. abused(alanna,access(X)) }, ¬∃X. abused(alanna,access(X)) 〉
Upon receiving messageattack(i′⇁ g′′):
• Benjamin will replaceg′ with g′′ in P [benjamin]. However becauseg′′ 6⊑ gB,
argumentg′′ will be inserted intoCB as a new argument (courtesy ofreconcile)
and Benjamin will invokeposit(P [benjamin], j ′) (courtesy ofargue), wherej ′
is a slightly more explicated re-iteration of Benjamin’s original objection (see
below).
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• Benjamin will inserti′ into P [benjamin] and intoCB; upon reconcilingi′ with
CB, Benjamin realises thati′ ⇁ j ′, and so invokesattack(P [benjamin], i′⇁ j ′)
and revises his beliefs accordingly.
• Benjamin will establish thati′⇁ g′′ in P [benjamin].
Whilst Benjamin concedes that validity of Alanna’s attack on argumentg′, Benjamin
still has a rebuttal fore. This is argumentj ′:
j ′ = 〈 { abused(alanna,access(laboratory)),
analogous(access(laboratory),access(library)),
∀X,Y,Z. abused(X,Y)∧ analogous(Y,Z)→¬trustworthy(X,Z) },
¬trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) 〉
Whereasj ′ would originally have been too detailed for the argument space ∆ of P ,
the elaboration ofg′ into an argument no longer representative of Benjamin’s private
beliefs means that nowj ′ ∈ ∆. However, argumentj ′ is already attacked byi′ in P ,
which Benjamin realises when he integratesi′ into his own beliefs. Thus Benjamin is
forced to follow up on his positing ofj ′ with the admission thati′⇁ j ′ — if he does
not do this, Alanna will do it instead (in fact, Alanna might do it anyway if there is a
significant gap between receivingj ′ and notification thati′⇁ j ′, at which point each
agent would receive the other’s attack notification to no consequence).
Thus at this point we have a portrayalP , where for both instancesP [alanna] and
P [benjamin]:
• Σ = {alanna,benjamin}.
• ϒ = {¬accessible(alanna, library),patron(X1, library),controller(X2, library),
trustworthy(alanna,access(library)}.
• A = {a′,b′,c′,d′,e′′, f′,g′′,h′, i′, j ′}, wheree′′⇁ g′′, e′′⇁ j ′, g′′⇁ e′′, h′⇁ e′′,
i′⇁ g′′, i′⇁ j ′ andj ′⇁ e′′.
• invA (alanna] = invA [benjamin) = /0.
• inv⇁(alanna] = inv⇁[benjamin) = /0.
• obs(alanna) = {researcher(alanna)} andobs(benjamin) = /0.
• acc(alanna) = acc(benjamin) = {a′,b′,c′,d′,e′′, f′, i′}.







Figure 6.2: The accepted interpretation of the system of arguments within
the interaction portrayal of §6.1.3.
Assuming that Benjamin dismisses argumenth′ on the basis thatresearcher(alanna) ∈
ΘA (essentially addingresearcher(alanna) to ΘB), then both agents accept argument
e′, which means that both agents accept thatrustworthy(alanna,access(library)). If
Benjamin had not dismissedh′, then Benjamin would have rejected′. Moreover, if
Benjamin had been able to attacki′, or if Benjamin had another argument by which it
could claim that¬trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) that was not attacked byi′, then
Benjamin would have accepted that claim instead.
Given the portrayalP above however, and assuming that the declared accepted
extension ofP reflects the accepted beliefs of Benjamin, then Benjamin will unfold
his role in interaction as follows:
a(advocate(library), benjamin) ::
c(request⇐ a(applicant(library), alanna)) then
c(advocate(alanna) ⇒ a(controller(library), charlotte)).
If Benjamin had decided that¬trustworthy(alanna,access(library)), or even if Ben-
jamin found himself unable to decide eithertrustworthy(alanna,access(library)) or
¬trustworthy(alanna,access(library)) (i.e. Benjamin simply did not know which was
true), then Benjamin would instead have unfolded his role ininteraction as so:
a(advocate(library), benjamin) ::
c(request⇐ a(applicant(library), alanna)) then
c(decline⇒ a(applicant(library), alanna)).
At which point Alanna would receive the messagedecline from Benjamin, forcing her
to bring interaction to a close having failed to acquire access tolibrary. In either case,
this brings an end to Benjamin’s role in interaction — as specified in §5.3.4, Benjamin
will indicate the completion of his role to his peers. Benjamin ay still contribute to
the portrayal, but once all agents have finished their roles,th interaction will end and
the portrayal will be disposed of.
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6.1.4 Granting Permission
Let us assume that Benjamindid consider Alanna to be worthy of trust. In this case,
Benjamin recommends Alanna to Charlotte, the accepted controller of access tolibrary.
As controller, Charlotte has the right to accept or reject Alanna’s application:
a(controller(library), charlotte) ::
advocate(alanna) ⇐ a(advocate(library), benjamin) then
( permit(alanna, access(library))
← controls(charlotte, permissions(library)) ∧
trusts(charlotte, benjamin) ∧ eligible(alanna, access(library)) then
permit⇒ a(applicant(library), alanna) )
else
reject⇒ a(applicant(library), alanna) ).
If Charlotte is indeed able to manipulate permissions forlibrary, and if Charlotte trusts
Benjamin, then Alanna will be granted permission to accesslibrary provided that she
is eligible. Once more, we look at the propositions to be satisfied:
controls(Agent, Configuration) — controls is an objective predicate used in this proto-
col to confirm thatAgent has the power to fulfil its role, essentially verifying the
satisfaction of thecontroller predicate earlier.
trusts(Agent1, Agent2) — trusts is an abstract predicate which is sensitive to the con-
text in which it is invoked. In particular,trusts is distinguished from the predicate
trustworthy in that rather than establishing thesuitability for trust in a given con-
text, trusts merely confirms that trust has already been given. In this case, the
role of this proposition is to confirm that the agent in the role f advocate has
the influence to recommend theapplicant agent in the first place. Yet again, the
details are left out of the predicate and left to the discretion of individual agents.
eligible(Agent, Action) — eligible is an objective predicate which could be primarily
based on the nature ofAgent or on the nature ofAction depending on the domain
in which it is invoked.
Charlotte enters the interaction upon reception of the messageadvocate(alanna), and
is such is accorded by Benjamin her own portrayal instanceP [ harlotte]. This instance
is identical to that of Benjamin’s at the time of induction. Simultaneously, Alanna is
informed of Charlotte’s presence, ensuring that all futureportrayal updates are duly
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delivered to all three agents. Charlotte can now articulateher own arguments in re-
sponse to the arguments already within the portrayal — for alacrity, let us assume that
Charlotte finds all existing arguments to be at least admissible.
Alanna, Benjamin and Charlotte can now portray the constraints on Charlotte’s role
in interaction. Charlotte immediately makes the followingar uments:
k ′ = 〈 { controls(charlotte,permissions(library)) },
controls(charlotte,permissions(library)) 〉
l′ = 〈 { trusts(charlotte,benjamin) }, trusts(charlotte,benjamin) 〉
m′ = 〈 { certified(alanna),
¬at capacity(library),
∀X,Y. certified(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→ eligible(X,access(Y)) },
eligible(alanna,access(library)) 〉
n′ = 〈 { ¬certified(alanna) }, ¬certified(alanna) 〉
o′ = 〈 { certified(alanna) }, certified(alanna) 〉
Charlotte herself accepts argumentsk′ and l′, but is undecided about argumentm′,
being uncertain as to the truth of the propositioncertified(alanna). This uncertainty is
represented by the rebutting argumentsn′ ando′.3
Alanna and Benjamin both accept argumentsk′ and l′ without dispute. The two
agents must also reconcile argumentsm′, n′ ando′ with their beliefs. FromCA, Alanna
can construct the following elaboration of′:
o′′ = 〈 { employed(alanna,edinburgh),
backing(alanna,edinburgh),
∀X. employed(X,Y)∧backing(X,Y)→ certified(X) },
certified(alanna) 〉
This argument can also be integrated intom′:




∀X,Y. certified(X)∧¬at capacity(Y)→ eligible(X,access(Y)) },
eligible(alanna,access(library)) 〉
In response to this, Benjamin makes argumentp′:
p′ = 〈 { ¬backing(alanna,edinburgh) }, ¬backing(alanna,edinburgh) 〉
3The obvious question is why we have a separate argumento rather than acknowledge that accep-
tance of argumentm attacksn. This is a limitation of the particular formulation of assumption-based
argumentation used in Chapter 3 — in particular the notion ofattack used. Other formulations are
possible which do not produce such extraneous arguments, atthe cost of more complex definitions.
The important thing to note is that the particular choice of assumption-based argumentation framework
makes no difference to the portrayal mechanism as specified in Chapter 5, nor does it affect the critical
definitions of synchronisation (4.8), sufficient expressivity (4.9) and reconciliation (4.10).
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Assume that due to communication delays, Benjamin receivesargumento′′ beforeo′.
In such a circumstance, Benjamin would inserto′′ into P [benjamin] as a new argu-
ment rather than an elaboration, ensuring that Benjamin need do nothing upon finally
receivingo′ (see §5.4.2).
In any case, upon invokingreconcile, Charlotte finds that she can counter Ben-
jamin’s objection with a final argumentq′ — this is an example of an argument which
Charlotte had not associated with arguments foreligible(alanna,access(library)) before,
having not previously linkedbacking(X,Y) with certified(X):
q′ = 〈 { researcher(alanna),
employed(alanna,edinburgh),
∀X,Y. researcher(X)∧ employed(X,Y)→ backing(X,Y) },
backing(alanna,edinburgh) 〉
Assuming that this is sufficient to reconcile all agents’ beliefs with portrayalP , each
updated portrayal instance will contain the following:
• Σ = {alanna,benjamin}.
• ϒ = {¬accessible(alanna, library),patron(X1, library),controller(X2, library),
trustworthy(alanna,access(library),controls(charlotte,permissions(library)),
trusts(charlotte,benjamin),eligible(alanna,access(library))}.
• A = {a′,b′,c′,d′,e′′, f′,g′′,h′, i′, j ′,k′, l′,m′′,n′,o′′,p′,q′}, wheree′′⇁ g′′,
e′′⇁ j ′, g′′⇁ e′′, h′⇁ e′′, h′⇁ q′, i′⇁ g′′, i′⇁ j ′, j ′⇁ e′′, n′⇁ m′′, n′⇁ o′′,
o′′⇁ n′, p′⇁ m′′, p′⇁ o′′ andq′⇁ p′.
• invA (alanna | benjamin | charlotte) = /0.
• inv⇁(alanna | benjamin | charlotte) = /0.
• obs(alanna) = {researcher(alanna)} andobs(benjamin | charlotte) = /0.
• acc(alanna | benjamin | charlotte) = {a′,b′,c′,d′,e′′, f′, i′,m′′,o′′,q′}.
In this case argumentsn′ ando′′ are equally admissible, but the agents have all de-
cided to favouro′′ (probably becauseo′′ has more substantive reasoning behind it;n′
is not conclusively defeated however). Charlotte thus unfolds her role in interaction as
follows:
a(controller(library), charlotte) ::
c(advocate(alanna) ⇐ a(advocate(library), benjamin)) then
c(permit(alanna, access(library))) then
c(permit⇒ a(applicant(library), alanna)).










Figure 6.3: The accepted interpretation of the system of arguments within
the interaction portrayal of §6.1.4.
Charlotte is required to perform the actionpermit(alanna,access(library)). As one
might expect, the effect of this action is to change the enviro ment such that Alanna
can accesslibrary. This will affect Alanna’s observations. Thus Alanna will have
to executeobserve(P [alanna],{accessible(alanna, library)}), which will result in the
immediate dismissal of argumenta′ and the creation of argumentr ′ in its stead, where
r ′⇁ a′ (and vice versa):
r ′ = 〈 { accessible(alanna, library) }, accessible(alanna, library) 〉
The articulation ofr ′ is dictated becauser ′ ∈ ∆ (i.e. Alanna no longer rejects the claim
of r ′, and r ′ supports a portrayable proposition in the portrayal). We can also ex-
pect that Charlotte will observeaccessible(alanna, library) independently, being clearly
within her competence to do so (it being a consequence of her actions). This will affect
the declared accepted arguments within portrayalP , removinga′ and insertingr ′.
Meanwhile, with the dispatch of messagep rmit, control returns to Alanna. If
Charlotte grants permission to Alanna, then Alanna should be able to confirm this by
observation in her own role:
a(applicant(library), alanna) ::
c(request⇒ a(advocate(library), benjamin)) then
succeed← permit⇐ a(controller(library), charlotte) ∧ accessible(alanna, library).
Confirmation is obtained by re-evaluating the propositionaccessible(alanna, library).










Figure 6.4: An alternative accepted interpretation of the system of argu-
ments within the interaction portrayal of §6.1.4 from the perspective of agent
Charlotte.
6.2 Alternative Outcomes
In the preceding description of interaction portrayal, theevaluation of the portrayal
executed very cleanly, with a common consensus as to the end result. However a
number of other (valid) outcomes could have transpired. Forinstance:
• If Charlotte had not accepted Alanna’s observation thatresearcher(alanna), then
argumenth′ would not have been dismissed, and not only would Charlotte hav
not accepted thattrustworthy(alanna,access(library)), but Charlotte would also
have had to rejecteligible(alanna,access(library)) as well (unless additional argu-
ments to defend argumentm′′ could be constructed by any of the three available
agents). The former would not be so bad for Alanna, because Benjamin would
have already made his decision, and Charlotte had put her trust in Benjamin, but
the latter would have led Charlotte to reject Alanna’s application.
• Similarly, if Charlotte had chosen to acceptn′ instead ofo′′, Charlotte would
again have rejected Alanna’s application.
• Alternatively, if Charlotte had been able to posit an argument d feating argument
e′′ such that Alanna could not be determined as trustworthy based on the current
evidence, this wouldnot have necessarily affected the outcome of interaction
(Benjamin having already made his commitment earlier), butcould provide a
basis for Benjamin to reject requests from Alanna in future,o even to begin a
new interaction to retract Alanna’s newly acquired access.
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Another thing not illustrated in the prior example is invalid argumentation. All argu-
ments posited above were complete insofar as the claim couldbe educed from the
supporting assumptions, which is quite reasonable for basic examples. In more com-
plex cases, we might want to drop certain ‘commonly known’ domain rules from ar-
guments, assuming that such rules are included in the logical frameworks of all agents
[Hunter, 2007]. If such a presumption is in error however, there may be posited argu-
ments which are uninterpretable by peers. For example, recall argumentg′′:
g′′ = 〈 { ∃X. abused(alanna,access(X)),
∀X,Y. trustworthy(X,access(Y))→¬∃Z. abused(X,access(Z)) },
∀X. ¬trustworthy(alanna,access(X)) 〉
Perhaps Alanna (the positing agent) thinks that∀X,Y. trustworthy(X,access(Y))→
¬∃Z. abused(X,access(Z)) is common knowledge. Thus she might instead posit the
following:
g′′ = 〈 { ∃X. abused(alanna,access(X)) },
∀X. ¬trustworthy(alanna,access(X)) 〉
If Benjamin does not recognise the missing rule, then Benjamin would go on to invoke
dismiss(P [benjamin],g′′) (§5.4.8), and addg′′ to invA (benjamin). Benjamin would
thennot replaceg′ (which is valid to Benjamin) with elaborationg′′ and argumentg′
would not be attacked byi′, and sog′ would not be rejected from Benjamin’s perspec-
tive. Benjamin would still attacke′′ with argumentj ′ and notice thati′ attackedj ′,
but Benjamin would still reject argumente′ on the basis ofg′. Alanna could however
prevent this by invokingexpand(P [alanna],g′′,g′′′), which would replaceg′′ with g′′′
(which would be identical to the originalg′′) — this would lead to the same outcome
described in the previous section.
An important question though is what would have happened in this scenario if no
portrayal had been used. This can be determined quite easilyby looking at the initial
arguments posited by agents immediately after each expansion of the portrayal argu-
ment space. The first disputed proposition wastrustworthy(alanna,access(library)).
Alanna posited argumente′ for, and Benjamin posited argumentg′ against. The com-
bination of arguments involving Alanna and Benjamin ultimately supported Alanna’s
trustworthiness. In this respect the use of a portrayal aided Alanna — without a por-
trayal Alanna would have been immediately rejected on the assumption that Alanna
has abused trust in the past. Of course, the validity of Benjami ’s revised belief de-
pends on Alanna’s sincerity; the portrayal mechanism offers no inherent protection
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against deceptive peers, merely collating evidence. If Benjamin (as an intelligent, au-
tonomous entity) had reason to doubt Alanna’s testimony, then Benjamin could have
drawn his conclusions in spite of the portrayal, but this is beyond the concerns of this
thesis.
The other contentious proposition waseligible(alanna,access(library)). In this case,
Charlotte illustrated her uncertainty with argumentsm′, n′ ando′, effectively inviting
her peers to produce conclusive evidence. If we pretend thatBenjamin did consider
Alanna to be trustworthy even without the portrayal, then Alanna would still have met
failure, because Charlotte would have been undecided abouther eligibility and thus
would have been forced to reject Alanna’s application.
Naturally, the portrayal can go the other way; perhaps Benjami and Charlotte
could have been very receptive to Alanna’s application, butupon using the portrayal to
compare beliefs, they would have been led to reject Alanna.
A final consideration; what if instead of using the portrayalmechanism, we simply
revised theacquire access protocol to do what we just did with a portrayal? In answer,
consider how we might revise theadvocate role. In acquire access, we specified the
obligations of an advocate as so:
a(advocate(Resource), Advocate) ::
request⇐ a(applicant(Resource), Applicant) then
( advocate(Applicant)⇒ a(controller(Resource), Controller )
← controller(Controller, Resource) ∧ trustworthy(Applicant, access(Resource))
else
decline⇒ a(applicant(Resource), Applicant) ).
In order to replicate the dialogue that naturally arises from the interaction portrayal of
§6.1.3, we would have to specifyadvocate as so:
a(advocate(Resource), Advocate) ::
request⇐ a(applicant(Resource), Applicant) then
( query(researcher) ⇒ a(applicant(Resource), Applicant)
← ¬ beneficial(Applicant, abuse(access(Resource))) then
a(interrogator(Actions, access(Resource), Applicant), Advocate)
← potential abuses(Applicant, Actions) then
( advocate(Applicant)⇒ a(controller(Resource), C)
← pass⇐ a(interrogator( , access(Resource), Applicant), Advocate)
else
decline⇒ a(applicant(Resource), Applicant)
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← fail⇐ a(interrogator( , access(Resource), Applicant), Advocate) )
else
decline⇒ a(applicant(Resource), Applicant) )← controller(C, Resource).
This role model sacrifices the generality of therustworthy predicate, instead determin-
ing specifically whether there is any benefit in the applicantabusing access to the given
resource before checking to see whether the applicant is a rese rcher. It then demands
that the advocate assume a new role asinterrogator in order to check for prior abuses
by the applicant which might undermine the presumption of the applicant’s trustwor-
thiness. This means that we also have to specify the role ofinterrogator. We can define
a base case where there are no prior actions to check:
a(interrogator( /0, access(Resource), ), Interrogator ) ::
pass⇒ a(advocate(Resource), Interrogator ).
We also define a step case where the interrogator challenges the defender (the appli-
cant in this scenario) to provide an explanation for any analogous acts which might
demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness as regards accessingthe particular resource in
question:
a(interrogator([ Action | Actions ], access(Resource), Defender ), Interrogator ) ::
challenge(Action)⇒ a(defender, Defender )
← analogous(Action, access(Resource)) then
response(Counter ) ⇐ a(defender, Defender ) then
( a(interrogator(Actions, access(Resource), Defender ), Interrogator )
← ¬ applicable(Action, access(Resource), Counter )
else
fail⇒ a(advocate(Resource), Interrogator ) ).
If the defender is unable to explain away any given action, then the interrogator will
decline to advocate it. Of course, we also need a specification for defender, which
actually tries to produce such explanations:
a(defender, Defender ) ::
challenge(Action)⇐ a(interrogator(Actions, Comparison, Defender ),
Interrogator ) then
( response(Counter ) ⇒ a(interrogator(Actions, Comparison, Defender ),
Interrogator )
← ¬ applicable(Action, Comparison, Counter )
else
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response(null)⇒ a(interrogator(Actions, Comparison, Defender ),
Interrogator ) ).
These role models (in combination with the other parts ofacquire access) are signifi-
cantly more complex than the simpleadvocate model used in tandem with the portrayal
mechanism. Furthermore, they demonstrate additional probems:
• The revised models are more domain-specific than the genericmodel. They
assume that trustworthiness is based on the applicant’s staus as a researcher
(perhaps valid for a library, but not for other resources) and lack of detectable
benefit in abusing trust. They also assume that this trustworthiness is undermined
by analogous instances of abuse.
• The revised models only provide a single procedure for determining trustworthi-
ness. The applicant has to confirm their status as a researcher, but the advocate
decides independently whether or not there is any benefit in the applicant abus-
ing trust. The applicant then has to defend itself as regardspast behaviour that
the advocate is aware of. It is possible to change the burden of pro f of course,
but any given configuration will trade one set of problems foranother.
• Despite being a more explicit protocol for the specific problem case described in
previous sections, the actual constraints imposed arelessclear than the generic
originals. Whilst a predicate liketrustworthy is both abstract and subjective, it is
easier to identify what the predicate is evaluating than a predicate likeapplicable,
which here is used to compare one action to another in light ofa given ‘counter’
— only in a system with a very well-defined single ontology cansuch a predicate
be used with any reasonable expectation that agents will be able to correctly
interpret any resulting proposition.
This illustrates theotherway by which we might consider the contribution of this the-
sis. On the one hand, we have a mechanism by which interactions can be augmented
with additional unstructured dialogue based on a well-defined formal model (the syn-
chronisation of beliefs within a shared argument space). Onthe other hand, we have a
justification for simpler, more generically-applicable interaction protocols.
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6.3 Implementation Requirements
Interaction portrayals operate in the intersection of multi-agent coordination and agent-
based defeasible reasoning. Any implementation of the portrayal mechanism specified
in Chapter 5 is wholly dependent on the implementation of these two things. In the case
of multi-agent coordination, a functional system for deploying and executing agent
interaction protocols in a distributed environment is required. In the case of agent-
based defeasible reasoning, for each agent a knowledge baseand an inference engine
capable of abductive (and perhaps inductive) reasoning is required; this machinery
must then be comprehensible as an argumentation process such that we can then extract
concrete arguments which can then be mapped into the argument space of a portrayal.
In the context of these systems, the portrayal mechanism itself s relatively simple,
its theoretic properties being the significant point of interest (hence the focus of this
thesis).
The deployment and execution of agent interactions is perhas the simplest com-
ponent of an implementation to deal with, insofar as existing systems can be exploited.
For LCC, the Open Knowledge system [Siebes et al., 2007] can be used, for example.
For simulation purposes, an LCC interpreter [Robertson, 2004, Robertson et al., 2008]
can be implemented easily in any programming language (Prolog is particularly suit-
able). Any simulated environment must support distinct autonomous agents (or ab-
stractions thereof), and must support extensions to the corc ordination mechanism
to support the inclusion of the portrayal mechanism (this would be the most obvious
issue with using an off-the-shelf platform).
The modelling of agents themselves may be more difficult. Interaction portrayals
are conceived to assist in scenarios where agents possess a significant depth of knowl-
edge in various different domains, and where there needs to be spontaneous ability to
produce an efficient abstraction of that knowledge during interaction. Thus any non-
trivial implementation of the portrayal mechanism requires agents with non-trivial data
corpuses. In order to produce the potential arguments necessary for producing a por-
trayal, these agents require access to efficient algorithmsfor abducting new hypotheses
and then interpreting the consequences of those hypothesesgiven prior observations —
basically, fully functional argumentation systems. If merely simulating a multi-agent
system, some concern for the overall practical efficacy of the resulting system of com-
plex agents will also be necessary.
The result of any implementation would be to give additionalconfidence in the
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inherent executability of the portrayal mechanism under a variety of circumstances —
in particular, if the defeasible reasoning processes of individual agents in a multi-agent
system are capable of generating arguments in a real-time syst m, then the portrayal
mechanism should be able to produce potential arguments in support of agents’ beliefs
during interaction. Of course the converse also applies — the portrayal mechanism will
not magically make it feasible to reason at a level of expressivity beyond what an agent
is competent to process. Thus, a direction of further work would be to categorise the
logics best suited for an agent to map their beliefs into in the context of an interaction
portrayal (as mentioned in §7.2).
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis, we explored the use of argumentation as a means to discuss constraints
imposed on multi-agent interaction by an interaction protoc l during interaction. In
particular, we have examined how dialogue between heterogeneous agents with very
different beliefs can be constrained in such a way as to minimise computation whilst
still making adequate use of the distributed knowledge avail ble to peers. This has led
us to specify a distributed logical mechanism by which constrain s on interaction can
be resolved based on collaborative reasoning — a mechanism for portraying interac-
tions which ensures various desirable properties defined for this purpose. With this
mechanism we essentially provide a means for opportunistic, pr oritised belief revi-
sion between heterogeneous agents on demand, wherein beliefs are prioritised based
on how they are seen to bear influence on the outcomes of interactions between those
agents. Thus, this thesis can be distinguished from prior research in two aspects:
• The use of potential argumentation and the reconciliation of argument systems
bridges the gap between the private formulation of beliefs on the part of individ-
ual agents and the mapping of arguments representing those beliefs into a social
argument space.
• The portrayal mechanism operates during an active interaction, responding to
developments in the interaction state, without requiring ay ugmentation of the
protocol to which a portrayed interaction adheres.
In this final chapter, we overview the most notable elements of this thesis’ contribution
(§7.1) and ruminate on possible directions for future research (§7.2).
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7.1 Discussion
Basically, what we desired was a process which could be executed d ring an interaction
which would allow agents to discuss constraints imposed on that interaction before
their resolution, so as to avoid outcomes not justified by thes ate of the system. Such
outcomes might occur because agents are in possession of incomplete information, or
have independently drawn false conclusions from what information is available. If
agents are given motivation to posit claims and arguments during interaction such that
their peers can then correct any perceived fallacies in those claims or arguments, then
it can reasonably be expected that the end conclusion will more likely match objective
reality (where objective constraints are to be evaluated) or communal wisdom (for
more subjective constraints). We wanted to do this without simply relying on replacing
existing interaction protocols with more complex, over-specified variants which then
lose all general applicability.
By relying on the resolution of a distributed argumentationproblem, one which
adapts to the state of the concurrent interaction with whichit is associated, we are
able to generate dialogues discussing constraints and their expected resolutions even
for interactions based on generic, unaugmented protocols.In addition, by allowing the
argumentation process to interface directly with the beliefs of agents, we effectively
perform distributed belief maintenance based on the logical propositions which must
be evaluated in order to resolve those interaction constraits.
In Chapter 2 we formalised the notion of distributed interaction so as to ensure that
we had something concrete to augment with our main contribution:
A concrete formalism for interaction. In order to counteract a perceived vagueness
in artificial agent literature, we provided a formal specification for an arbitrary
interaction and interaction dialogue in §2.1; this was madeuse of in Chapter 5.
An abstract specification of interaction modelling. In §2.2 we defined what we be-
lieved to be the essential forms of an interaction model and an interaction state,
and we described how they related to one another. This provided us a basis on
which to analyse past agent interaction literature, as wellas the ability to for-
mally state the nature of the problem this thesis attempts todeal with.
A process model for distributed interaction. In §2.3 we specified a logical process
model for distributed interaction. This allowed us to identify precisely how the
portrayal mechanism of Chapter 5 interfaced with the interaction being por-
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trayed. This particular model of the interactive process waan adaptation of
the model of linearised peer interaction described in [Robertson et al., 2008].
Its usefulness stemmed from being concrete enough to identify various impor-
tant facets of interaction (initialisation, role adoption, constraint resolution, etc.),
whilst still being abstract enough to be applicable to a number of different im-
plemented systems (distributed versus centralised, pre-determined agent groups
versusad-hocgroupings, etc.).
At the core of our contribution is the idea that social argumentation is primarily a
medium through which arguments can be mapped from one private argumentation
framework to another. In particular, by allowing agents to consider a shared argumen-
tation process with respect to another (possibly more complex) argumentation process
(as embodied by the theory contexts of §3.2.4), we allow agents to draw conclusions
about the argument space in which the shared process is conducted — this is not possi-
ble if one considers an argumentation framework in isolation. We are thus able to infer
whether or not the arguments generated within a shared argument space are balanced
(Definition 4.6), whether or not the shared space is sufficiently expressive (Definition
4.9) and whether or not the arguments within are reconciled with those held privately
by an observer (Definiton 4.10). Ultimately, we can determine whether or not a set
of theories issynchronisedwithin a given argument space (Definition 4.8). Practically
speaking, this allows us to ensure that decisions made within that space are admissible
to all peers. Specifically, in Chapter 3 we made the followingcontributions:
A formal notion of argument space. In §3.2.2 we introduced into this thesis the no-
tion of an argument space, which limits the scope of an argumentation frame-
work by restricting the system of arguments which could be generated within
that framework. This notion underpins our contribution by allowing us to con-
sider the construction of arguments in different argument spaces and ultimately
the transference of arguments between spaces. Whilst argument spaces have al-
ways been tacit in all argumentation frameworks described in the literature, we
have not seen elsewhere argument spaces described explicitly as a component of
an argumentation framework in quite the same form we use here.
An argumentation-based context for agent theories.In §3.2.4 we provided a de-
scription of the context of a theory produced using assumption-based argumen-
tation. By drawing the components of such a context togetherwe are able to
provide a succinct description of the basis for the production (and revision) of
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a theory which allows us to directly map arguments between anage t’s theory
context and a shared argument system, allowing us to define relationships be-
tween an agent’s beliefs and the state of a social argumentatio process more
easily in terms of potential restrictions (or expansions) ito (or out of) different
argument spaces.
A relational notion of potential argument. In §4.1.1 we used the notion of a poten-
tial argument as the basis for mapping arguments from one argument space into
another, more restricted space. We also looked briefly at thereverse case. Such
potential argumentation serves as an implementation-agnostic way to determine
the detail required of arguments articulated within a portrayal as the argument
space of that portrayal is refined.
A notion of argument mapping between contexts.Elaborating upon the prior point,
the notion of argument potential allowed us to describe how sets of arguments
can be mapped into a more restrictive or permissive argumentspace; we con-
sidered both potential restrictions of arguments, and potential expansions. More
generically, this can be seen as a basis for the general mapping of arguments
from one context to another, which we believe to be useful forabstracting or
combining information from different reasoning architectures.
A notion of belief synchronisation. In §4.2 we introduced the notion of belief syn-
chronisation within a given argument space as a basic goal state to which a so-
cial argumentation process can aspire. In essence, synchronisati n ensures that
any claim made by an agent within the chosen argument space will be admis-
sible to all agents given their own beliefs and observations. This is in lieu of
being able to enforce a single common interpretation of arguments on all peers
— instead, we content ourselves with agents making decisions c mpatible with
the available evidence. By limiting the ‘available evidenc’ to a given argument
space, we can limit computation to a reasonable portion of agents’ knowledge
bases, rather than attempt an intensive process of truth mainten nce over multi-
ple (large) belief stores.
A notion of sufficient expressivity in argument spaces.It is important that the argu-
ment space in which synchronisation is tested is useful. An argument space is
sufficiently expressivewith regards to a given agent’s theory if any attacks against
that theory which the agent can counter privately it can counter within that ar-
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gument space. As long as the argument space remains sufficiently expressive,
then it is possible to to synchronise all agents beliefs within at space. It has
been shown in §5.1.3 that a portrayal’s argument space will al ays accept new
arguments such that it becomes sufficiently expressive, even whilst otherwise
attempting to minimise the space.
A notion of argument balance. An alternative approach to ensuring a useful argu-
ment space is to check whether or not the arguments which can be generated
within that space arebalanced(as per Definition 4.6 at the end of §4.1.2). A
system of arguments is balanced with respect to an outside cont xt if any com-
mon premises deemed necessary to ultimately support arguments in the argu-
ment system are made explicit in all such arguments if already explicit in one.
The practical effect of such balancing is to ensure that the base premises on
which any accepted extension of arguments is supported are as independent of
one another as possible, such that any derived theory is a ‘good’ basis for deriv-
ing conclusions about its subject.
A notion of reconciliation between argument systems.The system of arguments in
an agent’s theory context is reconciled with another systemof arguments in a
different context if the other argument system not only reflects the beliefs of the
agent (such that there exists an admissible1 extension of that system which is a
potential restriction of the accepted extension in the agent’s theory context), but
every admissible extension of the other argument system is admissible within
the theory context. It has been shown in §4.2 that if every agent involved in
argumentation is able to reconcile their theory contexts wih the system of argu-
ments generated, then the beliefs of those agents will be synchro ised within that
system’s argument space. Thus reconciliation can be used toachieve synchro-
nisation without requiring knowledge of every peer’s beliefs. This is especially
important for portrayal-augmented interactions which must synchronise agent
beliefs within the argument space of a portrayal.
Having established a notion of a social argument space into which agents could map
arguments constructed privately within their own theory contexts andvice versa, and
having established the criteria by which the quality of sucha space could be evaluated,
it then became necessary for us to put theory into practice.
1In the sense of Definition 3.8.
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An interaction portrayal stored the shared system of arguments generated in dis-
cussing constraints imposed on an interaction. Using localknowledge of the interac-
tion state and the arguments already posited, agents could determine how to map their
beliefs into the portrayal. After any necessary belief revision brought about by the ar-
guments of peers, those agents could then be assured that their beliefs are synchronised
within the argument space of the portrayal. That argument space changes with the in-
teraction state, so perhaps necessitating further discussion. In Chapter 5 we provided
the following:
A formal decision problem for constraint discussion. The portrayal mechanism in-
crementally constructs an argument space for social argumentation in which
agents can synchronise their beliefs. This argument space is focused on the
constraints imposed on interaction by its protocol, and is expanded as neces-
sary to sufficiently describe the conflicts which exist between agents’ favoured
interpretations of the evidence available to each of them. During the process
of reconciliation, agents assimilate new information and defend their (revised)
beliefs, driving the construction of an interaction portrayal and ensuring that all
peers account for the information posited in that portrayal.
A mechanism which operates alongside interaction.The portrayal mechanism ex-
ecutes during an augmented interaction. There is no need to modify any interac-
tion protocol in order to ensure compatibility with interaction portrayals as long
as the logical propositions constituting constraints on interaction can be clearly
identified. This distinguishes this work from one in which agents simply argue
about a set of propositions in isolation.
A mechanism which adapts with the interaction state.As interaction develops, so
does its portrayal. It cannot necessarily be determined in advance which con-
straints out of those which can be extracted from a protocol will apply to the
specific interaction about to unfold. It may also be inefficient to argue about
certain propositions before certain decisions are made (particularly where as-yet
uninstantiated variables are concerned). By portraying aninteraction during its
execution, we can resolve these issues.
A mechanism which operates in a dynamic environment.In §3.2.3 we were able
to provide a simple justification for the use of argumentation in dynamic do-
mains. By noting the lack of practical difference between views of a state and
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multiple states, and by permitting the temporary dismissalof rguments which
contradict observations of the environment, we were able toquickly show that it
is feasible to describe an artefact of many states using a single stable argument
system (as per Definition 5.14). Such a system can simultaneously describe the
different states of the artefact as different admissible ext nsions of the system —
extensions which can be ‘collapsed’ by observation of the enviro ment.
The consequence of this with respect to our portrayal mechanism is that we need
not concern ourselves with changes to the environment during an interaction.
If the state of the world changes such that it impinges upon the portrayal ar-
gument system, then agents can simply observe the contradiction between the
world state and existing arguments, and posit those alternative rguments which
naturally arise under the new state. If the world state should revert, then past ob-
servations can be retracted, and new observations can be made to suppress now
unacceptable arguments. In this fashion is the integrity ofclaims made during
interaction sustained even in a dynamic system.2
A completely distributed mechanism. By choosing to distribute a portrayal amongst
peers such that every agent involved in an interaction has its own portrayal
instance, and by multi-casting each update message to all peers with such in-
stances, we ensure that our mechanism is robust and suitablefor environments
where portrayed interactions are themselves fully decentralised.
Practical argumentation in a minimal space. It is difficult to determine in advance
how large an argument space for social argumentation shouldbe without actu-
ally sharing information between peers. As such, we have takn a policy of
minimalism, permitting expansion where necessary to illustrate where conflicts
exist between admissible claims. Such expansion ensures that the portrayal argu-
ment space always becomes sufficiently expressive (which ensur s that synchro-
nisation within that space is feasible). Expansion is conducted in a disciplined
fashion, so as to keep the arguments in a portrayal as small aspossible.
A mechanism which ensures reconciliation.The portrayal mechanism operates by
requiring agents to respond to certain events under certainconditions; these re-
2It should be noted that this only has bearing to the interpretation of the portrayal, and not on de-
cisions already made during interaction as prescribed by the interaction protocol, which agents have
already executed. If the environment changes such that a past commitment is untenable, then agents
can only respond as permitted by the protocol, though it may be possible in limited circumstances to
backtrack [Osman, 2003].
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sponses then generate messages to which their peers can respo d. It has been
shown that the invocation of operations constituting the portrayal mechanism
will lead an agent to the reconciliation of its theory context with the portrayal
argument system. As long as all agents act according to specification, we can
thus ensure synchronisation with the portrayal argument space. If the portrayal
space changes, then agents will re-reconcile.
Opportunistic belief revision on demand. Whilst superficially one might consider
an interaction portrayal to be the artefact by which decision are made during
interaction, the reality is that it is merely a vessel for influencing the private
beliefs of agents — agents still make decisions based on their beliefs and their
beliefs alone. As mentioned many times prior to this, the effct of portraying an
interaction is to perform a kind of distributed truth mainteance procedure across
the set of agents involved in an interaction, focused only onth se beliefs which
can be seen to have bearing on the resolution of interaction constraints. Thus,
what we have is a partial solution to the problem of how to reconcile inconsisten-
cies between agent beliefs where attaining joint consistency is computationally
intractable — we focus only on what is immediately important, and we decide
this based on the interactions that agents choose to engage in.
A demonstration of potential argumentation in a practical system. Last but not at
all least, the logical specification of the portrayal mechanism as a means to dis-
cuss constraints on interaction acts an example of potential argumentation and
argument mapping put into practical use. The idea of mappingarguments be-
tween different contexts, and of combining the beliefs of agents within a limited
space (so as to abstract aside irrelevant details) is applied here to the task of en-
suring that decisions made during interaction by agents arem de with the best
information which can be practically made available given computational con-
straints.
Insomuch as this section has described our achievements, itow befalls us to discuss
the work undone.
7.2 Future Work
Despite the contributions described in the previous section, here still exist a number
of possible ways to expand upon this thesis. Broadly speaking, we can further develop
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upon potential argumentation and the mapping of arguments from one framework to
another, we can refine the portrayal mechanism, or we can perform further empirical
experiments in order to better demonstrate how theory translates into practice.
Experimentation would primarily concern itself with the influence of portrayals
over an extended period, or with measuring the usefulness ofportrayals given different
logics:
Evaluate systems of interaction rather than individual interactions. In this thesis
we have limited ourselves to considering the effect of portraying interactions
in isolation. We have not engaged in a significant evaluationof the influence
of portrayals across multiple interactions over an extended period. There are a
number of directions we could take such evaluation:
• We can seed an agent system with a mix of false and true information,
and see if portrayals accelerate the process of purging the fals information
through discussion motivated by interaction.
• We can distribute tasks amongst agents which require interaction and pro-
vide only incomplete information to each peer such that we can then mea-
sure if portraying interactions allows agents to more quickly attain their
goal states.
• We can provide a group of agents with a task which requires information
which is not available to them; we can then test the abductiveapabilities of
agents and test the ability of portrayals to rectify inconsistencies between
abductions at the point of interaction.
In any case, care must be taken as to the construction of experiments such that
they are representative of real systems. The great difficulty of reasoning-driven
agent systems research is the production of exemplar systems which possess
the qualities and complexity of the kind of system the research is envisaged to
assist. It is uncertain as to whether the toy problems often us d in the literature
to evaluate new models truly model average scenarios in manyc ses.
Evaluate interaction portrayals which use different logics. Whilst our treatment of
argumentation and potential argumentation has been kept mostly abstract, ex-
amples have focused on propositional or first-order predicate lculus. There
are of course other logical formalisms, such as descriptionlogics and higher or-
der logics on two different extremes. It would be instructive to perform further
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experimentation on the use of portrayals in domains described by such logics.
Such experimentation would allow us to better evaluate whether portrayals are
more suitable for more expressive logics for instance, or whether the value of
portrayals is invariant to the complexity of the underlyinglo ic and more linked
to the volume of information expressed in the logic.
In tandem with further work into mapping arguments between different argu-
mentation frameworks with different underlying logics, itwould also be instruc-
tive to consider the use of portrayals where agents privately use different logics
for internal reasoning. What interim logical formalism should a portrayal use?
Is it more important that portrayal logic be at least as expressiv as the logics
used privately by agents, or that portrayal logic be no more expressive than the
least expressive logic formalism used by a peer in an interaction?
Study the propagation of beliefs in multi-agent systems.One possibility we enter-
tained in the first chapter was the idea that portrayal of multiple concurrent in-
teractions would permit the transfer of information between interactions via a
shared peer, such that the portrayal of one interaction would almost incidentally
influence the outcome of the other interaction. It was felt that such unsolicited
information dissemination was indicative of the strengthening of societal bonds
within a particular agent group. Of great interest would be if there was some
possibility of deriving a calculus of unsolicited information flow through an in-
teracting agent system, such that we could better understand how dialogue pro-
duces a ‘common culture’ of assumptions amongst agents.
Alternatively, we can consider the process model for portrayal construction and main-
tenance, and consider how to make it more useful in a wider range of actual multi-agent
systems:
Make the portrayal mechanism more robust. As specified in Chapter 5, the por-
trayal mechanism is distributed and asynchronous — insomuch as it considers
the possibility of messages arriving out of order. The specificat on does not how-
ever consider the possibility of messages (or agents) beinglost or of responses
timing out. To a certain extent, this is the province of specific implementations
and in particular of the networking protocol used underneath the logical layer
at which our contribution operates. On the other hand, theredoes need to be
contingencies in place for when individual agents become unable to continue
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their contribution to a portrayal if their peers are to be able to continue (and fin-
ish) the interaction by themselves (of course, the primary interaction has to be
completable without the missing agent, which is hardly a given).
Another thing to note is that we have assumed a mesh topology fr agents,
wherein every agent can be (and is) contacted by every other agent. It may
be that other topologies may be more efficient in different circumstances. For
example, a ring topology (where messages are passed around fr m one agent to
another until they reach their originator) would remove theissue of mis-ordered
messages, but would present an alternative issue of being very sensitive to agent
failure.
Account for malicious or incompetent agents.It is assumed throughout this thesis
that the agents engaged in an interaction are sincere and competent, such that
any arguments made by an agent represent genuine considerations on its part and
are posited into a portrayal in accordance with the rules given by the portrayal
specification. Of course, this might not actually be the case. In question then, is
how to modify the portrayal mechanism such that agents are unable or at least
unwilling to act treacherously. Undoubtedly, this would require an additional
level of verification and validation to be built into the portrayal mechanism which
would increase complexity noticeably. In particular, there would need to be
a means by which agents can identify an unruly peer and dismiss it from the
portrayal (if not necessarily the interaction to which a portrayal is attached), so
that its (faulty) contribution need no longer be considered.
Identify socially optimal interpretations of portrayal ar guments. Throughout this
thesis we have made the case that peers cannot dictate to a given agent its own
beliefs, and thus if multiple admissible interpretations of a given portrayal argu-
ment system exist, then there is no justifiable basis on whichto force communal
selection of any one of those interpretations. Whilst we stand by this case, it
is still possible that it may be advantageous, given no better reason to choose
one interpretation over another, for an agent to submit to peer ressure in cer-
tain circumstances. In [Rahwan and Larson, 2008], a study ismade of ‘socially
optimal’ interpretation of argument systems — perhaps there are grounds for an
agent to (voluntarily) favour a socially optimal interpretation over another when
taking decisions in the interaction to which a portrayal is attached. This does
not necessarily commit it to accepting that interpretationprivately outside the
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interaction though.
Finally, we can step back from concerning ourselves with interaction portrayals them-
selves, and further explore the underlying notions of potential argumentation and ar-
gument mapping applied by the portrayal mechanism:
Explore argument mappings between more different contexts. The foremost con-
cern when mapping arguments between different contexts in this thesis has been
with different argument spaces, with only limited attentiogiven to different
underlying logical frameworks. What attention that has been given has been
focused on to what extent certain facts and rules can be subsumed by the frame-
work. It would be of great interest to consider how argumentscan be abstracted
or restructured to fit into alternative contexts, and to consider how an argument
admissible in one context may justifiably be inadmissible inanother (orvice
versa).
Study optimal argument spaces in different circumstances.The argument space in
which an argumentation framework produces arguments determin s which con-
flicting hypotheses an argumentation process will explore.In isolation, there is
little we can say about the quality of a given argument space,except perhaps
whether or not it describes aflat framework [Bondarenko et al., 1997]. Given
an outside context however, we can draw further conclusions. We have already
considered whether a given argument space is sufficiently expressive given an
agent’s standing beliefs, and we have considered whether the system of argu-
ments which can be generated within a given argument space under a given log-
ical framework is balanced. Other qualities which might be required of a ‘good’
argument space may include the ability to prove that peers will notbe able to in-
fer certain things from the mapping of arguments into a restricted space (which
might be useful where sensitive information is concerned).More work could
also be done to permit us a more complete understanding ofwhena particular
property is important for argument spaces under what conditi s.
Research an improved notion of argument refinement.For the most part, in this
thesis we have considered arguments abstractly. Even wherewe look at the in-
ternal structure of arguments, we treat logical sentences as base assumptions or
claims. Thus, if a given sentence is unacceptable as a whole,we reject the sen-
tence entirely, and any variant of a given sentence is treated as a wholly differ-
ent sentence. In practice, this is a rather clumsy approach to assumption-based
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argumentation which forces the propagation of many similararguments when
debatably the more pragmatic approach would be to refine an existing argument.
In [Carbogim, 2001], a number of schemata are specified for the modification of
existing sentences in a theory in response to different attacks gainst that theory
— an interesting project on the implementational side of this esis would be to
integrate such schemata into the workings of the portrayal mechanism such that
a more subtle refinement of the portrayal space is then engaged in. This would
have the effect of producing smaller argument spaces by permitting a finer grain
of reconciliation between the portrayal and each agent’s theory context.
Consider the opportunistic merging of interactions by peers. It has been assumed
that interactions are instigated by a single agent. It is posible however for agents
to instigate separate interactions, with distinct protocols, which might then be
merged into a single interaction upon convergence of interes s. A simple exam-
ple would be one where there exists a server agent and a clientag — the client
agent initiates a new interaction requesting a service fromthe server, whilst the
server might be engaged in another interaction which is driven by such service
requests. Whilst these interactions can be kept separate, it is possible that upon
receiving a request, the protocols for both interactions could be merged by the
server — consider the benefits of the client needing only a vestigial description
of the server role, and the server only needing a vestigial description of the client
role, with a combined protocol describing the ‘true’ interaction. In such a case,
both agents will have conceived portrayals independently,and these portrayals
will need to be merged along with their parent interactions.
It is apparent then that there is still work to be done if the portrayal mechanism, or
something very like it, is to be deployed in a real-world system. Nevertheless, even
if interaction portrayals arenot ever implemented in the form described in this thesis,
the concepts underpinning them remain generically useful as a basis by which to un-
derstand how dialogue between agents creates a social argument space which exists in
the intersection of agents’ private belief models. This is important for understanding
how heteorogeneous information sources interact at the level of inference rather than
merely ontology, and is itself a basis for understanding howabstractions of knowledge
domains can be constructed collectively by peers with access to different types and lev-
els of expertise (and of course, possibly conflicting beliefs which must be reconciled).
Returning specifically to the contribution of this thesis however, what we have
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demonstrated is that using argumentation to discuss an interaction during its own exe-
cution is a viable strategy for improving the ability of intelligent agents to actually use
that intelligence in dialogue. Agents can engage in interacion according to concise
protocols with easily recognisable results and still engage in sophisticated debate with-
out sacrificing basic executional feasibility or relinquishing their autonomy to over-
elaborate dialogue models. Such debate allows for agents todi seminate knowledge
and test their beliefs against those of peers, which should then allow agents to make
more informed decisions based on the collective wisdom of peers, rather than simply
with whatever knowledge they happened to have or not have prior to interaction. Intu-
itively, more informed decisions should lead to better outcmes for an interaction with
respect to the intended purpose of that interaction.
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